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Abstract 
The ultimate goal of language comprehension is to obtain meaning. However, this is 
difficult because many words are semantically ambiguous, mapping onto multiple 
meanings. Semantic ambiguity resolution has proven a useful tool to investigate 
language processing in general. However, the majority of research has focused on 
the initial encounter of an ambiguous word. Less work has investigated the 
processes occurring after an ambiguous word is encountered, when the initially 
understood meaning needs to be reinterpreted in light of subsequent inconsistent 
information.  
The first part of this thesis investigated the cognitive processes underlying semantic 
reinterpretation, examining how successful listeners are at this process as well as 
assessing the time course of suppressing and integrating the contextually 
inappropriate and appropriate meanings respectively. A semantic relatedness task 
was employed in which participants listened to ambiguous and unambiguous 
sentences and decided whether a following visual probe word was related or 
unrelated to the sentence. The results revealed that listeners are highly effective at 
reinterpretation but that suppression of the inappropriate meaning is delayed relative 
to integration of the appropriate meaning. The rest of the thesis examined the neural 
responses to these sentences by using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). The fMRI study demonstrated 
ambiguity-elevated responses in left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) and posterior 
temporal cortex. These responses were modulated by the frequency of the 
ambiguous word’s meanings, such that activation was greater for sentences with a 
higher likelihood of reinterpretation. The final study developed a TMS paradigm to 
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examine whether LIFG is necessary for this process, demonstrating evidence that 
this region may be important for sentence processing more generally. Together, this 
thesis has advanced understanding into the cognitive and neural processes 
underlying semantic reinterpretation that have various implications for models of 
ambiguity resolution and language comprehension in general.  
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
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1.1 Semantic Ambiguity Resolution 
The purpose of language is to convey meaning, enabling the efficient sharing of 
information, knowledge and experiences. However, understanding the meaning of 
an utterance is computationally complex on many levels. One difficulty is that many 
words do not have a single meaning but refer to several, sometimes completely 
unrelated, concepts, such as “bark” which refers to the sound that a dog makes as 
well as to the material from a tree trunk. Thus, listeners must frequently use 
contextual information to discern which meaning is intended by the speaker, while 
ensuring that their understanding of the word and ongoing discourse is not affected 
by its alternative, irrelevant, meanings.   
Understanding the processes underlying semantic disambiguation is important to 
develop comprehensive theories of language comprehension for several reasons. 
Semantic disambiguation is a fundamental part of everyday communication. 
Semantically ambiguous words are abundant in natural language, representing the 
rule rather than the exception. Their ubiquity has been confirmed in calculations of 
the number words in a standard dictionary that have multiple definitions. For 
example, Rodd et al. (2002) estimated that at least 80% of English words are 
ambiguous based on entries in the Wordsmyth dictionary (Parks, Ray, & Bland, 
1998). Additionally, current words continue to acquire new meanings which will need 
to be dealt with by the comprehension system (Rodd, Berriman, et al., 2012). For 
example, “twitter”, “tablet”, “spam”, “window”, “blackberry” and many more have 
been adopted by novel technological concepts. Moreover, ambiguous words have 
been of great interest to cognitive psychologists for over forty years (e.g., K. S. 
Binder & Morris, 2011; Foss, 1970; Leinenger & Rayner, 2013; Mackay, 1966; 
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Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rodd, Lopez Cutrin, Kirsch, Millar, & Davis, 2013; Simpson, 
1981; Swinney, 1979; Twilley & Dixon, 2000; Vu, Kellas, & Paul, 1998) because 
these words provide a window into fundamental cognitive processes, such as 
selection, inhibition and contextual integration. Such research has led to important 
and influential insights into the language comprehension system, including 
contributing key evidence in favour of both modular and interactive accounts of 
lexical access (e.g., Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988; Swinney, 1979; Twilley & Dixon, 
2000; Vu et al., 1998), elucidating factors that affect meaning access and integration 
(e.g., Rayner, Pacht, & Duffy, 1994; Sereno, O'Donnell, & Rayner, 2006; Simpson, 
1994; Twilley & Dixon, 2000; Vu et al., 1998) and demonstrating the fluidity of 
fundamental lexical properties such as meaning frequency (Rodd et al., 2013).  
Understanding into the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying ambiguity 
resolution has been considerably advanced by examining how ambiguous words are 
processed within sentences (Simpson, 1994). Sentences provide a window into 
natural ambiguity resolution since ambiguous words are usually encountered in 
these contexts. In addition, sentence comprehension not only requires the 
perception and identification of an ambiguous word, but, critically, also requires the 
disambiguation of its meaning. The latter is, arguably, the most fundamental part of 
ambiguity resolution since it is essential for successful communication.   
1.2 Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Semantic Ambiguity Resolution 
A wealth of behavioural research converges on several key cognitive processes that 
underlie both the processing and disambiguation of an ambiguous word during 
sentence comprehension. These may be broadly categorised into those associated 
 17 
 
with initial meaning access, initial meaning selection and semantic reinterpretation 
(Duffy et al., 1988; Rodd, Johnsrude, & Davis, 2010; Simpson, 1994; Twilley & 
Dixon, 2000).  
1.2.1 Initial Meaning Access 
Early, strict, “exhaustive access” models of semantic ambiguity resolution argued 
that when an ambiguous word is encountered during a sentence (e.g., “the man 
went to the bank…”) all of its meanings are automatically accessed regardless of 
contextual information or meaning frequency (also known as meaning dominance) 
(Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Swinney, 1979). This assumption was primarily supported 
by cross-modal semantic priming studies in which participants made lexical 
decisions to, or named, visual probe words that followed the ambiguous word (e.g., 
Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Bienkowski, 1982; 
Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Seidenberg, 1979). The consistent finding 
was that when the probe was presented immediately after the ambiguous word, 
responses were faster for probes that were semantically related to either meaning of 
the ambiguous word compared to unrelated probes. Critically, priming occurred 
even when context preceding the ambiguous word biased its meaning (e.g., “the 
accountant went to the bank…) and regardless of whether it corresponded to the 
highly frequent (i.e., dominant) meaning or its less frequent (subordinate) meaning. 
The finding that neither contextual bias nor frequency affected initial meaning 
access was interpreted as evidence that accessing multiple meanings is the one of 
the primary, automatic stages of ambiguity resolution.   
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However, subsequent priming studies called into question the automaticity of such 
an exhaustive access process, with the finding that only one meaning of an 
ambiguous was primed in certain sentence contexts (e.g., Glucksberg, Kreuz, & 
Rho, 1986; Simpson & Krueger, 1991; Tabossi, 1988; Tabossi, Colombo, & Job, 
1987; Tabossi & Zardon, 1993). For example, in a set of experiments, Tabossi and 
colleagues found that only the contextually appropriate meaning was primed if it was 
the dominant meaning and if the context was strongly semantically constraining 
such that it highlighted distinguishing features of that meaning (e.g., “the violent 
hurricane did not damage the ships which were in the port, one of the best equipped 
along the coast”) (Tabossi, 1988; Tabossi et al., 1987; Tabossi & Zardon, 1993). 
Eye-movement research further demonstrated that even in neutral contexts multiple 
meanings may not be activated equally as suggested in exhaustive access models 
(K. S. Binder & Morris, 1995; Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rayner & 
Frazier, 1989). Such studies showed that readers were just as fast at reading 
ambiguous words than unambiguous words in neutral sentences when the 
ambiguous word had one more dominant meaning (i.e., biased words such as 
“bank”). It was only when the ambiguous words’ had relatively equally frequent 
meanings (i.e., balanced words such as “bark”) that readers fixated on them longer 
than unambiguous, or biased ambiguous, words. These results suggested that, for 
biased words, their alternative meanings were not activated equally in parallel; 
otherwise these words should have incurred an ambiguity-related reading cost.  
Together these sets of results contributed to the development of various influential 
theories of semantic ambiguity resolution. For example, the reordered access model 
(Duffy, Kambe, & Rayner, 2001; Duffy et al., 1988) argues that both frequency and 
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contextual bias specifically influence the rate at which the alternative meanings of an 
ambiguous word are accessed. Under this view, in neutral contexts, biased words 
do not incur processing costs because dominant meanings become available more 
quickly than subordinate meanings and thus can be immediately integrated into 
sentence comprehension like the meanings of unambiguous words.  The current 
general consensus in the ambiguity literature is that the extent to which multiple 
meanings are accessed depends on a combination of contextual bias, contextual 
strength and meaning frequency although the weight given to these factors varies 
across models (e.g., Duffy et al., 2001; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 
1994; Simpson, 1994; Twilley & Dixon, 2000).  
Although the precise influence of these factors and their interactions on meaning 
access is still being investigated (e.g., Colbert-Getz & Cook, 2013; Leinenger & 
Rayner, 2013; Sheridan & Reingold, 2012; Sheridan, Reingold, & Daneman, 2009) 
there are two combinations of sentence context and meaning frequency that seem 
to consistently induce multiple meanings to be accessed or, at least, accessed at 
the same rate. Evidence of exhaustive access, as measured by priming or increased 
reading times, is typically found for balanced words when they are encountered in 
neutral contexts (e.g., “the man thought the bark was going to…”). This has been 
argued to reflect the fact that neither frequency nor contextual information is 
available to influence initial meaning access (K. S. Binder & Morris, 1995; Duffy et 
al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979). The second 
case concerns biased words. Both dominant and subordinate meanings of a word 
are often found to be accessed when the preceding context supports the 
subordinate meaning (e.g., “the ecologist went to the bank…”) (e.g., Colbert-Getz & 
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Cook, 2013; Duffy et al., 1988; Kambe, Rayner, & Duffy, 2001; Rayner & Duffy, 
1986; Sereno et al., 2006; Sheridan et al., 2009; Tabossi et al., 1987; Tabossi & 
Zardon, 1993). According to the reordered access model, in these sentences, both 
meanings are simultaneously accessed because the context boosts activation of the 
subordinate meaning while the higher frequency of the dominant meaning causes it 
to become available at the same time (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988).   
1.2.2 Initial Meaning Selection 
The early priming studies that demonstrated access of multiple meanings also 
produced evidence suggesting that listeners do not maintain these meanings for 
long but make a rapid selection within a few hundred milliseconds of encountering 
an ambiguous word (e.g., Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus et al., 
1979). This conclusion was based on the finding that priming became restricted to 
targets related to only one meaning of the word when the target was presented 3 
syllables or 200 ms after the ambiguous word. Interestingly, such rapid initial 
selection was found even for balanced words in neutral contexts, suggesting that 
listeners do not maintain alternative possible interpretations until disambiguating 
context is encountered but integrate one meaning into their current understanding of 
the discourse (Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979). Seidenberg et al. (1982) 
proposed that such selection may occur because of limited processing capacity. 
Subsequent eye-movement research, however, demonstrated that initial meaning 
selection can also be a cognitively demanding process, particularly for balanced 
words that are encountered before disambiguating information (K. S. Binder & 
Morris, 1995; Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rayner & Frazier, 1989). 
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Such studies found that readers fixated longer on balanced words than biased or 
unambiguous words when contextual information was delayed until later in the 
sentence. As well as being interpreted as evidence that multiple meanings are 
activated for balanced words, this reading cost was also argued to reflect a 
processing difficulty associated with selecting a meaning when neither frequency 
nor context can substantially constrain this process. It is possible that the processing 
cost may actually reflect difficulty in maintaining multiple meanings rather than in 
making the selection. However, semantic priming studies provide corroborating 
evidence for the latter, showing that only one meaning of balanced words still shows 
priming after a few hundred milliseconds of the ambiguous word being presented, 
suggesting that, even for these words, one meaning is selected relatively quickly 
(Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979).  
Nevertheless, not all researchers support the notion of initial meaning selection in 
the absence of biasing information, arguing, instead, that multiple meanings of 
balanced words in particular are maintained in working memory during sentence 
comprehension (Mason & Just, 2007; Miyake, Just, & Carpenter, 1994). This view 
has been defended by the finding that (high-span) readers show no difficulty reading 
disambiguating information that follows an ambiguous word, which was argued to 
reflect the ready availability of both meanings (Miyake et al., 1994). Yet, this result is 
open to another interpretation that is still compatible with the initial selection 
account. High-span readers may show no reading cost merely because they are 
efficient at reinterpreting the meaning of sentence rather than because they have 
maintained both meanings (Twilley & Dixon, 2000). Twilley and Dixon (2000) 
provide support for this hypothesis through various computer simulations of their 
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independent activation model of ambiguity resolution. Their simulations show that 
when an ambiguous word is encountered, one meaning is quickly selected and, 
critically, the alternative meaning can be rapidly reactivated if the subsequent 
context is inconsistent with the initial selection and weighted strongly enough. 
Another reason to be doubtful that meanings are maintained is the fact that 
numerous studies do show that both listeners and readers experience processing 
costs when encountering disambiguating information late in a sentence such as “fish 
in this stream” in the sentence “usually the bank is not the place to start if you want 
to catch a fish in this stream” (henceforth referred to as late-disambiguation 
sentences). For example, readers fixate longer on these sections in ambiguous 
sentences than in unambiguous sentences (Duffy et al., 1988; Kambe et al., 2001; 
Rayner & Duffy, 1986) and listeners are slower at performing a visual task when it is 
concurrent to hearing disambiguating information during an ambiguous than 
unambiguous sentence (Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010). Such costs are argued to 
reflect the premature selection of an incorrect meaning that needs to undergo a 
cognitively demanding reinterpretation process when the disambiguating information 
is encountered. Consistent with the initial selection view, processing difficulty is 
specifically found for contexts that correspond to subordinate meanings as well as 
for sentences containing balanced words (Duffy et al., 1988; Kambe et al., 2001; 
Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rayner & Frazier, 1989). Those are the two types of 
ambiguous sentences for which the contextually inappropriate meaning is likely to 
be initially selected on many trials (Duffy et al., 1988; Simpson, 1994; Twilley & 
Dixon, 2000). For the former, frequency information will strongly bias the incorrect, 
dominant meaning to be selected. For the latter, the incorrect meaning will be 
selected on a substantial, but smaller, amount of trials as there is no systematic 
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frequency bias for a particular meaning, causing it to be selected on approximately 
half the trials.  
Together this body of research strongly corroborates the original conclusion from 
priming studies that a single meaning is initially selected after an ambiguous word is 
encountered even in the absence of biasing context. The exact fate of the non-
selected meaning, however, is uncertain. For example, non-selected meanings may 
be completely suppressed (Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; MacDonald et al., 1994) 
or retain a low level of activation (McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998).   
1.2.3 Semantic Reinterpretation 
As briefly mentioned, one consequence of not waiting for disambiguating information 
before making a selection is that the selected meaning may turn out to be incorrect. 
As a result, it will need to be reinterpreted when information is heard that is 
inconsistent with that interpretation. However, semantic reinterpretation has 
received substantially little research focus compared to the initial meaning and 
selection processes. Yet, it is an equally important area of research as it provides a 
window into the flexibility of semantic representations generated during 
comprehension and the operations underlying this process.  
Research to date provides a converging body of work demonstrating that 
reinterpretation is a cognitively demanding process, as evinced by various 
aforementioned behavioural processing costs (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Kambe et al., 
2001; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010). Researchers generally 
agree that this cost reflects time required to suppress the incorrect meaning (e.g., 
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finance meaning of “bank”) and (re)activate the contextually appropriate meaning of 
the ambiguous word (e.g., “river” meaning) (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; 
Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). However, this is the extent of 
understanding into this process. Amongst the many unknown details, it is unclear 
what is the time course of meaning reactivation and suppression during semantic 
reinterpretation or the extent to which listeners can fully revise and update their 
understanding of an ambiguous word and the sentence to which it occurs. The first 
part of this thesis (Chapter 2) focused on this under-examined aspect of ambiguity 
resolution, presenting three behavioural experiments which revealed insightful 
findings about both the time course and effectiveness of semantic reinterpretation.    
1.3 Neural Mechanisms Underlying Semantic Ambiguity Resolution  
The long history of psycholinguistic research into semantic ambiguity resolution 
provides a well-informed cognitive foundation to examine the neural basis 
underlying this process. As reviewed above, it is clear that understanding the correct 
meaning of an ambiguous word entails numerous cognitive processes that ultimately 
requires the successful integration of contextual and lexical sources of information. 
Thus, understanding the neural circuitry underlying these processes may provide 
important insights into how high-level semantic processing is instantiated in the 
brain.    
Neural research into semantic ambiguity resolution has greatly advanced in the 
recent decade due to the substantial development of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) as a technique that enables the network-level assessment of brain 
regions engaged during cognitive tasks (e.g., Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd, Davis, & 
 25 
 
Johnsrude, 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, & Davis, 2012; Rodd, Longe, Randall, & Tyler, 
2010; Zempleni, Renken, Hoeks, Hoogduin, & Stowe, 2007). The increasingly 
consistent finding from these fMRI studies is that processing semantically 
ambiguous sentences is supported by a relatively specific set of frontal and temporal 
brain regions. The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) and posterior middle/inferior 
temporal cortex have particularly been highlighted. A review of this literature is 
presented in Chapter 3. However, because of the relative infancy of such research, 
many fundamental aspects of these neural responses are uncertain. It is unclear 
what the precise functional roles and mechanisms underlying these regions are. To 
what extent are these regions related to the specific cognitive processes highlighted 
in psycholinguistic models of ambiguity resolution such as initial meaning access, 
initial selection and semantic reinterpretation? What is the relationship between the 
neural basis of ambiguity resolution and sentence comprehension more generally?  
For example, do semantic ambiguities place extra demand on brain regions already 
involved in sentence comprehension or do they recruit additional regions?  In 
addition, to date there has been no investigation of the inter-subject variability of 
neural responses to semantic ambiguity. This is important as these ambiguity 
responses have been used as a marker of high-level comprehension in individual 
patients (Coleman et al., 2009; Coleman et al., 2007). The second part of this thesis 
(Chapter 3) focuses on a number of these questions. An fMRI study is presented 
that focuses on the neural responses to initial selection and semantic 
reinterpretation demands by exploiting the psycholinguistic finding that ambiguous 
words with either two equally frequent meanings or one dominant meaning load 
differently onto these processes. This study also examines the relationship between 
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ambiguous and unambiguous sentence responses as well as inspected inter-subject 
variability of the ambiguity-elevated network.   
Despite the important insights that can be revealed by fMRI work, these findings are 
unavoidably limited in their ability to indicate whether the activated brain regions are 
causally involved in the cognitive task. This is because fMRI, like many other 
neuroimaging techniques, is a correlational measure of brain activity, measuring 
neural processes that occur during a task. As a result, it cannot distinguish between 
the responses that are necessary for the task from those that are merely a by-
product of the task. Consequently, based on fMRI research alone, it is unclear the 
extent to which the frontal and temporal neural responses to semantic ambiguities 
are serving critical roles in the processing and resolution of their meaning. Some 
preliminary insights into this question come from patients who have suffered brain 
damage. Such research has primarily examined the effect of frontal lobe damage on 
semantic ambiguity processing (e.g., Grindrod, 2012; Hagoort, 1993; Milberg, 
Blumstein, & Dworetzky, 1987; Swaab, Brown, & Hagoort, 2003; Swinney, Zurif, & 
Nicol, 1989; Vuong & Martin, 2011). The converging finding is that patients differ in 
their behavioural performance on ambiguity tasks compared to neurologically 
healthy adults. Although the exact pattern of differences is not consistent across 
studies, these constitute support that frontal cortex may play a necessary role in 
normal ambiguity processing.  
However, there are many well-known and uncontrollable difficulties of patient 
research that limit the precise interpretations that can be drawn from their results. 
For example, brain damage is often large and varies extensively across patients, 
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there is usually no record of patients’ pre-morbid ability and behavioural 
performance may be confounded by cortical reorganisation (Price & Crinion, 2005). 
Thus, the final part of this thesis (Chapter 4 and 5) uses Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS) to investigate the causal role of one region of the ambiguity 
network, the LIFG. Because TMS is a non-invasive technique, it can be used on 
neurological healthy adults to examine relatively focal regions of interest, 
overcoming many of the problems associated with patient data (Devlin & Watkins, 
2007; Walsh & Cowey, 2000).  
1.4 Summary of Experimental Work 
In summary, this thesis investigates three aspects of semantic ambiguity resolution. 
The cognitive process underlying semantic reinterpretation is examined using a 
novel experimental paradigm that enables assessment of both the time course of 
meaning activation/suppression and how effective this process is. The second 
section examines the neural basis of semantic ambiguity resolution by using fMRI. 
Specifically, this study assesses the functional roles of ambiguity-responsive brain 
regions, with a focus on initial selection and semantic reinterpretation demands, as 
well as examines how consistent the ambiguity network is across subjects. Finally, 
the third section develops a novel TMS paradigm to assess the causal role of the 
LIFG in semantic reinterpretation.  
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Chapter 2 Semantic Reinterpretation: Its Effectiveness and 
Time Course 
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2.1 Introduction 
The majority of cognitive studies on semantic ambiguity resolution have focused on 
the event of encountering an ambiguous word and how preceding context affects its 
processing. Such research has provided important insights into several aspects of 
the language system, including factors that affect meaning access and integration 
(e.g., Colbert-Getz & Cook, 2013; Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; 
Seidenberg et al., 1982; Sereno et al., 2006; Simpson, 1981; Swinney, 1979; 
Tabossi, 1988; Twilley & Dixon, 2000; Vu et al., 1998) and shown evidence of the 
fluid nature of lexical properties (Rodd et al., 2013). Considerably less work, 
however, has examined the processes occurring after an ambiguous word is 
encountered, when a listener or reader needs to reinterpret their understanding of 
the word upon encountering contextual information that is inconsistent with their 
initial interpretation of its meaning. This area of research is important for developing 
comprehensive models of language as it may reveal the extent to which semantic 
representations generated during comprehension can be flexibly updated and the 
operations underlying this process. 
2.1.1 Current Account of Semantic Reinterpretation 
Semantic reinterpretation is an underspecified feature of models of semantic 
ambiguity resolution. This is surprising considering that various influential models, 
such as exhaustive access theories (e.g., Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Seidenberg et 
al., 1982; Swinney, 1979), reordered access model (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 
1988)  explicitly assume that a single meaning is rapidly selected after encountering 
an ambiguous word even in the absence of disambiguating information. The 
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selection assumption necessarily implies that an incorrect meaning may be 
prematurely selected during comprehension that will need reinterpretation if it turns 
out to be inappropriate. Specifying this reinterpretation process is, furthermore, 
important because initial selection seems to be a fundamental part of semantic 
ambiguity resolution during sentence contexts. As discussed in the general 
introduction, numerous behavioural studies have found that even for words with 
equally frequent meanings (e.g., “bark”) only one interpretation is favoured in neutral 
contexts (e.g., K. S. Binder & Morris, 1995; Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; 
Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979). Such a selection process may be the 
result of a limited processing capacity to store alternative interpretations 
(Seidenberg et al., 1982) and/or may be the result of a highly efficient system that 
integrates and weights sources of information with the effect that a single 
interpretation is maintained higher than alternatives in seemingly “neutral” contexts 
(MacDonald et al., 1994).  
It must be noted that the term “selected” does not necessarily mean that the non-
selected meaning becomes fully deactivated. Indeed there is little consensus about 
the precise fate of the non-selected meaning. Many models do assume full 
deactivation of the non-preferred meaning due to various mechanisms such as 
passive decay (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; Twilley & Dixon, 2000), active 
suppression (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; Twilley & 
Dixon, 2000), mutual exclusivity of meanings with lateral inhibition from the selected 
meaning (MacDonald et al., 1994), or computational constraints that allow only one 
set of semantic features to be represented (Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 
2004). Other authors, however, argue that, whilst non-selected meanings are 
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suppressed in the left hemisphere, they are maintained in the right hemisphere in 
case reinterpretation is needed (e.g., Faust & Chiarello, 1998; Faust & Gernsbacher, 
1996). Still other models assume some residual activation may remain (McRae et 
al., 1998). Despite these differences in perspective, there is agreement that non-
preferred meanings lose activation when an alternative is selected, which highlights 
the need of a reinterpretation mechanism that can later re-activate an incorrectly 
disregarded meaning.  However, the operations underlying this process have 
received relatively little research attention.   
Amongst the various models of semantic ambiguity processing, only the reordered 
access model (Duffy et al., 1988) attempts to describe semantic reinterpretation. 
According to this model, it is a “time consuming” process (Duffy et al., 1988 p. 440) 
that entails both accessing/integrating the contextually appropriate meaning and 
suppressing the incorrect meaning. For example, when reading the late-
disambiguation sentence “usually the bank is not the place to start if you want to 
catch a fish in this stream”, readers may first interpret “bank” as a financial institution 
but will have to suppress this interpretation when encountering the last part of the 
sentence and integrate the river bank meaning instead. This view is based upon 
eye-movement research showing that readers require extra time to read 
disambiguating information in late-disambiguation sentences than in unambiguous 
sentences and, critically, that this ambiguity cost is largest when the disambiguating 
information biases the subordinate meaning of a biased ambiguous word (Duffy et 
al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rayner & Frazier, 1989). Biased words are the 
types of ambiguous words for which eye-movement and priming research strongly 
converge on the finding that the dominant meaning is selected in the absence of 
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preceding biasing context and, thus, will need reinterpretation when subordinate-
biased context is later encountered (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; 
Rayner & Frazier, 1989; Simpson & Burgess, 1985; Simpson & Krueger, 1991). 
Sentences with balanced ambiguous words also show an ambiguity-related reading 
cost on the disambiguating region but this is smaller than for subordinate-biased 
sentences (Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rayner & Frazier, 1989). This 
is consistent with the notion that balanced words also require reinterpretation but 
less often than biased words as the correct meaning will be selected on a larger 
proportion of the trials than for biased words because frequency cannot 
systematically drive the selection processes toward one particular meaning (Duffy et 
al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979; Twilley & 
Dixon, 2000).  
Processing costs for late-disambiguation sentences have also been shown for 
spoken sentences. For example, using a dual-task interference paradigm, Rodd et 
al. (2010) found that participants were slower to make unrelated upper/lower case 
judgements about a visual letter when it was presented at the same time as they 
heard the delayed disambiguating information within a spoken sentence, compared 
with either an unambiguous sentence or a sentence in which the ambiguity had 
been resolved earlier in the sentence. This finding indicates that delayed 
disambiguation places a particularly heavy demand on domain-general cognitive 
resources. Additionally, recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
studies have found that late-disambiguation in visual and auditory sentences elicits 
greater neural activation than unambiguous or dominant-biased sentences (Mason 
& Just, 2007; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007). Together, these 
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findings provide converging evidence that when disambiguating information is 
delayed in either written or spoken sentences, listeners and readers must engage in 
cognitively and neurally demanding operations to revise incorrect interpretations.  
While the cognitive cost of reinterpretation is fairly well-established, little else is 
known about this process. Two important, yet, uncertain, aspects are 1) the 
effectiveness of semantic reinterpretation and 2) the time-course of the two 
fundamental operations: activation and suppression of the contextually appropriate 
and inappropriate meanings, respectively.   
2.1.2 Effectiveness of Semantic Reinterpretation  
Current studies do not provide clear evidence about the effectiveness of this 
process. Can readers/listeners completely recover from a misinterpretation? Recent 
research on syntactically ambiguous sentences (e.g., “While Anna dressed the baby 
that was small and cute spit up on the bed”) shows that syntactic reinterpretation 
may only be partial (e.g., Christianson, Hollingworth, Halliwell, & Ferreira, 2001; 
Patson, Darowski, Moon, & Ferreira, 2009). These studies found that inappropriate 
semantic representations from a reader’s initial parse are sometimes incorporated in 
their final interpretation of the sentence (e.g., understanding that the baby spit up on 
the bed and incorrectly that Anna had dressed the baby). These findings diverge 
from computational models of ambiguity resolution which claim that inappropriate 
analyses are fully deactivated following disambiguation (e.g., MacDonald et al., 
1994). The outcome of semantic ambiguity resolution is less clear. The 
aforementioned processing costs demonstrate difficulty in reinterpreting the 
meaning of a sentence but do not indicate whether this has been successful. 
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Although most studies assess participants’ explicit comprehension of the sentences 
alongside the processing speed, it is usually only included to encourage participants 
to pay attention to the meaning of the sentence and, thus, are usually simple tasks 
that only crudely measure comprehension. For example, participants may be asked 
to repeat or paraphrase the sentences or to answer simple yes/no comprehension 
questions (Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rayner & Frazier, 1989). Such 
tasks are not designed to assess whether participants have understood the correct 
meaning of the ambiguous word in the sentence. However, there are a number of 
potential reasons why comprehension of late-disambiguation sentences might not 
be completely successful. Listeners may be unable to integrate contextual 
information with the correct meaning of an ambiguous word when it occurs 
substantially after an ambiguous word due to memory constraints and/or may fail to 
disengage from an initial interpretation of the sentence if it has been too well-
integrated during the course of the sentence.  
Despite these potential difficulties, two previous studies have found preliminary 
evidence that reinterpretation can be completely successful for visually presented 
ambiguous sentences. Miyake et al. (1994) and Zempleni et al. (2007) 
systematically measured participants’ understanding of late-disambiguation 
sentences using semantic verification tasks. Both studies found that readers were 
highly successful in integrating the delayed context to understand the contextually 
appropriate meaning of the ambiguous word and in also using it to reject the 
contextually inappropriate meaning of these words. However, as both studies were 
conducted on visually presented sentences, it is unclear whether this is also the 
case for spoken sentences. Delaying contextual information may have different 
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effects on spoken sentence comprehension. For example, the transient nature of the 
auditory signal may make integrating such information with the earlier ambiguous 
word more demanding on memory processes and, thus, reinterpretation may be less 
successful. In addition, Zempleni et al. (2007) did not measure comprehension when 
participants first read the sentences. Their participants initially read the sentences in 
an fMRI scanning session and then performed the comprehension task in a post-
scanning session where they re-read the sentences. Thus, it is uncertain how well 
participants comprehended these sentences on their first encounter.  
2.1.3 Time Course of Reinterpretation Processes 
The second uncertain aspect concerns the time course of the two key processes of 
semantic reinterpretation: (i) suppression of the initially selected meaning and (ii) 
(re)accessing and integrating the previously non-preferred meaning. Existing 
experimental paradigms that have been used to examine semantic reinterpretation 
can only show general behavioural costs of disambiguation (e.g., longer reading 
times or slower performance on concurrent tasks). However, it is also important to 
investigate these processes separately because different models of semantic 
ambiguity resolution make different claims about their relative time courses. Various 
models assume that alternative meanings are mutually exclusive and, thus, suggest 
that these reinterpretation processes are tightly coupled. For example, in Rodd et 
al.’s (2004) distributed connectionist model, meanings are represented across a 
single set of distributed semantic features, which means that increases in the 
activation of one meaning necessarily correspond to a decrease in the alternative 
meaning. The opposite perspective is that there is no direct coupling between the 
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activation of alternative meanings, and, thus, the suppression of inappropriate 
meanings may dissociate from the activation of the appropriate meaning. One clear 
example is the reordered access model of ambiguity resolution (Duffy et al., 2001; 
Duffy et al., 1988) which assumes that different meanings are affected by different 
constraints. According to this model, contextual information only enhances the 
appropriate meaning without affecting the inappropriate meaning; the inappropriate 
meaning merely passively decays in the absence of supporting information. This 
suggests that inappropriate meanings may have a slower time course of being 
disregarded compared to the time it takes to integrate the contextually appropriate 
meaning.  
Between these two extremes are a number of other influential models which suggest 
that both patterns (coupling or dissociation of these processes) are possibilities as 
meaning activation is viewed as being dependent on the combination of numerous 
sources of information during sentence comprehension. For example, MacDonald et 
al.’s (1994) probabilistic constraint-based theory assumes that all meanings are 
directly affected by multiple constraints in parallel (e.g., lexical, semantic, syntactic, 
pragmatic) and also implements lateral inhibition between meanings. However, they 
also assume that different meanings may be differently affected by these 
constraints, depending on their weighting and the current activation levels of the 
meanings. In terms of semantic reinterpretation, the disambiguating information is 
critical to understand the correct meaning of the ambiguous word. Thus, the 
activation of the contextually appropriate and inappropriate meanings will be tightly 
coupled if the disambiguating information is weighted such that it affects these 
meanings equivalently to lead to a simultaneous increase in the former and 
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decrease of the latter. However, it is also possible that such information may affect 
one meaning more quickly than the other since the alternative meanings have 
different activation levels when the disambiguating information is encountered (i.e., 
the more frequent, inappropriate, meaning is more active than the less frequent, 
appropriate, meaning) and/or because the disambiguating information may constrain 
these meanings to different extents. Another theory that supports alternative 
possible time courses is the structure-building framework (Gernsbacher, 1990; 
Gernsbacher & St John, 2001). This model focuses on the influence of contextual 
information in the enhancement and suppression of appropriate and inappropriate 
meanings, respectively. Recent versions of this model (Gernsbacher & St John, 
2001), in contrast to all aforementioned theories, propose that suppression is 
specifically transmitted by sentence-level representations rather than by inhibition 
from the alternative meanings per se. Thus, this theory suggests that, during 
semantic reinterpretation, the suppression of inappropriate meanings may be 
delayed until the correct meaning is incorporated into a new interpretation of the 
sentence. However, as with the constraint-based theories, the extent of this potential 
delay is dependent on the strength of these representations and the current level of 
activation of the inappropriate meaning. For example, suppression of the 
inappropriate meaning may occur instantaneously to the integration of the 
contextually appropriate meaning if the sentence-level representation is sufficiently 
constraining. Thus, these models make different predictions about the activation of 
appropriate and inappropriate meanings during semantic reinterpretation which have 
not yet been empirically tested. Assessing their time-course may, therefore, reveal 
important insights into the influence of different constraints on the processes 
underlying semantic reinterpretation.  
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2.1.4 The Current Study 
The current study is the first comprehensive investigation of the reinterpretation of 
semantically ambiguous sentence, examining both the effectiveness of semantic 
reinterpretation as well as the time course of activating and suppressing the 
appropriate and inappropriate meaning, respectively. For this, a modified version of 
the semantic relatedness task developed by Gernsbacher, Varner, and Faust (1990) 
to study the initial processing of ambiguous words was employed. In this task probe 
words are presented after ambiguous and unambiguous sentences and participants 
must decide whether they are related to the meaning of the sentence. The 
processes underlying ambiguity resolution are evaluated by varying the semantic 
relationship between the probe word and the meaning of the ambiguous word in the 
sentence. For example, in the original version, Gernsbacher (1990) presented 
participants with sentences that ended with an ambiguous word (or unambiguous 
control word). The critical manipulation was that when the probe (e.g., “ace”) was 
unrelated to the ambiguous sentence (e.g., “he dug with the spade”), it was actually 
associated with the contextually inappropriate meaning of the ambiguous word (i.e., 
the card suit meaning of “spade”). Activation of the inappropriate meaning was 
assessed by comparing how much longer participants took to decide that these 
inappropriate probes were unrelated to the ambiguous sentence than unrelated to 
an unambiguous sentence (e.g., “he dug with the shovel”): slower decisions for the 
ambiguous sentences indicated that inappropriate meanings were more active than 
baseline. Activation of the contextually appropriate meaning can similarly be 
assessed by examining reaction times (RTs) for probes related to the contextually 
appropriate meaning of the ambiguous word (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; 
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Gernsbacher & Robertson, 1995). Furthermore because this task requires an 
explicit semantic decision, the effectiveness of disambiguation can be indexed by 
how accurate participants are at accepting contextually appropriate probes as 
related to the sentence and rejecting inappropriate probes as unrelated to the 
sentence.  
Whilst this paradigm has been used fruitfully to assess the processing of sentence-
final ambiguous words, it has not yet been employed to assess the reinterpretation 
of previously heard ambiguous words. To do this, three changes were made to the 
original paradigm. First, late-disambiguation sentences were employed that ended 
with a disambiguating word (e.g., “the teacher explained that the bark was going to 
be very damp”) so that probes could be presented directly after the disambiguating 
information rather than after the ambiguous word. Second five probe conditions 
were employed: three for the ambiguous sentences and two for the unambiguous 
sentences. For the ambiguous sentences, probes were 1) related to the contextually 
appropriate meaning (“wood”), 2) related to the contextually inappropriate meaning 
(“sound”) or 3) completely unrelated to the sentence (“pound”). For the 
unambiguous sentences, probes were either related or unrelated, serving as control 
conditions. See Table 2-1 for example sentences and probes. The majority of 
previous studies (e.g., Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher et al., 1990) have 
only assessed performance for either the ambiguous-inappropriate probes or the 
ambiguous-related probes in a single experiment (see Gernsbacher & Robertson, 
1995 for a study that examined both probe types). This current study importantly 
contrasts all these conditions within the same experiment, allowing us to jointly 
assess the extent to which contextually appropriate meanings (as indexed by 
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ambiguous-related probes) and inappropriate meanings (as indexed by ambiguous-
inappropriate probes) are integrated and suppressed, respectively. The third critical 
change was our choice of baseline for the ambiguous-inappropriate probe. To 
assess the activation level of inappropriate meanings, prior studies (e.g., 
Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher et al., 1990) compared the ambiguous-
inappropriate probe condition with the unambiguous-unrelated condition. However, 
the unambiguous-unrelated probe does not take into account general processing 
costs of comprehending late-disambiguation sentences that is emphasised by 
previous research (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010) For this 
reason, we used the ambiguous-unrelated probe as the comparison condition, 
reasoning that any additional slow-down for the inappropriate probe can be more 
confidently associated with how active the inappropriate meaning is.  
Table 2-1: Sentence conditions and their corresponding probe conditions 
Note. In each example sentence, the underlined word is the ambiguous (or matched 
unambiguous word) and the italicized word is the disambiguating word.  
 
 
This extended paradigm allows us to test several alternative predictions made by 
models of ambiguity resolution. First, if contextually appropriate meanings are 
successfully retrieved and inappropriate meanings are successfully disregarded 
then participants will have high accuracy for ambiguous-related and inappropriate 
Sentence type     Visual probe word 
Ambiguous (e.g., the woman had to 
make the toast with a very old 
microphone) 
  Related (e.g., speech) 
  Inappropriate (e.g., bread) 
  Unrelated  (e.g., blanket) 
Unambiguous (e.g., the student had to 
wrap the wrist with a very old bandage) 
  Related (e.g., arm) 
  Unrelated (e.g., rock) 
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probes, respectively. Alternatively, reinterpretation may be only partial such that 
listeners understand the contextually appropriate meaning (hence ambiguous-
related probes would have high accuracy) but they may also accept the contextually 
inappropriate meaning, resulting in low accuracy for ambiguous-inappropriate 
probes (cf. Christianson et al., 2001). In addition, whilst accuracy can measure the 
outcome of disambiguation, RTs can provide insights into the processes of 
disambiguation. First, responses may be slower for all ambiguous sentence probes 
compared with unambiguous sentence probes, suggesting a general processing 
cost or residual uncertainty about the meaning of the ambiguous sentences. 
Alternatively we may see a more specific RT cost for the ambiguous-related probes 
(relative to the unambiguous-related probes), which would suggest the contextually 
appropriate meaning has not been fully activated/integrated. Similarly, we may see a 
specific RT cost for the ambiguous-inappropriate probes (relative to the ambiguous-
unrelated probes), which would suggest that the contextually inappropriate meaning 
has not been fully suppressed. Furthermore, the theories of ambiguity resolution that 
claim mutual dependency between activations of alternative meanings would predict 
that processing costs associated with integrating appropriate meanings should co-
occur with those associated with suppressing inappropriate meanings. Hence, RT 
costs for related probes should co-occur with RT costs for the inappropriate probes. 
In contrast, theories that do not explicitly assume such dependency may predict that 
inappropriate meanings may take more time to be suppressed than it takes 
appropriate meanings to be integrated and, hence, RT costs for inappropriate 
probes may be found in the absence of RT costs for related probes.  
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2.2 Experiment 1: 100 ms Probe Delay  
As the time course of semantic reinterpretation is unknown, Experiment 1 tested 
these predictions using a short probe delay, presenting the probe 100 ms after the 
disambiguating word. 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants  
25 (15 female) native British English speakers took part in this experiment. Their 
mean age was 22 years (range: 18-34), all were born and raised in Britain, right-
handed and had no known reading or language impairment. Participants were 
recruited via the University College London (UCL) subject pool, UCL board notices 
and student mailing lists. Participants were paid for their participation, except first 
year UCL psychology undergraduates who were given course credit.  
Stimuli  
(i) Sentences 
90 ambiguous and 90 unambiguous sentences were created. On average, the 
sentences had 12.5 words (SD = 1.24), 16.6 syllables (SD = 1.85) and lasted 2.97 
seconds (SD = 0.30). Each ambiguous sentence contained one ambiguous word 
that occurred, on average, 6.70 words (SD = 1.00) into the sentence. The 
disambiguating information was provided by the sentence-final word. Four 
sentences were disambiguated by a compound noun, comprised of two words. This 
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was necessary to maintain a natural sounding sentence. The disambiguation 
occurred 4-10 words after the ambiguous word (M = 5.79, SD = 1.46); for example, 
“the woman had to make the toast with a very old microphone”, where “toast” is the 
ambiguous word (i.e., toast refers to grilled bread or a speech given to celebrate an 
event/person) and “microphone” is the disambiguating word. The minimum gap of 
four words between the ambiguity and the disambiguation ensured that listeners 
would have selected a meaning (usually the dominant) before hearing the 
disambiguating information, since research converges on a short window (within 
about 200 ms) in which selection takes place (e.g., Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010; 
Swinney, 1979). The ambiguous words were all used as nouns. Some of the 
ambiguous words possessed two meanings that corresponded to the same spelling 
(e.g., bark), while others had different spellings (e.g., night/knight). Most of the 
sentences were modified versions of those used in Rodd et al. (2010), altered such 
that each ambiguous word was disambiguated by the last word only. Furthermore, 
to ensure that the words between the ambiguity and the disambiguation did not 
provide strong cues as to which meaning was more likely to be correct, the 
sentences were created such that only the last word would need to be changed to 
disambiguate the ambiguous word to its alternative meaning. For example, in the 
toast example, “grill” could replace “microphone” for the bread meaning. (Note that 
the alternative version of each sentence was never included in this experiment.)   
A well-matched unambiguous sentence was created for each ambiguous sentence, 
which had the same syntactic structure but with a low-ambiguity noun (unambiguous 
target word) in the same position as the high-ambiguity noun (ambiguous target 
word) in the ambiguous sentence. The ambiguous targets had a significantly higher 
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mean number of meanings (t(89) = 8.20, p < 0.001) and senses (t(89) = 8.23, p < 
0.001) than the unambiguous targets, as indexed in the Online Wordsmyth English 
Dictionary-Thesaurus (Parks et al., 1998). There was no significant difference 
between the ambiguous and unambiguous targets in terms of word frequency in the 
CELEX lexical database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995) (t(89) = 1.55, p = 
.13), log-transformed word frequency (t(89) = .37, p = .71) or number of letters (t(89) 
= .52, p = .61). See Table 2-2 for descriptive statistics of these lexical properties. 
 
Table 2-2: Descriptive statistics (mean (SD)) for properties of the ambiguous 
and unambiguous target words 
Target Word 
Frequency 
per million 
Log 
frequency 
Number 
of letters 
Number of 
meanings 
Number 
of senses 
Ambiguous 
62.3 3.62 4.71 1.94 10.1 
(79.2) (1.02) (1.17) (0.90) (5.66) 
Unambiguous 
56.69 3.64 4.77 1.09 4.86 
(63.2) (0.94) (1.09) (0.32) (3.10) 
 
 
The unambiguous and ambiguous sentences did not differ statistically in terms of 
physical duration (t(89) = .118, p = 0.91), number of syllables (t(89) = 1.62, p = .11) 
or number of words in the whole sentence. Naturalness ratings were also obtained 
for the sentences by asking 15 participants who did not take part in the main 
experiment to rate all sentences on a scale of 1-7, with 7 being highly natural and 1 
highly unnatural. Both sets of sentences had relatively high mean naturalness 
ratings but the ambiguous sentences were rated as significantly less natural than 
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the unambiguous sentences (t(89) = 3.81, p < .001). See Table 2-3 for descriptive 
statistics of these sentence properties.   
 
Table 2-3: Descriptive statistics (mean (SD)) for properties of the ambiguous 
and unambiguous sentences 
Sentence 
Length in 
seconds 
Number of 
syllables 
Number of 
words 
Naturalness 
rating 
Ambiguous 
2.97 16.6 12.5 5.47 
(0.30) (1.85) (1.24) (0.62) 
Unambiguous 
2.97 16.4 12.5 5.80 
(0.31) (1.91) (1.24) (0.61) 
 
 
(ii) Meaning Dominance  
The ambiguous sentences were constructed to elicit semantic reinterpretation by 
selecting disambiguating words that corresponded to the less frequent meaning of 
the ambiguous word as indicated by pre-test scores for a similar set of sentences 
used by Rodd et al. (2010). To confirm the validity of these meaning preferences, 
two types of meaning dominance scores were obtained from two independent 
groups of participants: 1) “single-word” scores, which are participants’ preferences 
for the meanings of the ambiguous words when they are heard in isolation, and 2) 
“in-sentence” scores, which are meaning preferences at the point when these words 
are heard in the experimental sentences just prior to the disambiguation word (e.g., 
before “supportive” in the sentence “the businessman told him that the fan had been 
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very supportive“). While the “single-word” scores provide an index of the baseline 
relative frequencies of the alternative meanings of an ambiguous word, the “in-
sentence” scores index the extent to which the sentence context influences these 
preferences. The latter were important to check that, when these words were 
specifically heard in the sentences used in this study, participants would be likely to 
prefer the inappropriate meaning prior to the disambiguating word and, thus, need to 
reinterpret the meaning when hearing that word at the end of the sentence.  
54 participants took part in the “single-word” version, all of whom did not take part in 
the main experiment. Participants performed a modified version of a word 
association task that is standardly used to measure meaning preferences (e.g. 
Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, & Clark, 1994). Responses were initially obtained from a set 
of 15 participants, who performed the task (detailed below) on all the experimental 
items1. The remaining 39 subjects were, subsequently, assessed as part of a larger 
project that examined a larger set of ambiguous words (N = 406)2. Because of this 
larger number, the stimuli were divided into three sets so that participants only 
performed a subset of the items. As a result, the ambiguous words relevant to this 
current experiment were also divided across the three sets, which resulted in each 
of these participants contributing to approximately 66% of the experimental stimuli. 
Nevertheless, for all participants, the procedure was as follows. Participants listened 
to each ambiguous word in isolation (e.g., “fan”) and typed the first related word that 
came to mind. After participants had performed all word associations, they 
performed a second task where they explicitly indicated to which meaning of the 
                                               
1
 Three undergraduate students assisted in the data collection.  
2
  The data collection for this project was conducted by Dr. Jane Warren.   
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ambiguous word their word associations corresponded. Participants were informed 
that each word they had heard had multiple meanings. They then heard each word 
again and were shown the ambiguous word along with two or three definitions of its 
meanings. These definitions always included the meaning that was used in the 
experimental sentence (e.g., “admirer” for the sentence “the businessman told him 
that the fan had been very supportive”) as well as the “dominant” meaning (e.g., 
“ventilation device”) and sometimes included a third definition if the word had 
another highly frequent meaning. They were asked to choose the definition that 
matched the ambiguous word that they had previously generated. If none fit their 
interpretation, they were instructed to select the “other” option and write down their 
own definition. The definition choice allowed participants to code their own word 
association responses and was included to avoid having to remove unclear word 
associations that could refer to either meaning of the ambiguous sentence. For 
example, for the word “fan”, participants may respond with vague words such as 
“like” or “cool”, which the experimenter would not have been able to code reliably.  
All the word associations were coded by the same experimenter (SV) as to whether 
they were consistent (e.g., “supporter”) or inconsistent (e.g., “wind”) with the 
interpretation that was used in the whole sentence. When the response was vague, 
the participant’s definition choice was used to code the response. 7% of responses 
could not be coded for various reasons including that participants misheard the 
ambiguous word, did not type in a word association or produced a vague response 
that was not accompanied by a definition selection. These responses were excluded 
from subsequent analyses. 5 participants’ total datasets were also excluded from all 
analyses due to a high rate of missing data or misunderstanding the task.   
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A dominance score was subsequently calculated as the proportion of included 
responses (minimum N = 31 per item) that were consistent with the meaning used in 
the whole sentence. Figure 2-1 shows the distribution of scores. As expected, most 
sentences had low dominance scores (see Figure 2-1; M = 0.25, SD = 0.20) 
indicating that the more frequent, inappropriate, meaning was preferred for the 
majority of words. Approximately two-thirds of the words had clearly polarised 
meanings (Dominance < 0.3) while approximately one-third had meanings that were 
relatively equally preferred (0.3 < Dominance < 0.6). The latter words were included 
in the study as the majority of evidence suggests that, even for such “balanced” 
words, listeners do not maintain multiple meanings but make a commitment to a 
single meaning (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Seidenberg et al., 
1982; Simpson, 1994; Swinney, 1979). Thus, reinterpretation will also occur for 
these sentences if the contextually inappropriate meaning is initially interpreted. 
These results also showed that for six sentences the more dominant meaning had 
unintentionally been chosen. These stimuli were also included as they were rare and 
these meanings were not unanimously preferred, so some participants will still 
select the incorrect meaning and need to reinterpret the meaning of these 
sentences.  
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Figure 2-1: Distribution of single-word dominance scores for the 90 
ambiguous words. Dominance score is the proportion of participants who 
chose the meaning of the ambiguous word used in the complete version of 
these sentences. 
 
An independent group of 303 participants performed the “in-sentence” version to 
examine listeners’ preferences for the meanings of the ambiguous words when they 
are heard in the experimental sentences. It was important that listeners preferred 
the inappropriate meaning prior to the disambiguating word to ensure that 
reinterpretation would be induced. The “in-sentence” task was identical to the 
“single-word” task except that participants generated sentence completions to 
experimental sentences that had the disambiguating word cut off (e.g., “the 
businessman told him that the fan had been very”). As for single-word task, 
                                               
3
 Three undergraduate students assisted in the data collection.  
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participants then indicated the definition of the meaning that corresponded to their 
completion. The completions were analysed in the same manner as the single-word 
data, such that responses were coded as being consistent or inconsistent with the 
meaning of the experimental sentence. Again, a small portion of all responses could 
not be coded, and therefore were excluded from further analyses (4% of total 
responses). Two participants’ whole datasets were also excluded due to a large 
number of missing data and/or uninterpretable responses (> 50%). As a result of 
these exclusions, a minimum of 16 usable data points contributed to each item’s “in-
sentence” mean dominance scores. These scores was significantly higher than the 
mean “single-word” score (M = 0.38, SD = 0.25; t(89) = 4.72, p < .001), indicating 
that, to some extent, the context biased the sentences toward the sentence 
meaning. However, this absolute score was still low in that the majority of these 
ambiguous words were still interpreted toward the incorrect meaning in the sentence 
frames and, thus, would have needed reinterpretation if the disambiguating 
information had been encountered.  
(iii) Probe Words  
For each ambiguous sentence, three types of probes were selected: 1) a word 
related to the contextually appropriate meaning of the sentence (ambiguous-
related); 2) a word related to the contextually inappropriate meaning of the 
ambiguous word (ambiguous-inappropriate), and 3) a word completely unrelated to 
the sentence (ambiguous-unrelated). For each unambiguous sentence, two types of 
probes were selected: a word related (unambiguous-related) and a word unrelated 
(unambiguous-unrelated) to the sentence (see Table 2-1 for examples). Across 
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conditions, there were no significant differences in the probes’ length (number of 
letters: F(4,356) = .44, p = .76), CELEX frequency (F(4,356) = .15, p = .94), log 
frequency (F(4,356) = .37, p = .83) or Wordsmyth-based number of meanings 
(F(4,356) = .45, p = .73) and senses (F(4,356) = 1.28, p = .28).  
Relatedness ratings were obtained for the probes to assess how semantically 
related they were to the corresponding sentence. The relatedness task required 
participants to rate the degree to which the word was related to the preceding 
sentence on a scale of 1 (very unrelated) to 7 (very related). 34 native British 
English speakers, who did not take part in the main experiment, performed the 
relatedness task. Mean relatedness ratings for each probe were calculated by 
averaging across participants’ ratings. Importantly, each related probe had a mean 
relatedness > 4.5 and a median relatedness > 5. The overall mean rating for the 
ambiguous and unambiguous related probe conditions were all relatively high (see 
Table 2-4). However, the ambiguous-related probes had significantly lower ratings 
than the unambiguous-related probes (t(89) = 2.59, p = .01). Each inappropriate and 
unrelated probe had a mean relatedness < 2.5 and a median relatedness < 2. There 
was no significant difference between the ambiguous-unrelated and unambiguous-
unrelated probes (t(89) = .64, p = .52). Although the inappropriate probes had a 
similar low mean rating, this was significantly higher than the two unrelated probes 
(t(89) = 10.03, p < .001; t(89) = 11.90, p < .001, respectively). Importantly, the 
finding that the ambiguous-related probes had high relatedness ratings and the 
ambiguous-inappropriate probes had low ratings, additionally, confirmed that the 
sentence-final words are effective in disambiguating the meaning of the ambiguous 
word in the intended way.  
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Table 2-4: Descriptive statistics (mean (SD)) for properties of the probes 
 
In order to create six versions of the experiment (see Design section) the set of 
ambiguous sentences were divided into three lists, matched (all p > .1) on 
relatedness rating, frequency, log frequency, length, number of meanings and 
number of senses of each probe condition, and the unambiguous sentences were 
divided into two matched lists (all p > .1). 
24 practice sentences were additionally created for use in an initial practice block 
and 50 filler sentences were created. 20 of these filler sentences were to be 
 
Ambiguous Sentence 
Probe 
Unambiguous Sentence 
Probe 
Probe Property Related Inappropriate Unrelated Related Unrelated 
Relatedness rating 
5.59 1.80 1.27 5.81 1.29 
(0.64) (0.38) (0.29) (0.55) (0.24) 
Frequency per million 
71.0 68.5 66.5 62.2 70.7 
(106) (95.1) (97.9) (97.0) (100) 
Log frequency  
3.38 3.48 3.37 3.26 3.38 
(1.40) (1.33) (1.37) (1.41) (1.46) 
Number of letters 
5.97 5.98 6.03 6.26 6.08 
(1.79) (1.71) (1.71) (1.73) (1.65) 
Number of meanings 
1.10 1.11 1.09 1.07 1.06 
(0.37) (0.44) (0.36) (0.25) (0.27) 
Number of senses 
5.73 6.14 5.17 4.87 4.98 
(4.93) (5.77) (4.83) (3.76) (4.56) 
 53 
 
presented at the beginning of the experimental blocks (lead-in sentence) and the 
other 30 were to be sentences presented during the experiment with a related probe 
(related filler sentence) to result in an equal number of related and unrelated 
responses (see Procedure section). The sentences were constructed in the same 
way as the experimental sentences. Half of each type of filler were ambiguous 
sentences and the other half unambiguous. All sentences were spoken by the same 
female speaker4. For each practice and lead-in sentence, one probe was selected 
and probe conditions were of roughly the same proportion as in the experimental 
task.  
Design 
Probe condition was manipulated within-subjects so that participants responded to 
all five conditions. However, to avoid repeating sentences, participants were 
assigned to one of six versions, such that each participant only encountered each 
sentence once (i.e., with one probe) but that across participants all combinations of 
sentence and probes types were presented. Six versions ensured that the 
assignment of probe type to each sentence was fully counterbalanced because the 
ambiguous sentence had one more probe condition than the unambiguous 
sentences. Specifically, the ambiguous sentences had three probe types, requiring 
three stimulus lists (see Stimuli section) whereas the unambiguous sentences had 
two probe types, requiring only two stimulus lists, which led to six combinations of 
the two sets of lists. Thus, in all versions, one third of the ambiguous sentences 
                                               
4
 Dr. Jennifer M. Rodd 
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were followed by a related probe, one third by an inappropriate probe and the 
remaining third by an unrelated probe, and half of the unambiguous sentences were 
followed by a related probe and the other half by an unrelated probe.  
Procedure 
The experiment was presented on a computer using MATLAB 2010 software 
(Mathworks, Sherborne, MA, USA). Each trial commenced with a fixation cross 
presented in the centre of a computer screen. After one second, a sentence was 
presented through headphones. 100 ms after sentence offset, a probe was 
presented (font: Helvetica; size: 36pt), replacing the fixation cross. The probe 
remained on screen until participants responded. Participants were instructed to 
decide whether the word was related or unrelated to the meaning of the sentence 
just heard by pressing keyboard button number one for related and number two for 
unrelated with their index and middle fingers, respectively. Once participants had 
responded, a blank screen was presented for one second followed by the next trial.  
Participants were given written instructions with two example sentences, each with 
two related and unrelated probes. To ensure that participants treated the 
ambiguous-inappropriate probes as unrelated to the sentences, one of the examples 
was of an ambiguous sentence with an ambiguous-inappropriate probe as one of its 
unrelated probes and participants were informed why this probe was unrelated (i.e., 
that it does not fit the meaning of any of the words in that sentence). Ambiguity was 
never explicitly mentioned. All participants completed the same 24 practice trials 
prior to performing the actual experiment, being given accuracy feedback during the 
trial and clarification of incorrect answers from the experimenter after the practice.   
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The trials were divided into five blocks, ensuring that each ambiguous and its 
matched unambiguous sentence appeared in separate blocks. The blocks were 
randomised across participants, each starting with four different lead-in sentences, 
and having 36 experimental sentences and 6 related fillers. All sentences (except 
the lead-in items) were randomised within each block for each participant. Feedback 
was not given during the experimental blocks. 
2.2.2 Results 
Data Preparation and Analysis 
One participant’s whole dataset was excluded due to 50% accuracy in the 
ambiguous-inappropriate probe condition. Sets of items were also excluded if at 
least one of their probe conditions achieved less than 50% accuracy across 
participants. A set is comprised of one ambiguous sentence and its matched 
unambiguous sentence with the five corresponding probe conditions. This led to one 
set of items being removed due to 38% accuracy for its ambiguous-related probe 
condition. For this set, the ambiguous word was “cast” and the related probe 
“plaster”. Individual responses faster than 300 ms or made after the timeout (2500 
ms) were also excluded; they contributed to 0.4% of the total data.  
By-subject (F1) and by-item (F2) means of the accuracy and reaction time (RT) were 
subjected to two main analyses. In all analyses Sentence Ambiguity and Probe 
Relatedness were employed as repeated-measures factors. First, 2 × 2 ANOVAs 
were conducted to evaluate the effects of Sentence Ambiguity (ambiguous vs. 
unambiguous) and Probe Relatedness (related vs. unrelated) on accuracy rates and 
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RTs. The ambiguous-inappropriate probe condition was not included in these initial 
analyses because there was no inappropriate probe condition for the unambiguous 
sentences. Second, to assess interference of the inappropriate meaning, ANOVAs 
were conducted that specifically examined the effect of the unrelated ambiguous 
probe type (ambiguous-inappropriate vs. ambiguous-unrelated) on accuracy and 
RTs. Version was included in all ANOVAs as a dummy variable but main effects and 
interactions with version are not reported (Pollatsek & Well, 1995). Furthermore, 
wherever additional analyses were conducted between pairs of conditions, ANOVAs 
were employed so version could be included as a dummy variable5.    
Accuracy  
Overall accuracy was high, with at least 90% correct responses in each condition. 
However, the ambiguous-related and ambiguous-inappropriate probes had markedly 
lower accuracy than the other three probe conditions (see Figure 2-2A far left 
column).  
Sentence Ambiguity and Probe Relatedness. This ANOVA showed a significant 
main effect of probe relatedness, where related probes were less accurate than 
unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 20.3, p < .001, η
2
p = .530; F2(1,83) = 51.2, p < .001, 
η2p= .381). There was also a significant main effect of sentence ambiguity, where 
                                               
5
 Preliminary analyses also examined the effects of dominance but these showed no 
significant effects. These results are not reported further because they may be merely due to 
low power resulting from a combination of three factors that increase variance: 1) between-
item variance due to variation in the sentence-probe relationships, 2) a relatively small 
number of items in three key dominance condition (N = < 30; see Chapter 3 for more details) 
and 3) the mean response values being contributed by only eight participants due to the 
version manipulation.    
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ambiguous sentence probes were less accurate than unambiguous probes (F1(1,18) 
= 9.60, p = .006, η2p= .348; F2(1,83) = 12.2, p = .001, η
2
p= .128). This main effect of 
ambiguity was modulated by a significant interaction between sentence ambiguity 
and probe relatedness such that the ambiguity cost was larger for related probes 
(5%) than unrelated probes (0.6%) (F1(1,18) = 8.79, p = .008, η
2
p=.328; F2(1,83) = 
6.01, p = .016, η2p= .067). Additional ANOVAs conducted on related and unrelated 
probes separately revealed that the ambiguity cost was only significant for the 
related probes (F1(1,18) = 10.2, p = .005, η
2
p= .361; F2(1,83) = 9.66, p = .003, η
2
p= 
.104); there was no significant ambiguity effect for the unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 
1.13, p = .302, η2p= .059; F2(1,83) = .903, p = .345, η
2
p= .011).  
Because the ambiguity effect was specific to the related probes, it was important to 
rule out the possibility that this was due to the ambiguous-related probes having 
lower relatedness ratings than the unambiguous-related probes. Thus, a subset 
analysis was conducted on a set of related probes that were matched on 
relatedness rating across ambiguity. The subset was obtained by removing 
ambiguous-related probes with relatedness ratings lower than the minimum ratings 
for the unambiguous items (4.63) and unambiguous-related probes with high 
relatedness ratings (> 6.5). 76 out of 90 items were included; the mean relatedness 
ratings for the ambiguous-related and unambiguous related probes were 5.6 (SD = 
.63) and 5.7 (SD = .52) respectively, which did not differ statistically (t(75) = .841, p 
= .403). This confirmed the initial findings: ambiguous-related probes were still found 
to be less accurate than unambiguous-related probes (F1(1,18) = 8.03, p = .011, 
η2p= .309; F2(1,69) = 5.08, p = .027, η
2
p= .069).  
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Ambiguous Inappropriate Probes. The ANOVA comparing accuracy of the 
ambiguous inappropriate probes with that of the ambiguous unrelated probes 
showed a main effect of unrelated probe type, where accuracy was lower for 
inappropriate probes than unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 34.1, p < .001, η
2
p= .654; 
F2(1,83) = 32.3, p < .001, η
2
p= .280). 
  
5
9
 
 
Figure 2-2: Mean accuracy (A) and mean RT (B) of all probe conditions (by-subjects). These means are taken from the 
combined analysis of the three experiments’ datasets to facilitate comparisons across experiments. Although the 
values are slightly different to those in the separate datasets because extra items were excluded, the patterns of means 
and significances remain the same. Error bars show standard errors adjusted to remove between subjects variance. 
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Reaction Times 
Only correct RTs were analysed. The same analyses were conducted as for the 
accuracy data. Inspection of the data revealed a large range of RTs within subjects 
that resulted from long outliers. To reduce the potential effect of such outliers, the 
raw RT data were transformed using an inverse transformation. To assess the effect 
of this transformation on the results, the analyses were re-run on the untransformed 
data when RTs greater than three standard deviations from each subject’s mean 
had been removed. The results of both analyses were very similar so we report the 
results of the transformed data and indicate where the patterns of significance differ 
for the untransformed data. In addition, for ease of interpretation, the means of the 
untransformed data are presented (see Figure 2-2B far left column). 
Sentence Ambiguity and Probe Relatedness. This ANOVA showed a significant 
main effect of sentence ambiguity, where responses were, on average, 62 ms 
slower for ambiguous than unambiguous probes (F1(1,18) = 25.6, p < .001, η
2
p= 
.588; F2(1,83) = 23.8, p < .001, η
2
p= .223).  There was no significant main effect of 
relatedness (F1(1,18) = .920, p = .350, η
2
p= .049; F2(1,83) = 1.59, p = .211, η
2
p= 
.019) and no significant interaction between sentence ambiguity and probe 
relatedness (F1(1,18) = .485, p = .495, η
2
p= .026; F2(1,83) = .336, p = .563, η
2
p= 
.004). 
Ambiguous Inappropriate Probes. Comparing the ambiguous inappropriate and 
ambiguous unrelated probe conditions, the results showed a significant main effect 
of unrelated probe type,  where responses were, on average, 47 ms slower for the 
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inappropriate than unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 12.7, p = .002, η
2
p= .413; F2(1,83) = 
8.64, p = .004, η2p= .094). 
2.2.3 Discussion 
The results revealed interesting, but different, effects within the accuracy and RT 
data. These two sets of results will be discussed separately because they have 
different theoretical implications. Whilst accuracy indicates the outcome of 
disambiguation (i.e., participants’ explicit understanding of the sentence), RT, which 
is analysed for correct trials only, provides insights into the processes that underlie 
disambiguation when it is successful.  
Accuracy 
The first important finding was that accuracy was high (M > 90%) for all conditions, 
including the ambiguous-related and inappropriate probes. As correct decisions for 
these two conditions require that the contextually appropriate meaning is integrated 
and the inappropriate meaning is disregarded, respectively, this pattern 
demonstrates that participants fully disambiguated most sentences, settling on the 
contextually appropriate interpretation.  
Despite high absolute accuracy, performance was not uniform across conditions. In 
particular, the ambiguous-related and inappropriate probes had relatively lower 
accuracy. Specifically, although more errors were made for related than unrelated 
probes (regardless of ambiguity), the results showed a specific difficulty for 
ambiguous-related probes, indexed by a significant sentence ambiguity by probe 
relatedness interaction. The ambiguous-unrelated probes, in contrast, had near 
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perfect accuracy that was comparable with the unambiguous-unrelated probes. 
Importantly, this specific ambiguity cost for related probes cannot be attributed to the 
difference in relatedness ratings between the ambiguous-related and unambiguous-
related probes since it remained in a subset of items that were matched on 
relatedness. In addition, participants also produced more errors for the ambiguous-
inappropriate probes compared with the ambiguous-unrelated probes. This suggests 
that, on a small, but significant, proportion of trials, participants were unable to use 
the disambiguating word to either select the correct interpretation of the ambiguous 
word or to suppress the contextually inappropriate meaning.   
One possible reason for these (relatively rare) disambiguation failures is that 
reinterpretation may have been interrupted by the probe task. Under this view 
participants would reach the correct interpretation if given more time, which predicts 
that a longer probe delay should improve accuracy for these two types of ambiguous 
probes. This prediction is tested in Experiment 2.  
Reaction Times 
The reaction results showed a rather different pattern. While responses were slower 
for ambiguous than unambiguous sentence probes, there was no interaction with 
probe relatedness: related and unrelated probes were similarly delayed by 
ambiguity. For example, for the sentence “the woman had to make the toast with a 
very old microphone”, participants were slower both to accept “speech” and to reject 
“blanket”, compared with unambiguous controls. This non-specific slow-down for 
ambiguous sentences suggests a general processing cost associated with 
understanding these sentences, presumably reflecting time needed to resolve 
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uncertainty about the correct meaning. This finding is consistent with previous 
research and shows novel behavioural costs of resolving late-disambiguation 
sentences (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rayner & Frazier, 1989; 
Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010). In addition to this main effect of ambiguity, there was 
also a specific RT cost for ambiguous-inappropriate probes (e.g., “bread” for the 
sentence “the woman had to make the toast with a very old microphone”) compared 
to ambiguous-unrelated probes (e.g., “blanket”). As this inappropriate probe cost 
was found over and above the general ambiguity effect, it suggests that the 
inappropriate meaning was still more active than unrelated meanings.  
Together, these effects suggest that at this short probe delay there is still uncertainty 
about contextually appropriate meanings and also that inappropriate meanings are 
over-active compared with unrelated meanings. These results are consistent with 
descriptions of reinterpretation as a “time-consuming process” (Duffy et al., 1988 p. 
440). Importantly both these RT effects are emerging on trials in which participants 
make a correct response, which suggests that, although participants incur 
processing costs when resolving late-disambiguation sentences, this does not 
prevent successful comprehension.  
Furthermore, the finding of impairments for both appropriate and inappropriate 
meanings may provide preliminary support for models claiming that activation of 
alternative meanings are tightly coupled (e.g., MacDonald et al., 1994; Rodd et al., 
2004). For example, the disambiguating information at the end of the sentence did 
not seem to preferentially help the appropriate meaning, as has been suggested in 
the reordered access model (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988), otherwise there 
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should have been an RT cost for the ambiguous-inappropriate probes in the 
absence of a cost for the ambiguous-related probes. However, it may be possible 
that such a dissociation between appropriate and inappropriate meanings occurs at 
a later time when more time has elapsed for constraints to have a differential effect 
on these meanings. Therefore Experiment 2 examined this possibility by increasing 
the delay between the end of the sentence and the onset of the probes from 100ms 
to 300ms. This longer probe delay was chosen because previous research on initial 
meaning selection suggests that inappropriate meanings can be suppressed by 
about a few hundred milliseconds after encountering an ambiguous word (e.g., 
Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979). In addition, this longer delay will allow us 
to investigate whether the (relatively rare) disambiguation failures seen in the 
accuracy data are reduced when participants are given more time to process the 
disambiguating word before the arrival of the probe. 
2.3 Experiment 2: 300 ms Probe Delay 
2.3.1 Method 
Participants 
26 (17 female) native British English speakers from the same population as 
Experiment 1 took part in this experiment. Their mean age was 22 years (range: 18-
34).6 
 
                                               
6
 Two undergraduate students assisted in the data collection.  
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Stimuli, Design and Procedure  
All was the same as Experiment 1 except that the probe was presented at 300ms 
post sentence offset.  
2.3.2 Results 
Data preparation and analysis 
Data were trimmed in the same way as Experiment 1 leading to three participants’ 
data and three sets of items being removed from all subsequent statistical analyses. 
The excluded item sets had low accuracy in the ambiguous-related probe condition; 
these probes (ambiguous word) were “layer” (coat), “metal” (cymbal), and “fireplace” 
(poker). Individual responses faster than 300 ms or made after the timeout (2500 
ms) were also excluded; they contributed to 0.8% of the total data. The same 
analyses were conducted as in Experiment 1. 
Accuracy  
Like Experiment 1, overall accuracy was above 90%, for all probe types with the 
lowest accuracy for ambiguous-related and ambiguous-inappropriate probes (see 
Figure 2-2A middle column).  
Sentence Ambiguity and Probe Relatedness. This ANOVA showed a significant 
main effect of probe relatedness, where related probes were less accurate than 
unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 29.5, p < .001, η
2
p= .621; F2(1,81) = 49.9, p < .001, 
η2p= .381). There was also a significant main effect of sentence ambiguity, where 
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ambiguous sentence probes were less accurate than unambiguous probes (F1(1,18) 
= 4.54 p = .047, η2p= .201; F2(1,81) = 4.82, p = .031, η
2
p= .056). The interaction 
between sentence ambiguity and probe relatedness did not reach significance 
(F1(1,18) = 2.66, p = .120, η
2
p=.129; F2(1,81) = 2.49, p = .118, η
2
p= .030), although, 
on average, the ambiguity cost was larger for related probes than unrelated probes 
(3% vs. 0.6% respectively).  
Ambiguous Inappropriate Probes. The ANOVA comparing accuracy of the 
ambiguous inappropriate probes with that of the ambiguous unrelated probes 
showed a main effect of unrelated probe type, where accuracy was lower for 
inappropriate than unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 34.4, p < .001, η
2
p= .657; F2(1,81) = 
28.3, p < .001, η2p= .259).  
Reaction Times 
The correct RT data were transformed and analysed using the same method as 
Experiment 1. Again, for ease of interpretation, the means of the untransformed data 
are presented (see Figure 2-2B middle column).   
Sentence Ambiguity and Probe Relatedness. This ANOVA showed no significant 
main effect of sentence ambiguity, (F1(1,18) = 2.34, p = .114, η
2
p= .115; F2(1,81) = 
2.12, p = .150, η2p= .025), although responses were on average, 23 ms slower for 
ambiguous than unambiguous probes. This difference was significant in the 
untransformed data (F1(1,18) = 5.34, p = .033, η
2
p= .229; F2(1,81) = 4.49, p = .037, 
η2p= .053). The main effect of relatedness was not significant in the transformed 
data (F1(1,18) = .062, p = .807, η
2
p= .003; F2(1,81) = .725, p = .397, η
2
p= .009) but 
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was significant in the by-items analysis of the untransformed data, where responses, 
on average, slower for related than unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = .363, p = .555, η
2
p= 
.020; F2(1,81) = 4.65, p = .034, η
2
p= .054). There was no significant interaction 
between sentence ambiguity and probe relatedness (F1(1,18) = .012, p = .914, η
2
p= 
.001; F2(1,81) = .214, p = .645, η
2
p= .003). 
Ambiguous Inappropriate Probes. Comparing the ambiguous-inappropriate and 
ambiguous-unrelated probe conditions, the results showed a significant main effect 
of unrelated probe type, where responses were 84 ms slower for the inappropriate 
probes (F1(1,18) = 13.4, p = .002, η
2
p= .427; F2(1,81) = 27.6, p < .001, η
2
p= .254).  
2.3.3  Discussion  
The pattern of accuracy across the different probe conditions was remarkably similar 
to that of Experiment 1 (see Figure 2-2A). Despite having an additional 200ms to 
process the sentence before the probe appeared, accuracy was still lowest for the 
ambiguous-related and the ambiguous-inappropriate probes. The ambiguous-
inappropriate probes were, again, significantly less accurate than the ambiguous-
unrelated probes, indicating a specific difficulty in suppressing contextually 
inappropriate meanings. Although the ambiguous-related probes also appeared to 
have particularly low accuracy, the interaction between sentence ambiguity and 
probe relatedness did not reach statistical significance. Despite this, there was still a 
significant main effect of ambiguity, suggesting that, even at this longer probe delay, 
participants still had more difficulty understanding ambiguous than unambiguous 
sentences. Together, these results show that these (relatively rare) comprehension 
failures are not eliminated by giving an additional 200ms before presenting the 
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probe. This pattern may suggest that disambiguation failures may be an evitable 
consequence of semantic ambiguities. However, before drawing such a conclusion, 
it is important to investigate whether comprehension improves with an even longer 
probe-delay that gives participants even more uninterrupted processing time to 
disambiguate the ambiguous sentence successfully. Experiment 3 examines this 
hypothesis with a 1 second probe-delay.   
The pattern of response times, which examine trials where comprehension was 
successful, however, was markedly different to that seen in Experiment 1. Although 
responses were, on average, slower for ambiguous than unambiguous sentence 
probes, this main ambiguity effect was not statistically reliable and was only around 
a third of the size found in Experiment 1’s results (23 ms vs. 62 ms). Importantly, the 
interaction between ambiguity and probe-delay is significant, reported formally in 
Section 2.5. This suggests that, when probe words are presented at 300ms, the 
contextually appropriate meanings of ambiguous sentences are not significantly less 
integrated than those of unambiguous sentences. In contrast, the ambiguous-
inappropriate probe condition still showed a specific, large (84 ms), and highly 
significant impairment compared to ambiguous-unrelated probes, suggesting that 
the inappropriate meanings are still more active than unrelated meanings. Taken 
together, these findings suggest a dissociation between the time course of 
integrating the appropriate meaning and that of suppressing the inappropriate 
meaning, such that inappropriate meanings are briefly maintained alongside the 
correct interpretation.  
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The finding that the 300ms probe delay produced well-integrated contextually 
appropriate meanings (or, at least, meanings that were not significantly less 
integrated than those of unambiguous sentences) suggests this process is relatively 
rapid and, hence, is efficiently enhanced by disambiguating information. The 
additional finding that this integration develops in spite of highly activated 
inappropriate meanings suggests that forming a new understanding of the sentence 
may not be substantially impaired by such inappropriate representations.   
The finding that the inappropriate probes still incurred a significant cost with the 
300ms delay indicates that meaning suppression during reinterpretation has two 
cognitive features. First, encountering contextual information that is inconsistent with 
a current interpretation is not sufficient for it to be quickly suppressed. This is directly 
consistent with the reordered access model of ambiguity resolution which claims 
that contextual information only acts to enhance the contextually appropriate 
meaning (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988). It is also compatible with several 
other models of ambiguity resolution, including probabilistic constraint-based 
theories (MacDonald et al., 1994) and the structure-building framework 
(Gernsbacher, 1990; Gernsbacher & St John, 2001) that assume variable effects of 
context on the activation of an ambiguous word’s meanings. According to these 
models, contextual effects are dependent on its association with the meaning and 
the weighting of other information such as the meaning’s current level of activation. 
Second, the results demonstrate that activation of the appropriate meaning does not 
lead to simultaneous suppression of the inappropriate meaning. This is not predicted 
by models in which meanings are mutually exclusive such as Rodd et al.’s (2004) 
distributed connectionist model where increases in activation of the appropriate 
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meaning must necessarily correspond to immediate decreases in activation of 
inappropriate meanings. However, this finding may be accommodated if there are 
multiple levels of semantic representations such that word meanings can be 
activated at an early lexical-semantic level of representation that is separate from 
the subsequent sentential representation in which only one meaning is currently 
integrated. Multiple types of representations are explicitly incorporated in the 
structure-building framework (Gernsbacher, 1990) and have been formally and 
successfully implemented in computational simulations of ambiguity resolution 
(Gernsbacher & St John, 2001).  
Furthermore, the finding that the inappropriate meaning was still active when the 
probe was presented at 300ms contrasts with previous research on the initial 
selection of an ambiguous word’s meaning. Such research suggests that meanings 
may be selected within 200ms of hearing an ambiguous word (e.g., Seidenberg et 
al., 1982; Swinney, 1979). Thus, the question remains, how long does it take to 
suppress the inappropriate meaning during semantic reinterpretation? Studies on 
initial meaning selection that used the same semantic relatedness task as this 
current study used longer probe delays and report that good-readers can suppress 
inappropriate meanings by 750 ms or 1 second after reading an ambiguous word 
(Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher et al., 1990). Based on these studies, 
Experiment 3 presented the probe 1 second after the disambiguating word.   
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2.4 Experiment 3: 1 Second Probe Delay 
2.4.1 Method 
Participants 
25 (14 female) participants from the same population as Experiment 1 took part in 
this experiment. Their mean age was 22 years (range: 18-34).   
Stimuli, Design and Procedure  
The procedure was the same as Experiment 1 except that the probe was presented 
at 1 second post sentence offset.  
2.4.2 Results 
Data Preparation and Analysis  
Data were trimmed in the same way as Experiments 1 and 2 leading to one set of 
items (where the ambiguous word was “coat”) being removed from all subsequent 
statistical analyses. The same analyses were conducted as in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Individual responses faster than 300 ms or made after the timeout (2500 ms) were 
excluded, contributing to 0.6% of the total data.  
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Accuracy  
Like Experiment 1 and 2, overall accuracy was high, above 90%, for all probe types 
with the lowest accuracy for ambiguous-related and ambiguous-inappropriate 
probes (see Figure 2-2A far right column).  
Sentence Ambiguity and Probe Relatedness. This ANOVA showed a main effect 
of probe relatedness, where related probes were less accurate than unrelated 
probes (F1(1,18) = 18.2, p < .001, η
2
p= .502; F2(1,83) = 21.17, p < .001, η
2
p= .203). 
The main effect of sentence ambiguity was marginally significant in the by-subjects 
analysis, where ambiguous sentence probes were, on average, less accurate than 
unambiguous probes (F1(1,18) = 4.25 p = .054, η
2
p= .191; F2(1,83) = 2.60, p = .111, 
η2p= .030). The interaction between sentence ambiguity and probe relatedness was 
significant in the by-subjects analysis only, where the ambiguity cost was larger for 
related than unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 7.30, p = .015, η
2
p= .288; F2(1,83) = 2.81, 
p = .097, η2p= .033). Additional ANOVAs conducted on related and unrelated probes 
separately revealed that the ambiguity effect was only significant for the related 
probes (F1(1,18) = 7.70, p = .012, η
2
p= .300; F2(1,83) = 3.29, p = .073, η
2
p= .038) but 
not for the unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = .122, p = .731, η
2
p= .007; F2(1,83) = .049, p 
= .825, η2p= .001).  
Ambiguous Inappropriate Probes. The ANOVA comparing accuracy of the 
ambiguous inappropriate probes with that of the ambiguous unrelated probes 
showed a main effect of unrelated probe type, where accuracy was lower for 
inappropriate than unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 28.3, p < .001, η
2
p= .611; F2(1,83) = 
24.4, p < .001, η2p= .227).  
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Reaction Times 
The correct RT data were transformed and analysed using the same method as the 
previous experiments. Again, for ease of interpretation, the means of the 
untransformed data are presented (see Figure 2-2B far right column).   
Sentence Ambiguity and Probe Relatedness. This ANOVA showed a significant 
main effect of sentence ambiguity, with responses, on average, 48 ms slower for 
ambiguous than unambiguous probes (F1(1,18) = 27.2, p < .001, η
2
p= .602; F2(1,83) 
= 17.0, p < .001, η2p= .170). The main effect of relatedness was significant in the by-
items analysis and marginally significant in the by-subjects analysis, with responses, 
on average, faster for related than unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 4.12, p = .057, η
2
p= 
.186; F2(1,83) =17.6, p < .001, η
2
p= .175). There was no significant interaction 
between sentence ambiguity and probe relatedness (F1(1,18) = 1.41, p = .250, η
2
p= 
.073; F2(1,83) = .753, p = .388, η
2
p= .009). 
Ambiguous Inappropriate Probes. Comparing the ambiguous inappropriate and 
ambiguous unrelated probe conditions, the results showed no significant main effect 
of unrelated probe type with responses, on average, 16 ms faster for inappropriate 
probes than unrelated probes (F1(1,18) = 1.41, p = .250, η
2
p= .073; F2(1,83) = 2.37, 
p = .127, η2p= .028).   
2.4.3 Discussion 
The main aim of Experiment 3 was to assess the suppression of the inappropriate 
meaning further by using a longer probe delay, as both Experiment 1 and 2 revealed 
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that this meaning was still more active than unrelated meanings with relatively short 
probe delays.    
Accuracy 
Although error rates were somewhat lower than in the previous experiments, the 
overall pattern of accuracy across the conditions remained similar. Although the 
ambiguity cost for ambiguous-related probes was only statistically reliable in the by-
subjects analysis, this effect provides some evidence that, even with this longer 
probe delay, participants are still incurring disambiguation failures. More convincing 
evidence for these failures is seen in the performance on the ambiguous-
inappropriate probes, where accuracy was significantly lower than for the control 
ambiguous-unrelated probes across both items and subjects, suggesting that 
inappropriate interpretations may be particularly pervasive even when participants 
are given additional time to process the sentence before encountering the visual 
probe.      
Reaction Times 
The pattern of response times across the conditions was markedly different to that 
seen in the earlier experiments. Fulfilling the aim of this experiment, presenting the 
probe 1 second after the disambiguating word eliminated the specific RT cost for the 
ambiguous-inappropriate probe condition seen in Experiment 1 and 2. In fact, the 
inappropriate probes showed a contrasting trend to be faster than ambiguous-
unrelated probes, suggesting that, at this later time point, on those trials where 
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disambiguation is achieved, the inappropriate meanings have been substantially 
suppressed compared to their activation at 300ms.   
An unexpected finding was the re-emergence of a significant main effect of 
ambiguity. I suggest that this is not due to a re-emergent processing cost associated 
with accessing the appropriate meaning for two reasons. First, Experiment 2 
showed only a minimal ambiguity cost, suggesting that, already when the probe is 
presented at 300 ms post sentence offset, appropriate meanings of ambiguous 
words are relatively well integrated. Second, unlike Experiment 1 and 2, with this 1 
second delay the response times across all ambiguous probe conditions are 
remarkably similar to each other. This suggests there may be another processing 
cost that is affecting all three types of ambiguous probes.  A possible explanation is 
that it is driven by meta-linguistic processes that are evoked more by the ambiguous 
sentences than the unambiguous sentences. For example, using ambiguous 
sentences that require reinterpretation may have made the ambiguity salient and the 
1 second delay may have encouraged participants to reflect on the structure of 
those sentences and how the ambiguous words are resolved (i.e., by the last word). 
This may have generally delayed participants’ responses to probes that followed 
ambiguous sentences. The semantic priming literature provides some indirect 
support for this hypothesis. Long delays of 1 second or more between semantically-
related prime and target words (e.g., cat – dog) have been found to induce strategic 
or expectancy factors that affect lexical decisions and naming of the targets (e.g., 
Balota, Black, & Cheney, 1992; Hagoort, 1993; Neely, 1977). Neuroimaging 
research has additionally demonstrated that such long prime-target delays engage 
different neural correlates than short delays during lexical decision (Gold et al., 
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2006). Although these findings are based on tasks that implicitly tap into lexical-
semantic processing, they provide evidence that long delays between semantic 
elements of a task may give participants time to process the stimuli in a qualitatively 
different way.        
2.5 Experiments 1-3 Combined 
The three experiments revealed several interesting effects of ambiguity. As some of 
these effects (particularly in the response times) appeared to be markedly different 
across the three probe delays, the three datasets were subjected to a combined 
analysis to examine the statistical reliability of these differences. To allow for direct 
comparisons across experiments, any sets of items which were excluded from at 
least one experiment’s analyses were also excluded from the other datasets; this 
removed four sets of items. The analyses conducted were the same as those 
conducted for each experiment separately except that, now, probe delay (i.e., 
experiment) was included as a three-level (100ms, 300ms, 1 second) between-
subjects factor in the by-subjects ANOVAs and as a within-items factor in the by-
items ANOVAs.   
Accuracy 
Sentence Ambiguity, Probe Relatedness and Probe Delay. This ANOVA showed 
a main effect of probe relatedness, where related probes were less accurate than 
unrelated probes (F1(1,54) = 61.7, p < .001, η
2
p= .533; F2(1,80) = 74.0, p < .001, 
η2p= .481). The main effect of sentence ambiguity was also significant, where 
ambiguous sentence probes were less accurate than unambiguous probes (F1(1,54) 
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= 15.5, p < .001, η2p= .223; F2(1,80) = 11.8, p = .001, η
2
p= .129). This main effect of 
ambiguity was modulated by a significant interaction between sentence ambiguity 
and probe relatedness in that the ambiguity cost was larger for related than 
unrelated probes (F1(1,54) = 12.0, p = .001, η
2
p=.182; F2(1,80) = 6.04, p = .016, η
2
p= 
.070). Additional ANOVAs conducted on related and unrelated probes separately 
revealed that the ambiguity cost was only significant for the related probes (F1(1,54) 
= 16.3, p < .001, η2p= .232; F2(1,80) = 9.86, p = .002, η
2
p= .110); there was no 
significant ambiguity effect for the unrelated probes (F1(1,54) = 1.91, p = .173, η
2
p= 
.034; F2(1,80) = 1.78, p = .186, η
2
p= .022).  
Additionally, there was a main effect of probe delay that was significant only in the 
items analysis (F1(2, 54) = 2.52, p = .090, η
2
p= .085; F2(2,160) = 12.6, p < .001, η
2
p= 
.136). This main effect was largely driven by a probe delay by probe relatedness 
interaction that was again only significant in the items analysis (F1(2, 54) = 2.91, p = 
.063, η2p= .097; F2(2,160) = 7.34, p = .001, η
2
p= .084). Additional ANOVAs 
conducted on the related and unrelated probes separately revealed that the effect of 
probe delay was only significant (or marginal) for the related probes (F1(2,54) = 
3.01, p = .057, η2p= .100; F2(2,160) = 11.7, p < .001, η
2
p= .128); there was no 
significant effect of delay for the unrelated probes (F1(1,54) = .388, p = .680, η
2
p= 
.014; F2(2,160) = 1.23, p = .294, η
2
p= .015). To statistically compare which of these 
accuracy differences were significant, additional ANOVAs were conducted on the 
related probe condition (averaging across ambiguity) for each pair of probe delay 
conditions. These analyses showed that accuracy for related probes was 
significantly higher with the 1 second probe delay than with either the 100 ms delay 
(F1(1,36) = 3.37, p = .075, η
2
p= .086; F2(1,80) = 10.4, p = .002, η
2
p= .115) or the 300 
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ms delays (F1(1,36) = 6.69, p = .014, η
2
p= .157; F2(1,80) = 25.5, p < .001, η
2
p= .241). 
There was no significant difference between the accuracy rates of the 100 ms and 
300 ms delays (both Fs  < 1).  
Most importantly, there was no interaction between sentence ambiguity and probe 
delay nor a significant three-way interaction between ambiguity, relatedness and 
delay (all ps > .2), indicating that the impact of ambiguity did not differ significantly 
across the three experiments. 
Ambiguous Inappropriate Probes and Probe Delay. The ANOVA comparing 
accuracy of the ambiguous-inappropriate probes with that of the ambiguous-
unrelated probes showed a main effect of unrelated probe type, where accuracy 
was lower for inappropriate than unrelated probes (F1(1,54) = 89.6, p < .001, η
2
p= 
.624; F2(1,80) = 50.3, p < .001, η
2
p= .386). There was a main effect of probe delay 
but, again, this was only significant in the by-items analysis (F1(2,54) = 1.28, p = 
.286, η2p= .045; F2(2,160) = 3.79, p = .025, η
2
p= .045). ANOVAs comparing each 
pair of probe delays (averaging across probe condition), showed that accuracy was 
significantly higher with 1 second delay than with either the 100 ms delay (F1(1,36) = 
1.84, p = .183, η2p= .049; F2(1,80) = 4.30, p = .041, η
2
p= .051) or the 300 ms delays 
(F1(1,36) = 2.25, p = .142, η
2
p= .059; F2(1,80) = 6.63, p = .012, η
2
p= .077). There 
was no reliable difference between 100 ms and 300 ms accuracy (both Fs < 1).  
Again most importantly, the unrelated probe type by probe delay interaction was not 
significant by-subjects or by-items (ps > .2) indicating that the impact of ambiguity 
did not differ significantly across the three experiments. 
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Reaction Times 
Sentence Ambiguity, Probe Relatedness and Probe delay. This ANOVA showed 
a significant main effect of sentence ambiguity, where responses were slower for 
ambiguous than unambiguous probes (F1(1,54) = 45.4, p < .001, η
2
p= .457; F2(1,80) 
= 18.4, p < .001, η2p= .187):. There was also a marginally significant main effect of 
relatedness, whereby responses were faster for related than unrelated probes 
(F1(1,54) = 4.00, p = .051, η
2
p= .069; F2(1,80) = 3.29, p = .074, η
2
p= .039). (The 
effect of relatedness was not significant in the untransformed data (F1(1,54) = .435, 
p = .512; F2(1,80) = .080, p = .778)).There was no significant sentence ambiguity by 
probe relatedness interaction (ps > .1).  
There was a main effect of probe delay but it was significant only in the by-items 
analysis (F1 < 1, η
2
p= .035; F2(2,160) = 90.2, p < .001, η
2
p= .530). ANOVAs 
comparing each pair of probe delays (averaging across probe conditions) showed 
that responses were significantly faster with 100 ms delay than with either the 300 
ms (F1(1,36) = 2.13, p = .153, η
2
p= .056; F2(1,80) = 227.3, p < .001, η
2
p= .740) or 1 
second delay (F1 < 1, η
2
p= .008; F2(1,80) = 19.1, p < .001, η
2
p= .193). Responses 
were also faster with 1 second than 300 ms delay (F1 < 1, η
2
p= .019; F2 1,80) = 71.3, 
p < .001, η2p= .471). In the by-items analysis, there was also a significant interaction 
between probe delay and probe relatedness (F1(2,54) = 1.17, p = .319, η
2
p= .041, 
F2(2,160) = 8.91, p < .001, η
2
p= .100). ANOVAs analysing the effect of probe 
relatedness at each delay showed that the main effect of relatedness was significant 
in the 1 second delay condition (F1(1,18) = 4.40, p = .050, η
2
p= .196; F2(1,80) = 16.0, 
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p < .001, η2p= .167) but not with the 100 ms (F1(1,18) = 1.05, p = .320, η
2
p= .055; 
F2(1,80) = 2.39, p = .126, η
2
p= .029) or 300 ms delays (both Fs < 1).    
Most importantly, probe delay significantly interacted with sentence ambiguity in 
both the by-subject and by-items analyses (F1(2,54) = 5.03, p = .010, η
2
p= .157; 
F2(2,160) = 5.56, p = .005, η
2
p= .065). (The sentence ambiguity by probe delay 
interaction was marginally significant in the untransformed data (F1(2,54) = 3.09, p = 
.054; F2(2,160) = 2.90, p = .058)). Additional ANOVAs were conducted to examine 
this interaction for each pair of probe delays. The ANOVAs revealed that the effect 
of sentence ambiguity was significantly smaller in the 300 ms condition (mean 
ambiguity effect = 23 ms) compared to both the 100 ms condition (59 ms: F1(1,36) = 
8.18, p = .007, η2p= .185; F2(1,80) = 9.77, p = .002, η
2
p= .109) and the 1 second 
condition (47 ms: F1(1,36) = 6.56, p = .015, η
2
p= .154; F2(1,80) = 5.01, p = .028, η
2
p= 
.059). (The sentence ambiguity by probe delay interaction that compared the 1 
second and 300 ms delays, approached significance in untransformed data 
(F1(1,36) = 3.48, p = .070; F2(1,80) = 1.96, p = .165)). The effect of sentence 
ambiguity was not significantly different between the 100 ms and 1 second 
conditions (both ps > .2).  
As the probe delay condition (300 ms) that had the reduced ambiguity effect also 
had generally slower response times, it was important to assess whether reaction 
time was correlated with size of the ambiguity effect. To assess this, a Pearson’s 
moment correlation was conducted between the average RT and the average 
ambiguity cost (i.e., mean ambiguous probe RT – mean unambiguous probe RT) 
across the three probe delays. This showed a positive correlation between response 
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time and ambiguity effect (r1(71) = .328, p = .005; r2(85) = .359, p = .001). That is, 
slower responses times correlated with larger ambiguity costs, and thus, slower RTs 
cannot explain the smaller ambiguity effect found in the 300 ms delay condition.  
Moreover, the three-way interaction between sentence ambiguity, probe relatedness 
and probe delay was not significant by-subjects or by-items (ps > .1).   
Ambiguous Inappropriate Probes and Probe Delay. Comparing the ambiguous 
inappropriate and ambiguous unrelated probe conditions, the results showed a 
significant main effect of unrelated probe type, with responses, on average, 36 ms 
slower for inappropriate than unrelated probes (F1(1,54) = 8.83, p = .004, η
2
p= .141; 
F2(1,80) = 9.05, p = .004, η
2
p= .102). There was also a main effect of probe delay 
that was significant in the items analysis only (F1 < 1, η
2
p= .020; F2(2,160) = 19.1, p 
< .001, η2p= .193). Responses were significantly slower with the 300 ms probe delay 
than with either the 100 ms delay (F1 (1,36) = 1.00, p = .324, η
2
p= .027; F2(1,80) = 
27.9, p < .001, η2p= .259) or 1 second delay (F1 < 1, η
2
p= .021; F2(1,80) = 33.9, p < 
.001, η2p= .298). There was no difference between 100 ms and 1 second delays 
(both Fs < 1).  
Importantly, there was a significant interaction between unrelated probe type and 
probe delay (F1(2,54) = 7.68, p = .001, η
2
p= .221; F2(2,160) = 13.7, p < .001, η
2
p= 
.146). Additional ANOVAs conducted to assess this interaction between each pair of 
probe delays conditions showed that the inappropriate probe effect was significantly 
smaller with the 1 second probe delay than with both the 100 ms (F1(1,36) = 8.40, p 
= .006, η2p= .189; F2(1,80) = 12.8, p = .001, η
2
p= .138) and 300 ms probe delay 
(F1(1,36) = 12.1, p = .001, η
2
p= .251; F2(1,80) = 24.4, p < .001, η
2
p= .234). Although 
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the inappropriate probe effect was larger in the 300 ms than the 100 ms delay, a 
further ANOVA that included only these two probe delays showed no significant 
interaction between probe delay and unrelated probe type, demonstrating that this 
difference was not statistically reliable (F1(1,36) = 1.01, p = .321, η
2
p= .027; F2(1,80) 
= 3.02, p = .086, η2p= .036). (The unrelated probe type by probe delay interaction 
that compared the 100 ms and 300 ms delays was significant in the items analysis 
on the untransformed data (F2(1,80) = 6.33, p = .014)). 
2.6 General Discussion  
Understanding how ambiguous words are reinterpreted in light of disambiguating 
information can provide important insights into the flexibility of semantic 
interpretations. This study employed a new task to assess the effectiveness of 
reinterpretation as well as its time course. The results showed various ambiguity 
effects in both the accuracy and RT data which demonstrated that resolving late-
disambiguation sentences is a cognitively costly but fully achievable process.    
Effectiveness of Semantic Reinterpretation 
The accuracy data showed interesting effects of ambiguity that were not significantly 
modulated by the length of the probe delay. First, across the three experiments, 
accuracy was high. Participants were, on average, over 90% accurate for the two 
critical ambiguous conditions: ambiguous-related and ambiguous-inappropriate 
probes. This indicates that listeners are usually highly effective at reinterpreting 
dominant-meaning interpretations of ambiguous words in light of inconsistent, 
subordinate-biased, information. At first, this finding may not seem surprising 
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because the sentences contained disambiguating words. However, several features 
of the disambiguating context may have made it difficult for participants to resolve 
these ambiguities correctly. The disambiguating context was presented at the end of 
a fairly long sentence, several words after the ambiguous word. Such distance could 
have impaired integration of these sentential elements due to memory constraints. 
This may have been particularly detrimental as the sentences were spoken, and, 
thus, do not leave a permanent signal that may be revisited like written sentences. 
In addition, the context was minimal in that only one, or occasionally two, words 
were used, which could have been inadequate to trigger reinterpretation of an 
inconsistent interpretation. Instead, the high accuracy for both ambiguous-related 
and inappropriate probes shows that listeners make use of even minimal context to 
resolve ambiguity and, thus, must be constantly integrating contextual information to 
ensure accurate comprehension of words heard much earlier in sentences. This 
concurs with probabilistic constraint-based theories of language comprehension, in 
which multiple sources of information are continually and simultaneously used to 
constrain comprehension (MacDonald et al., 1994; MacDonald & Seidenberg, 
2006). In addition, these findings for spoken sentences complement and converge 
with the high accuracy found for visually-presented late-disambiguation sentences 
(Miyake et al., 1994; Zempleni et al., 2007), despite the potentially different 
processing demands that may result from the inherently different signals (i.e., 
transient versus permanent).  
Despite high absolute accuracy, accuracy was reduced for the ambiguous-related 
and ambiguous-inappropriate probes (relative to the appropriate control conditions). 
Because performance in these conditions did not significantly improve with 
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increasing probe delay and there was still evidence of occasional disambiguation 
errors with the 1 second probe delay, this suggests that a small number of 
misinterpretations might be inevitable wherever semantic ambiguity of this type is 
present. This failure to appreciate the relationship between context and the intended 
meaning of the ambiguous word may be the result of numerous factors, such as (i) 
lapses in attention toward the disambiguating information, (ii) idiosyncratic 
associations that listeners hold between the disambiguating words and the 
unintended meaning, or (iii) for some listeners, the intended meaning may be too 
infrequent to be activated by the context (Rodd et al., 2013). It must be noted, 
however, that these errors only occurred on a small portion of trials (less than 10%), 
demonstrating that listeners are usually highly effective at resolving ambiguities. 
Future work is needed to assess the causes of disambiguation failures and possible 
individual differences in the efficiency of these processes (Gernsbacher et al., 1990; 
Twilley & Dixon, 2000).  
Time Course of Semantic Reinterpretation 
Probe delay significantly modulated two ambiguity effects in the RT data: the main 
effect of ambiguity and the inappropriate probe effect. These modulations provide 
insights into the time course of the processes underlying semantic reinterpretation. 
Experiment 1 revealed a significant main effect of sentence ambiguity when probes 
were presented 100 ms after the disambiguating word. Both ambiguous-related and 
ambiguous-unrelated probes were responded to more slowly than unambiguous 
sentence probes, suggesting that disambiguation was not complete by the time the 
probe word appeared. This suggests that semantic reinterpretation is not a process 
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that occurs rapidly when inconsistent information is encountered and, hence, is 
consistent with the notion that reinterpretation is a time consuming, cognitively 
demanding process (Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Frazier, 1989; Rodd, Johnsrude, et 
al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 2007).  
Importantly, there was a significant interaction between this general ambiguity effect 
and probe delay. Critically, the ambiguity effect significantly reduced to around a 
third of its size when the probe was presented 300 ms after the disambiguating 
word. Although there was some evidence that responses were also generally slower 
with the 300 ms probe delay compared to the 100 ms delay, this cannot explain the 
reduced ambiguity cost found with this delay because 1) the slow RT trend was only 
reliable across items, suggesting it was driven by a subset of participants and 2) 
slower RTs significantly correlated with larger ambiguity costs not smaller ones. 
Thus, instead, these findings suggest that having an extra 200 ms of uninterrupted 
processing time helped enhance the meaning of the sentence. This finding, thus, 
further suggests that the processing cost of reanalysing ambiguity is a relatively 
transient phenomenon reflecting relatively rapid reinterpretation of the correct 
meaning. Unexpectedly, this ambiguity cost re-appeared with the longest probe 
delay (1 second). However, this may be driven by meta-linguistic awareness of the 
ambiguity that is evoked by long delays. This issue will be discussed further later.  
Interestingly, there was no interaction between sentence ambiguity and probe 
relatedness in any of the three experiments, indicating that there was no specific 
slow down for probes that were related (as opposed to unrelated) to the ambiguous 
words. This is most likely because the task required explicit semantic decisions, 
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meaning that all probes rely on participants having integrated the correct meaning. 
Thus, partial activation of, or uncertainty about, the contextually appropriate 
meaning can slow down decisions for both related and unrelated probes. 
The second important ambiguity effect was a specific RT cost for ambiguous-
inappropriate probes. In contrast to the main effect of ambiguity, this inappropriate 
probe effect was evident with both the 100 ms and 300 ms probe delays. The finding 
that RTs for these probes were greater than the ambiguity-unrelated probes 
indicates that this processing cost extended beyond the general cost of ambiguity 
and, therefore, can specifically suggest that inappropriate meanings were more 
active than unrelated meanings at these two time points. Unlike the general 
ambiguity cost that was significantly smaller at 300 ms compared to at 100 ms, the 
inappropriate cost was numerically larger (albeit not significantly) at 300 ms, 
suggesting that no substantial suppression of the inappropriate meaning occurred 
during this interval. Importantly, as the reduction in the general ambiguity cost with 
300 ms probe delay was not accompanied by significant suppression of the 
inappropriate meaning, this supports the view that the general ambiguity cost is 
specifically associated with stability of the contextually appropriate meaning. 
Furthermore, the inappropriate probe cost disappeared with the 1 second probe 
delay, suggesting that the inappropriate meaning requires several hundred 
milliseconds to be reduced.  
Theoretical Implications 
Together, these error rate and response time data suggest that, when 
disambiguating information was encountered several words after an ambiguous 
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word, contextually inappropriate meanings were over-active whilst contextually 
appropriate meanings were under-active. Time-costly processes, then, ensued to 
suppress the former and enhance the latter. This is consistent with a wealth of 
behavioural research and many models of semantic ambiguity resolution which 
argue that listeners (and readers) rapidly select a single interpretation of an 
ambiguous word even when no disambiguating context has yet been encountered, 
which will require reinterpretation if it is not consistent with subsequent information 
(Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010; Twilley & Dixon, 
2000).  
Current perspectives on ambiguity resolution, however, lack detail about the 
processes underlying semantic reinterpretation, stating only two features: 1) that it is 
a time-consuming or cognitively demanding operation and 2) that it involves two key 
processes of selecting the appropriate meaning and suppressing the inappropriate 
meaning (Duffy et al., 1988; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010, 2012). The current 
results provide novel evidence that support and detail these features further. First, 
the main ambiguity effect found in the RT data constitutes the first direct evidence 
that integrating a non-selected, yet, contextually appropriate meaning is a time-
consuming process, as speculated in previous studies that found general processing 
costs associated with reinterpretation (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; 
Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010). This process may be slowed through interference 
from contextually inappropriate meanings that were initially selected during 
comprehension, as evinced by the inappropriate probe RT cost. However, the 
additional finding that the general ambiguity effect reduces without a corresponding 
reduction in the inappropriate probe cost suggests that the activation of an 
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inappropriate meaning does not prevent listeners from ultimately attaining a correct 
interpretation of the sentence. This, perhaps, suggests a dissociation between 
meanings being active and their being integrated into a listener’s current 
interpretation of a sentence (or discourse), which is conceivably akin to 
Gernsbacher and St John’s (2002) distinction between concept-level and sentence-
level representations.    
Furthermore, the results provide the first evidence suggesting that the two key 
processes of activating appropriate meanings and suppressing inappropriate 
meanings during reinterpretation have different time courses. Unfortunately the 
exact timings of these processing stages cannot be inferred on the basis of this task 
because a decision is not made instantaneously with presentation of the probe. 
Instead, the different patterns of responses at these different probe positions provide 
insights into the relative timing of these two critical processes. The results suggest 
that the former is a relatively rapid process while the latter suppression process has 
a slower time course. This is difficult to reconcile with models in which meanings are 
strictly mutually exclusive such as distributed connectionist models (e.g., Rodd et 
al., 2004) unless multiple levels of representation are assumed (Gernsbacher & St 
John, 2001).  
Furthermore, while the current study cannot explain the reasons for this dissociation, 
the notion that a dissociation may occur is consistent with various different theories 
of ambiguity resolution. The reordered access model suggests that contextual 
selectivity may drive this difference, since contextual information is assumed to 
selectively affect the contextually appropriate meaning, leaving the inappropriate 
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meanings to decay passively (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988). In contrast, 
MacDonald et al.’s (1994) constraint-based theory does not claim for exclusive 
effects of specific constraints on specific meanings but suggests this dissociation 
may result from different weightings of constraints for alternative meanings. Under 
this account, the reinterpretation dissociation may arise for two reasons. First, the 
contextual information may have supported the contextually appropriate meaning 
more than it constrained the inappropriate meaning. This is possible as the 
disambiguating words in this set of stimuli explicitly related to features of the 
contextually appropriate meaning. For example, in the sentence “the teacher 
explained that the bark was going to be damp”, the word “damp” relates to the 
texture of the tree meaning of “bark”. Second, the activation levels of the two 
meanings may have differently modulated the influence of the contextual 
constraints. For instance, inappropriate meanings that were initially selected may 
have developed robust activation during sentence comprehension or been 
maintained by some excitatory connections, which may render these meanings 
difficult to suppress. Gernsbacher et al.’s structure building framework 
(Gernsbacher, 1990; Gernsbacher & St John, 2001) posits an additional more 
temporally specific explanation. According to this theory, suppression of 
inappropriate meanings may be delayed because it is driven, and thus must be 
preceded, by the creation of the new sentence-level representation. An alternative 
entirely different explanation is that currently non-preferred meanings may be 
actively maintained (e.g., by executive control mechanism) in case the current 
meaning turns out to be incorrect, as argued by right-hemisphere accounts of 
ambiguity resolution (e.g., Faust & Chiarello, 1998; Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996).  
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Despite the apparent temporal dissociation between the activation and suppression 
of meanings, the results showed that, in the 1 second probe delay condition, the 
inappropriate meaning was reduced to the level of unrelated word meanings. This is 
entirely compatible with most ambiguity models which view disambiguation as the 
process of settling on one interpretation whilst actively suppressing/inhibiting 
alternative meanings (Gernsbacher, 1990; MacDonald et al., 1994; Rodd et al., 
2004) or letting them decay to their original state (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 
1988). 
Methodological Implications 
The results also highlight several methodological issues that are important to 
consider when investigating ambiguity resolution. The finding of a general 
processing cost of disambiguation calls into question the suitability of baseline 
conditions used in previous ambiguity studies. For example, Gernsbacher et al. 
(1990) pioneered the use of semantic relatedness tasks to assess activation of 
contextually inappropriate meanings, arguing that by using probes unrelated to 
unambiguous sentences as the comparison condition, any additional time required 
to respond to ambiguous-inappropriate probes would index how activated the 
inappropriate meaning was. However, the results of this study show that relatedness 
judgements on an ambiguous sentence can be delayed even when the decision 
(ambiguous-unrelated) does not pertain to the inappropriate meaning. Thus, slower 
response times for ambiguous-inappropriate probes compared to unambiguous-
unrelated probes may reflect a general processing difficulty for ambiguous 
sentences rather than an activated inappropriate meaning per se. Hence, I argue for 
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the use of an ambiguous sentence control condition (i.e., ambiguous-unrelated) to 
account for general costs of processing ambiguous sentences.   
In addition, the unexpected re-emergence of the general ambiguity effect with the 1 
second probe delay highlights the potential problem that long probe delays can 
cause by evoking processes not involved in natural sentence comprehension. The 1 
second delay may have encouraged participants to reflect on the structure of those 
sentences causing participants to be generally delayed when presented with a 
probe after an ambiguous sentence. This possibility is supported by the finding that 
all ambiguous probe types had similarly long response times, suggesting that, with 
this longer delay, there is a factor (i.e. metal-linguistic awareness) affecting 
decisions on ambiguous probes in general. This further emphasizes the importance 
of ambiguous control conditions so as to assess general behavioural effects of 
ambiguity that are not specific to the alternative meanings of ambiguous words as 
well as including intermediate probe delays. It must be noted, however, that the use 
of these baselines may be more important for certain types of tasks and stimuli than 
others, in particular, for sentences or tasks likely to evoke meta-linguistic awareness 
of the ambiguity (e.g., late-disambiguation sentences and explicit semantic tasks). 
A potential concern of using a probe task to assess comprehension is that the probe 
itself may affect the natural course of the comprehension process. In particular, the 
inappropriate interference effect that was found with the 300 ms, and even the 100 
ms, probe delays may have occurred because the probe itself “reactivated” the 
inappropriate meaning of the ambiguous word rather than because the inappropriate 
meaning was still active when the probe appeared. While this is a possibility and 
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could potentially contribute, to some degree, to the inappropriate interference effect, 
it cannot explain the full pattern of results. First, if the inappropriate probe (e.g., 
“bread”) is simply “reactivating” the inappropriate meaning of an ambiguous word 
(e.g., “toast” in “the man made the toast with a very old microphone”), then an 
interference effect would most likely have been found regardless of probe delay. 
However, when the probe was presented at 1 second post sentence offset, 
responses were not significantly slower for the inappropriate probes than the control 
ambiguous-unrelated probes. In fact, they were numerically faster. This suggests 
that a simple reactivation hypothesis is not adequate to explain the lack of an 
inappropriate interference effect at the longest probe delay. A more complex 
reactivation hypothesis may still be possible, where the level of interference from the 
"reactivated" meaning relies on the level of uncertainty that surrounds the sentence 
meaning. That is, reactivation of inappropriate meaning may not have interfered with 
comprehension at 1 second because the sentence meaning had developed into a 
stable state by that time such that it was impervious to influences from the 
inappropriate meaning. However, this does not explain the lack of difference 
between the inappropriate effects with the 100 ms and 300 ms delays, given that the 
results also showed a greater stability/certainty of the sentence meaning between 
these two time-points. This improvement should have then also reduced the level of 
interference caused by the inappropriate probe.   
Thus, together the set of results suggests that the interference effect of the probe 
condition is not merely due to reactivating a non-active inappropriate meaning. The 
inappropriate meaning must be at some level of activation when the 100 ms and 300 
ms probes were encountered  in order to be susceptible to influence from the probe. 
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In addition, there is no behavioural evidence to suggest that this level of activation is 
qualitatively different between these time points. However, their activation does 
qualitatively change when the probe is presented at 1 second. Nevertheless, future 
studies are needed to test this reactivation hypothesis by using a more implicit 
semantic task that reduces the potential task-induced interference of the 
inappropriate probe, such as a word-naming task to assess whether the pattern of 
effects found with the probe verification task remain the same. Performance on 
these tasks has been shown to be relatively immune to backward priming effects of 
the probe word, as evidenced by the finding that targets that have strong backward 
associations with the prime (e.g., pan-bed) do not produce priming (e.g., Burgess, 
Tanenhaus, & Seidenberg, 1989; Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders, & Langer, 1984).   
Future research 
As well as providing novel findings to expand models of semantic disambiguation, 
this study also highlights various questions that warrant future research. First, to 
what extent is the suggested temporal dissociation between contextually appropriate 
and inappropriate meaning modulated by meaning frequency? This is important as 
frequency is consistently highlighted as an important constraint in ambiguity 
resolution (e.g., Chen & Boland, 2008; Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; 
Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; MacDonald et al., 1994; Simpson, 1994; Tabossi & 
Zardon, 1993; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). Second, to what degree does the amount of 
disambiguating context (e.g., single vs. multiple biasing words) and/or the nature of 
this context (e.g., syntactic, pragmatic or semantic cues) affect the speed and 
quality of disambiguation? By assessing both the outcome of the disambiguation 
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process via accuracy and the process of disambiguation via reaction times, this 
paradigm constitutes a novel efficient way to investigate these questions.  
Furthermore, the reinterpretation process has, until now, been discussed in rather 
broad terms as a process that has two aspects: 1) integrating a non-preferred, yet, 
contextually appropriate meaning and 2) inhibiting a currently active, but 
inappropriate, meaning that was selected prior to the disambiguating information. 
However, these two components are unlikely to involve the same operations across 
all types of ambiguous sentences. In particular, their nature is inevitably dependent 
on the nature and outcome of the initial selection process. For example, for some 
sentences, selecting the contextually appropriate interpretation may involve 
activating a currently “inactive” meaning. This may be because that meaning was 
either suppressed earlier during comprehension or it was never activated at the 
initial encounter of the ambiguous word. The latter may be the case for words that 
have really infrequent meanings (e.g., the “animal enclosure” meaning of “pen”). For 
other sentences, this process may involve merely boosting the activation of meaning 
that has been maintained at a lower level of activation during comprehension. 
Future research is needed to distinguish between these possibilities.  
Moreover, some researchers have also argued that meanings may be maintained in 
parallel until contextual support is encountered, especially if working memory 
capacity is sufficient for this (Miyake et al., 1994). Therefore, an additional possibility 
is that for some sentences listeners have maintained multiple meanings in parallel 
and the processing cost reflects difficulty in selecting between simultaneously active 
meanings as oppose to difficulty in reinterpretation per se. It is possible that such 
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selection would be demanding in these kinds of sentences because of the long 
distance between the ambiguous word and the contextual information that may 
make contextual integration difficult or it may be demanding merely because both 
representations have been strengthened throughout this delay, rendering it difficult 
to select one representation. However, it is unlikely that late-selection is 
substantially contributing to the processing costs found in this study because the 
majority of sentences were biased in that the ambiguous words had one more 
dominant meaning. It is well-established from behavioural data, and shown in 
computational simulations, that frequency information guides activation and 
integration with the sentence context such that the more dominant meaning is 
maintained at a higher level and integrated more than the subordinate meaning 
(e.g., Duffy et al., 2001; Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; Simpson & Krueger, 1991; 
Twilley & Dixon, 2000), which will need reinterpretation when context supporting the 
subordinate meaning is encountered. Nevertheless it is possible that selection may 
be delayed for balanced ambiguous words which have two relatively equal 
frequencies (Miyake et al., 1994). On the other hand, there is a larger body of 
evidence from priming and eye-movement studies that converges on the conclusion 
that even for balanced words a single meaning is predominately integrated into 
comprehension (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Seidenberg et al., 
1982; Swinney, 1979). Thus, it is clear that much more research is needed not only 
to understand the operations underlying reinterpretation but also the nature of the 
initial selection process.  
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Conclusion 
The accuracy and reaction time results show that delaying disambiguating 
information until the end of a spoken sentence does not prevent successful and 
complete resolution of semantic ambiguity. Semantic representations generated 
during comprehension can be flexibly changed in light of conflicting context. 
However, delaying context causes listeners to select an initial interpretation 
prematurely, which requires costly reinterpretation when a contextually inappropriate 
meaning is selected. In addition, the results suggest that suppression of the 
contextually inappropriate meanings does not occur immediately upon encountering 
inconsistent disambiguating information but may be delayed for several hundred 
milliseconds. Furthermore, despite high rates of disambiguation, some 
miscomprehensions seem inevitable wherever ambiguities of this type are present.  
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Chapter 3 Neural Responses to Semantically Ambiguous 
Sentences: An fMRI Study 
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3.1 Introduction 
A large body of behavioural research, including my work presented in the preceding 
chapter, demonstrates that understanding the correct meaning of an ambiguous 
word is a cognitively demanding process, especially when semantic reinterpretation 
is required. Existing neuroimaging studies of semantic ambiguity resolution have 
identified several key regions as being involved in this process (Bekinschtein, Davis, 
Rodd, & Owen, 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; 
Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 2007, see 
Figure 3-1) but their precise roles remain uncertain. Examining the neural responses 
to semantic ambiguities is important as it provides a means to gain insight into high-
level language networks operating during sentence comprehension that support key 
cognitive operations such as conflict resolution, contextual integration and inhibition.  
 
Figure 3-1: Left hemisphere regions that have been shown to have greater 
BOLD signal for semantically ambiguous than unambiguous sentences. 
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3.1.1 Initial Neuroimaging Studies 
One of the first fMRI studies to investigate semantic ambiguity resolution within 
sentence contexts was conducted by Rodd et al. (2005). Participants listened to 
sentences that contained several ambiguous words (e.g., “there were dates and 
pears on the kitchen table”). Activation was greater for ambiguous than well-
matched unambiguous sentences in several frontal and temporal regions: the left 
and right inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG, RIFG) and the left posterior temporal cortex 
that included the inferior temporal gyrus (LITG), fusiform and middle temporal gyrus 
(LMTG). These results provided the first evidence that the comprehension of 
semantically ambiguous sentences may be supported by a fronto-temporal network.  
The specific regions that were engaged by ambiguity were theoretically important on 
several levels. First, the LIFG activation resided in its middle and posterior sub-
divisions (pars triangularis and pars opercularis), which have been traditionally 
attributed to non-semantic processes, including speech production (Broca, 1861; 
Geschwind, 1970; Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; Penfield & Roberts, 1959; Wernicke, 
1874) and syntactic computations (Caplan, Alpert, & Waters, 1998; Caramazza & 
Zurif, 1976; Dapretto & Bookheimer, 1999; Goodglass et al., 1979; Grodzinsky, 
1986; Schwartz, Saffran, & Marin, 1980). Yet, Rodd et al.’s (2005) study tapped into 
semantic processing demands. Second, when prior research had attributed the 
LIFG to semantics, it was often highlighted as being important for explicit semantic 
decisions that required the strategic retrieval, maintenance or selection of semantic 
information rather than for natural speech comprehension per se (Crinion, Lambon-
Ralph, Warburton, Howard, & Wise, 2003; Gabrieli, Poldrack, & Desmond, 1998; 
Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2005; Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, 
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& Farah, 1997; A. D. Wagner, Paré-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001). However, in 
Rodd et al.’s (2005) study, LIFG activation was higher for ambiguous sentences 
despite the fact that participants were not aware of the ambiguity and did not rate 
these sentences as being any less natural than the unambiguous sentences. Such 
activation in the absence of explicit awareness makes it unlikely that they were due 
to strategic processes, and, hence, suggested a more routine involvement of this 
region in natural sentence comprehension. Rodd et al.’s (2005) findings are not, 
however, incompatible with non-semantic or strategy-based semantic accounts of 
LIFG function, as regions may serve multiple functions or there may be an overlap 
between neuronal populations that support different functions within the same 
anatomical regions (see Price & Devlin, 2003 for similar arguments about the left 
mid-fusiform gyrus). Furthermore, the posterior temporal activation was intriguing 
because it contrasted with accounts that highlighted anterior temporal structures as 
being important for semantic processing (Chan et al., 2001; Mummery et al., 2000; 
Nobre, Allison, & McCarthy, 1994). Thus, together, Rodd et al.’s (2005) study 
suggested that the LIFG may be more important for normal speech comprehension 
than had previously been emphasised, and that posterior, as oppose to anterior, 
temporal cortex is involved in semantic processes associated with ambiguous 
words.  
The consistency of this network in ambiguity resolution was supported by two 
subsequent studies that used the same stimuli as Rodd et al. (2005). Davis et al. 
(2007) replicated these findings in a study that examined ambiguity resolution at 
different levels of awareness. Subjects who were fully awake, but not those who 
were lightly or deeply sedated, showed ambiguity-elevated activity in the LIFG 
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bilaterally and in the posterior LITG. Such responses were also found in a small 
number of patients who were clinically diagnosed as being in a vegetative state or 
minimally conscious (Coleman et al., 2009; Coleman et al., 2007). Together, these 
results demonstrated that semantic ambiguity produces significant and reliable 
effects on neural activity, highlighting the importance of understanding this brain 
network for developing comprehensive models of language comprehension.   
From these ambiguity studies it is unclear which ambiguity-related processes are 
supported by these regions. As reviewed in Chapter 1, the psycholinguistic literature 
emphasises two key cognitive components of semantic ambiguity resolution during 
sentence comprehension: 1) initial meaning selection, when a single meaning is 
quickly selected after an ambiguous word is encountered and 2) semantic 
reinterpretation, when the initial selection needs to be changed in light of 
subsequent, inconsistent, context. Such research also demonstrates that different 
types of ambiguous words and sentential contexts place differential demands on 
these two components (Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rodd, Johnsrude, 
et al., 2010; Sereno et al., 2006). However, the set of ambiguous sentences 
examined in the aforementioned fMRI studies were heterogeneous in terms of these 
properties. For example, the position of the ambiguous words and the 
disambiguating information varied across sentences, the ambiguous words were a 
mixture of balanced and biased words and the contextual bias was not explicitly 
manipulated. Thus, it is unclear which ambiguity demands were contributing to the 
activation of these regions.  
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Building on the initial work of Rodd et al. (2005), several fMRI studies have 
examined this network by systematically manipulating demands on different 
ambiguity processes (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 2007). Such 
research has revealed various important insights into the ambiguity network, 
especially regarding the potential roles of the LIFG and the left posterior temporal 
cortex in semantic ambiguity resolution.  
3.1.2 LIFG and Semantic Ambiguity Resolution 
The LIFG is the most consistent region to show increased BOLD signal for 
sentences that contain semantically ambiguous words. In fact, this region has been 
reported in all published studies directly comparing these sentences with 
unambiguous ones (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Mason & Just, 
2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; 
Zempleni et al., 2007). Such consistency is due to the fact that the LIFG responds to 
a wide variety of semantically ambiguous sentences. Compared to unambiguous 
sentences, increased activation has been found for late-disambiguation sentences 
in which the ambiguous word was disambiguated to its subordinate meaning (Mason 
& Just, 2007; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007), dominant 
meaning (Zempleni et al., 2007) or one of two equally frequent (i.e., balanced) 
meanings (Mason & Just, 2007). In addition, such higher activation is also reported 
across a range of disambiguating positions: for sentences in which the 
disambiguating information immediately follows the ambiguous word (Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010), is delayed for several words 
(Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007), or even 
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precedes the ambiguity (Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012). Together, these findings 
clearly demonstrate that the LIFG plays a fundamental role in ambiguity resolution.  
Involvement of the LIFG across a variety of ambiguous sentences suggests that this 
region may support the initial processing of an ambiguous word. Direct evidence for 
this role was found by Rodd et al. (2012) who used semisparse fMRI to examine the 
time-course of neural responses to specific ambiguity-related events during 
sentence comprehension. The results showed that LIFG activation for ambiguous 
sentences was greater than unambiguous sentences at time-points that 
corresponded to presentation of the ambiguous word and was evident for sentences 
in which the disambiguating information preceded the ambiguous word (e.g., “the 
hunter thought that the hare in the field was actually a rabbit”) as well as for 
sentences in which the context occurred much later than the ambiguity (e.g., “the 
ecologist thought that the plant by the river should be closed down). Based on these 
results, Rodd et al. (2012) argued that the LIFG supports initial semantic selection 
processes that occur when an ambiguous word is encountered, supporting the 
selection of a single meaning based on contextual or frequency information, as 
proposed in current psycholinguistic models of ambiguity resolution (e.g., Duffy et 
al., 2001; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). The importance of the LIFG in the initial 
processing of an ambiguous word during sentence comprehension is further 
corroborated by several patient studies. Such studies demonstrate that patients with 
Broca’s aphasia are impaired in using prior sentence context to activate or select the 
contextually appropriate meaning of ambiguous words (e.g., Grindrod, 2012; Swaab, 
Brown, & Hagoort, 1998; Swinney et al., 1989). Supporting this finding, Vuong and 
Martin (2011) recently showed that patients with relatively circumscribed lesions to 
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the LIFG also had difficulty reading such sentences, especially when the context 
preceding the ambiguous word biased its subordinate meaning.   
While such evidence clearly demonstrates that the LIFG has a role in the initial 
processing of an ambiguous word, the aforementioned fMRI studies also suggest 
that this region is involved further downstream during comprehension, specifically, 
when the meaning of an ambiguous word needs to be reinterpreted. Supporting 
evidence for the LIFG’s role in semantic reinterpretation comes from the finding that 
its activation is affected by two factors: the position of the disambiguating 
information in the sentence and meaning dominance. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
reinterpretation is most likely to occur for late-disambiguation sentences, where 
disambiguating information is delayed for several words after the ambiguous word, 
since a meaning is selected relatively quickly after encountering an ambiguous word 
without prior context (Duffy et al., 1988; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010; Seidenberg 
et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). Reinterpretation is especially 
likely for two variants of late-disambiguation sentences: 1) for those with a biased 
ambiguous word that is disambiguated to its subordinate meaning since the 
dominant meaning is likely to be initially selected (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 
1988; Simpson & Krueger, 1991; Twilley & Dixon, 2000) and 2) for those with a 
balanced ambiguous word. For the latter, the incorrect meaning is likely to be 
selected approximately half the time, as they do not have a systematic frequency 
bias (Duffy et al., 1988; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979).    
Three previous fMRI studies support the semantic reinterpretation hypothesis of the 
LIFG, showing increased activation in this region to late-disambiguation sentences 
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and that it is affected by the position of disambiguation and modulated by meaning 
dominance. First, Rodd et al. (2012)’s time course study demonstrated that the LIFG 
produced responses that were time-locked to the disambiguating information as well 
as to the ambiguous word itself. Specifically, sentences in which disambiguating 
information was presented a few words after the ambiguous word (e.g., “the scientist 
thought that the film on the water was from the pollution”) produced greater 
responses in early processing time-windows than sentences in which context was 
delayed until several words later (“e.g., the ecologist thought that the plant by the 
river should be closed down”). The latter produced more activation in later time-
windows compared to the former. In support, Zempleni et al. (2007) showed greater 
LIFG activation for late-disambiguation sentences that referred to the subordinate 
meaning of biased ambiguous words than sentences that referred to the dominant 
meaning. In both types of sentences, the dominant meaning would often be initially 
selected, since context was presented later in the sentence. Thus, in the former 
sentences, this selection would turn out to be incorrect when the subordinate-
biasing context would be encountered, and thus need reinterpretation, whereas it 
would be correct in the latter sentences and thus not need reinterpretation. 
Corroborating evidence was further reported by Mason and Just (2007) who 
compared late-disambiguation sentences that contained balanced words with those 
that contained biased words. The latter were always disambiguated toward the 
subordinate meaning. Initial support came from the finding that both types of 
sentences produced greater LIFG activation than unambiguous sentences. This is in 
line with the reinterpretation hypothesis, since, again, delaying context causes 
inappropriate meanings to be selected on some proportion of trials. However, this is 
not strong evidence since both contrasts compare ambiguous sentences to 
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unambiguous sentences so the results may merely reflect processes associated 
with the initial processing of an ambiguous word rather than its reinterpretation per 
se. More critical support came from their direct comparison between the two types of 
ambiguous sentences, which showed that activation was additionally greater for the 
biased than balanced sentences. The former requires reinterpretation more often 
because it is only for these words that frequency systematically biases the initial 
meaning selection towards the incorrect (i.e., dominant) meaning. Therefore, 
together, this set of findings is consistent with the main predictions of the semantic 
reinterpretation hypothesis.  
Supporting evidence, however, has not been found in all studies that examined late-
disambiguation studies. Rodd et al. (2010) failed to find significant effects of 
meaning dominance on LIFG activation and Bekinschtein et al. (2011) only found a 
significant ambiguity response in this region for humorous, but not for non-humorous 
sentences. However, the lack of support for reinterpretation in these two studies can 
be explained in ways that do not have negative implications for this hypothesis. 
Rodd et al. (2010) suggested that the effect of meaning dominance may have been 
reduced in their study because of the relative position of the ambiguity and the 
disambiguating information in their stimuli. In their sentences, the ambiguous word 
was always disambiguated immediately after the ambiguity by the subsequent verb, 
which may have left insufficient time for a meaning to be selected prior to the 
disambiguating information that would need reinterpretation (e.g., “In Australia, 
strange barks grow on many trees”). Bekinschtein et al.’s (2011) null-finding for non-
humorous sentences is more surprising as the ambiguous stimuli followed a similar 
structure to that used in previous studies where the disambiguating information was 
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delayed relative to the ambiguous word. However, the ambiguous word and 
disambiguating information were not presented in the same sentence. Instead, the 
ambiguous word was presented at the end of a question and disambiguated by the 
following sentence (e.g., What happened to the post? As usual, it was given to the 
best-qualified applicant). This may have caused the ambiguity and its 
reinterpretation to be processed differently compared to when an ambiguous word is 
encountered during a sentence and/or this effect may be masked by additional 
between-sentence integration processes that may occur in ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentences. However, the nature of its potential effect on LIFG 
involvement is unclear.  Thus, in light of these explanations, the current set of these 
neuroimaging results appears consistent with the hypothesis that the LIFG is 
involved in semantic reinterpretation.  
The precise nature of the LIFG’s involvement in this process, however, is uncertain 
because there are notable differences between the reinterpretation-related findings 
reported across studies. The most apparent difference is the locus and extent of the 
LIFG response. Rodd et al. (2012) report a large cluster of reinterpretation-elevated 
activation that extends across all three anatomical sub-divisions of the LIFG, with 
activation centred in posterior pars triangularis. Mason and Just (2007) also report 
increased activation in a large region of the LIFG when they compared late-
disambiguation sentences to unambiguous sentences. However, the peak co-
ordinate was much more medial than that reported in Rodd et al. (2012) (x = -28 
versus x = -52, respectively) and the cluster appears confined primarily to pars 
triangularis and pars opercularis, with little anterior spread into pars orbitalis. Yet, 
the direct comparison between biased and balanced sentences was only localised 
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to a small cluster of activation in an anterior ventral region of the LIFG near the 
border of pars triangularis and pars orbitalis. In contrast, Zempleni et al. (2007) 
report activation in a small region of the posterior LIFG only, around the border of 
pars triangularis and pars opercularis. What can explain these discrepancies? A 
simple statistical explanation is that these differences are merely a thresholding 
artefact. Both Zempleni et al. (2007) and Mason and Just (2007) who report less 
extensive activation than Rodd et al. (2012) do not discuss the spread of activation 
at lower thresholds than their initial threshold choice. Additionally, Mason and Just 
(2007) employed a small number of trials (N = 9) per condition and a relatively small 
sample of subjects (N = 12), which may have reduced sensitivity to detect LIFG 
responses to reinterpretation demands. Another explanation that is more 
theoretically interesting is that such differences may reflect inter-subject variability in 
function-anatomy mappings. An assessment of inter-subject variability of ambiguity-
related activation has not yet been investigated. A third possibility is that there may 
be functional specialisation across the LIFG. For example, activation differences 
may reflect subtle differences on ambiguity-related processes induced by the 
employment of different presentation paradigms across the three studies. For 
example, Rodd et al. (2012) presented sentences in the spoken modality whereas 
the sentences were presented visually by Zempleni et al. (2007) and Mason and 
Just (2007) and, furthermore, Zempleni et al. (2007) presented each phrase of their 
sentence in isolation whereas Mason and Just’s (2007) sentences were presented 
word-by-word in a cumulative manner. However, it is unclear how such 
methodological differences would produce this specific pattern of results.    
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Moreover, it is uncertain how reliable the reported effects of dominance on LIFG 
activation are, as no direct replications have been published. Although both 
Zempleni et al (2007) and Mason and Just (2007) examined dominance effects, the 
former compared subordinate-biased with dominant-biased sentences while the 
latter compared subordinate-biased with balanced sentences. In addition, both 
studies employed visually-presented sentences. Thus, whether such patterns 
replicate for spoken sentences needs to be investigated before being able to 
generalise these conclusions.  
Examining how LIFG responses are modulated by dominance is important for two 
reasons. First, dominance effects are one of the main predictions of the 
reinterpretation hypothesis because dominance is a measure of meaning preference 
and, thus, an index of how likely it is that the contextually inappropriate meaning will 
initially be preferred and need reinterpretation later on. More specifically, if a region 
supports semantic reinterpretation then it should respond more to subordinate-
biased late-disambiguation sentences than any other ambiguous sentences, since 
these sentences have a higher probability that the inappropriate (dominant) meaning 
will initially be selected. Second, up until this point, effects of dominance on neural 
responses to late-disambiguation sentences have been discussed solely in relation 
to the reinterpretation hypothesis. However, they are also predicted by an initial 
meaning selection account but with a different pattern according to current 
psycholinguistic accounts of ambiguity resolution (Duffy et al., 2001; Twilley & 
Dixon, 2000). In late-disambiguation sentences, because ambiguous words are 
encountered prior to contextual information, balanced words place more demands 
on initial selection processes because the listener has no reason to strongly prefer 
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either meaning compared with biased words for which a single meaning can easily 
be selected based on frequency information. Eye-movement research provide 
behavioural evidence of their increased processing demand, finding that readers 
fixate longer on balanced words than biased words in these kinds of sentences 
(Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Rayner & Frazier, 1989). Thus, if a region 
is primarily involved in initial meaning selection then activation should be greater for 
balanced than biased words in these kinds of sentences. Mason and Just’s (2007) 
dominance pattern clearly show evidence for the reinterpretation hypothesis, as it 
was the biased sentences that produced greater activation than the balanced 
sentences. However, no other studies have examined these two conditions. 
Moreover, Rodd et al.’s (2012) study demonstrated that the LIFG may be involved in 
both initial meaning selection and reinterpretation processes. Thus, since balanced 
sentences load more highly on the former and biased sentences load more highly 
on the latter, then an alternative possibility is that no difference between these two 
kinds of ambiguous words may be found when an experimental design is used that 
does not separate out these two processes. Clearly, further examinations of the 
LIFG response to late-disambiguation sentence are needed, having the potential to 
elucidate functional contributions of ambiguity-responsive regions.   
3.1.3  Theories of the LIFG 
Several accounts of LIFG function explain its role in semantic ambiguity resolution.  
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Conflict Resolution  
One theory directly relevant to semantic ambiguity processing is the conflict 
resolution account (Novick, Kan, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009; Novick et al., 
2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997). According to this theory, the LIFG helps 
resolve competition between activated representations to support the selection of a 
single representation. This theory follows the bias competition framework whereby 
the prefrontal cortex provides top-down signals to bias information processing in 
other brain regions to support context-appropriate behaviour (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Conflict resolution is one of the core processes in 
psycholinguistic models of ambiguity resolution (e.g., Duffy et al., 2001; Twilley & 
Dixon, 2000).  
Novick et al. (2009) have recently specified that the LIFG supports representational 
selection in two types of situations: when representational conflict is caused by a 
prepotent but irrelevant response as well as when multiple representations are 
available but no dominant response exists. Elegantly, the former seems to map onto 
semantic reinterpretation demands of ambiguity resolution, where the dominant 
preference needs to be suppressed in favour of the less frequent meaning, whilst 
the latter seems to map onto initial selection demands for balanced words which 
have no strongly dominant meaning. Strong support for the LIFG’s role in both types 
of conflict resolution comes from numerous neuroimaging studies that have 
employed a wide variety of tasks and stimuli. These include verb generation or 
picture naming, where stimuli are associated with several possible options (Kan & 
Thompson-Schill, 2004a; Persson et al., 2004; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997), 
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semantic classification and comparison tasks in which the stimuli evoke strongly 
associated responses that are irrelevant to the task (Badre, Poldrack, Paré-Blagoev, 
Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997), working memory tasks that 
elicit proactive interference between items in memory such as item recognition tasks 
(D’Esposito, Postle, Jonides, & Smith, 1999; Jonides & Nee, 2006) and the Stroop 
task (January, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009; Milham, Banich, & Barad, 
2003). Lesion studies further corroborate these findings by showing that patients 
with damage to the LIFG are impaired on similar semantic and non-semantic tasks 
that have high representational conflict (Hamilton & Martin, 2005; Novick et al., 
2009; Robinson, Blair, & Cipolotti, 1998; Robinson, Shallice, & Cipolotti, 2005; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 2002; Thompson-Schill et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, this region is argued to resolve competition across multiple domains of 
linguistic representation, although Novick et al. (2009) acknowledge the possibility of 
regional specialisations across domains. Such domain-generality is supported by 
numerous neuroimaging studies and research on patients that show increased LIFG 
activation or impaired performance respectively when competition is manipulated 
within semantic, syntactic or phonetic information, during word and sentence tasks 
and during both language production and language comprehension (Bedny, McGill, 
& Thompson-Schill, 2008; Blumstein, Myers, & Rissman, 2005; Fiebach, Vos, & 
Friederici, 2004; Gennari, MacDonald, Postle, & Seidenberg, 2007; Humphreys & 
Gennari, 2014; Kan & Thompson-Schill, 2004b; Katzev, Tüscher, Hennig, Weiller, & 
Kaller, 2013; Novick et al., 2009; Ojanen et al., 2005; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 1997). It is also argued to be domain-specific with regard to 
the type of conflict, specifically attributed to conceptual rather than response-based 
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conflict and to verbal as oppose to non-verbal information. These dissociations are 
supported by the finding that tasks which manipulate response competition, such as 
Go/No-Go and Stop Signal tasks, produce consistent activation in right, rather than 
left, hemisphere frontal regions (see Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007 for a meta-
analysis) and patients with damage to the LIFG show normal performance on 
nonverbal, but not language, tasks that have high conflict demands (Hamilton & 
Martin, 2005; Robinson et al., 2005).  
Moreover, Novick et al. (2009) argue that the posterior region of the LIFG (BA44/45) 
is the critical site for representational conflict resolution. An extensive fMRI study 
conducted by Badre and Wagner (2005) found evidence supporting such a posterior 
locus for this function in the LIFG that dissociated from controlled semantic retrieval 
processes attributed to the anterior LIFG (discussed in more detail later). This 
suggests that different sub-regions of the LIFG may be serving different functional 
roles in ambiguity resolution.   
Another distinguishing claim of this theory with regard to language processing is that 
the posterior LIFG is engaged only when there is representational conflict. This is 
supported by a body of research showing that the LIFG is not necessary for 
language comprehension in the absence of such conflict. For example, patients with 
“Broca’s aphasia” or damage to the LIFG itself have relatively preserved 
comprehension of single words and simple sentences (Caplan, Hildebrandt, & 
Makris, 1996; Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; Grodzinsky, Piñango, Zurif, & Drai, 1999; 
Schwartz et al., 1980; Yee, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2008) and can produce and 
comprehend sentences that have low conflict demands such as when there is a 
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dominant response (Novick et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2005). Lesion-deficit 
analyses have also failed to find significant correlation between damage to the LIFG 
and single word or sentence comprehension (Bates et al., 2003; Dronkers, Wilkins, 
Van Valin, Redfern, & Jaeger, 2004). In addition, neuroimaging studies do not 
always report significantly greater activation in the LIFG for simple or unambiguous 
sentences over baseline (e.g., Crinion et al., 2003; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; 
Scott, Blank, Rosen, & Wise, 2000; Spitsyna, Warren, Scott, Turkheimer, & Wise, 
2006).  
Controlled Semantic Retrieval 
Badre and colleagues specifically attribute the anterior LIFG (pars orbitalis) to 
controlled semantic retrieval (Badre et al., 2005; Badre & Wagner, 2007). According 
to this theory, this region supports the controlled retrieval of semantic information 
from long-term memory. This process is required when stimulus-driven cues are 
insufficient to activate information relevant to one’s goal or task, such as in the case 
of a semantic decision where two stimuli are weakly rather than strongly associated. 
This process, therefore, seems particularly important to resolve ambiguous 
sentences that refer to the subordinate meaning of an ambiguous word, as these 
meanings are more weakly associated to the ambiguous words than their dominant 
meaning. Badre and Wagner (2005) specifically localised controlled semantic 
retrieval to the anterior LIFG, based on their extensive fMRI study that dissociated 
this function from selection processes by employing various tasks that loaded more 
heavily on one of these processes than the other. A recent TMS study provides 
direct support for a causal role of the LIFG in controlled semantic retrieval by 
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showing that stimulating the LIFG impaired performance on semantic decision tasks 
for conditions with weak, but not strong, semantic associates (Whitney, Kirk, 
O'Sullivan, Lambon Ralph, & Jefferies, 2011).     
Semantic Unification 
Hagoort and colleagues propose an alternative language-general account of the 
LIFG function that contrasts with the stimulus-specific views taken in the conflict 
resolution and controlled semantic retrieval accounts (Hagoort, 2005, 2013; 
Hagoort, Baggio, & Willems, 2009). According to this theory, the LIFG constitutes a 
unification space that combines basic units of information to form larger complex 
representations of a sentence or discourse. In contrast to the conflict resolution 
account, this theory argues that combinatorial demands drive activation in this 
region rather than conflict or selection load per se. Selection is merely one aspect of 
unification. This claim is supported by the findings of several neuroimaging studies 
which show greater activation in the LIFG for sentences without conflicting 
information, such as semantically congruent or semantically unambiguous 
sentences, compared to rest or a low-level baseline (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & 
Petersson, 2004; Rodd et al., 2005; Willems, Özyürek, & Hagoort, 2007) as well as 
for sentences compared with random word lists which are assumed not to require 
unification into a higher-level meaning (Snijders et al., 2009). As discussed 
previously, various other neuroimaging studies have found null-results for such non-
conflict sentences, which have been taken as evidence for conflict-specific accounts 
of the LIFG. However, null-results may merely be due to increased activation in 
baseline conditions that may mask significant activation in language conditions (e.g., 
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J. Binder et al., 1999). In addition, this theory can account for some empirical 
findings that are not straightforward to explain with the conflict resolution theory. For 
example, the LIFG shows increased activation for sentences that contain linguistic 
violations, such as semantically or syntactically anomalous words (Baumgaertner, 
Weiller, & Büchel, 2002; Hagoort et al., 2004; Kuperberg, Sitnikova, & Lakshmanan, 
2008; Zhu et al., 2012) compared with normal sentences. Although there is conflict 
between representations in anomalous sentences, they do not require selection 
processes to resolve the conflict (i.e., the LIFG function of the conflict resolution 
account). On the other hand, there is clearly a greater load on unification processes.  
The unification account also explicitly proposes functional specialisation across the 
LIFG in terms of the type of linguistic information that is processed. Based on a 
literature review by Bookheimer (2002), Hagoort (2005) argues that different types 
of information are processed between large overlapping regions. Specifically, 
semantic information is preferentially processed by pars orbitalis and pars 
triangularis, syntactic information by pars triangularis and par opercularis and 
phonological processes by pars opercularis and premotor cortex. Such a division 
has recently been supported by a resting state study showing different patterns of 
functional connectivity between the three sub-regions, suggesting that they form 
parts of different information processing streams (Xiang, Fonteijn, Norris, & Hagoort, 
2010). This fractionation is not entirely compatible with that argued by the conflict 
resolution account, which claims that the posterior, not the anterior, LIFG is the 
critical site for resolution between semantic representations. Thus, although Hagoort 
and colleagues explicitly incorporate semantic selection operations within the set of 
unification functions supported by this anterior region (Hagoort, 2005; Hagoort et al., 
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2009), it is unclear whether this is appropriate given that high-conflict semantic tasks 
frequently show posterior activation. Nevertheless, numerous other researchers 
support the notion of functional specialisation across the LIFG, although the exact 
type of operations performed in these sub-divisions differ across accounts (Badre & 
Wagner, 2007; Friederici, 2012; Gough, Nobre, & Devlin, 2005; Poldrack et al., 
1999; Vigneau et al., 2006). For example, the controlled semantic retrieval account 
described above is a more specific semantic-based theory that is associated with 
the anterior LIFG (Badre & Wagner, 2007), while various phonological processes 
have been attributed to the posterior LIFG, described further below.   
Phonological Accounts of the LIFG 
A variety of phonological processes have been associated with the posterior LIFG, 
namely pars opercularis. Aside from phonological unification (Hagoort, 2005, 2013), 
others include phonological working memory processes specifically associated with 
maintaining phonological representations (Nixon, Lazarova, Hodinott-Hill, Gough, & 
Passingham, 2004), articulatory operations (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007) and 
phonological sub-vocal rehearsal (Rogalsky, Matchin, & Hickok, 2008). These 
theories have received support from a variety of neuroimaging, TMS and lesion 
studies, employing paradigms such as letter/word rhyming judgements (Baldo & 
Dronkers, 2006; Gough et al., 2005), delayed phonological matching of 
words/pseudowords (Nixon et al., 2004; Strand, Forssberg, Klingberg, & Norrelgen, 
2008), concurrent comprehension and articulation (Rogalsky et al., 2008) and 
phoneme detection tasks (Zatorre, Evans, Meyer, & Gjedde, 1992).    
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Most cognitive theories of semantic ambiguity resolution do not highlight 
phonological-based mechanisms as mediating this process. However, there is 
reason to hypothesise that semantic reinterpretation, in particular, may involve these 
kinds of operations. For example, Rodd et al. (2012) propose that phonological 
working memory may be specifically necessary to reprocess sentences that have 
been misunderstood so that previous parts of the sentence can be re-evaluated into 
a new coherent interpretation. Rogalsky et al. (2008) suggest a similar, but more 
explicit, mechanism with regard to processing syntactically complex sentences, 
proposing that, when listeners hear complex sentences (i.e., object-relative 
sentences), they may use articulatory rehearsal to repeat back what they have 
heard to check that their analysis is correct. It is also possible that initial meaning 
selection may also engage phonological re-activation processes to support the 
appropriate selection of a single meaning. However, this is likely to be less 
demanding than that which occurs for semantic reinterpretation, as less of the 
sentence would have been heard at the time that the ambiguous word is 
encountered than when reinterpretation is needed (i.e., at the end of sentence).        
In summary, several theories of LIFG function predict involvement of this region in 
resolving the meaning of semantically ambiguous words during sentence 
comprehension. Although the specific functional and anatomical details differ 
between the accounts, it is clear that all of these theories predict that, some, if not 
all, sub-divisions of this region, should be engaged when sentences require 
semantic reinterpretation. Thus, all theories predict that the LIFG should show 
greater activation for late-disambiguation sentences compared with low-ambiguity 
control sentences. Some theories also predict its involvement in initial meaning 
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selection (i.e., unification and conflict resolution accounts). Since the theories 
suggest different involvements in these two components of ambiguity resolution 
(initial meaning selection and reinterpretation), they make different predictions about 
how these regions’ responses may be modulated by meaning dominance. Theories 
that only suggest a role in semantic reinterpretation predict that biased sentences 
should show greater activity than balanced sentences because it is the biased 
sentences that have the greatest likelihood of needing reinterpretation. In contrast, 
theories that suggest roles in both initial selection and semantic reinterpretation 
predict that balanced sentences may produce no greater activation than biased 
sentences because balanced meanings are hardest to select between, and, thus, 
may equate to the neural demands produced for reinterpretation in the biased 
sentences. No theories currently suggest an exclusive role for the LIFG in initial 
selection processes but not in reinterpretation, and thus, no theories predict that 
balanced sentences should produce greater activity than biased sentences. Current 
evidence cannot distinguish between these accounts.  
Left Posterior Temporal Cortex and Semantic Ambiguity Resolution 
The left posterior inferior temporal cortex is a second region that is often activated 
alongside the LIFG in response to semantically ambiguous sentences (Davis et al., 
2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007). Its 
ambiguity response appears more discriminate than that of the LIFG, showing 
robust activation for only certain types of ambiguous sentences (Rodd, Johnsrude, 
et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 2007), which suggests that 
this region may play a functionally different role in ambiguity resolution compared to 
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frontal regions. For example, Rodd et al. (2012) argue that, unlike frontal regions, 
the inferior temporal lobe has “a relatively pure contribution to reinterpretation 
processes”. This conclusion was based on the results of their time course study, 
which showed that posterior inferior temporal regions responded to disambiguating 
information when it was encountered after, but not before, an ambiguous word and 
did not show greater activation to the ambiguous word itself. Like the frontal region, 
its involvement in semantic reinterpretation is corroborated by the finding that 
meaning dominance has been shown to affect responses in the temporal cortex. 
Specifically, Zempleni et al. (2007) showed greater activity in the posterior 
middle/inferior temporal gyrus for subordinate than dominant-biased sentences. The 
specificity of this region’s role in reinterpretation is consistent with other reports of 
posterior inferior activation for late-disambiguation sentences (Bekinschtein et al., 
2011) as well as with the lack of ambiguity-elevated activation reported for 
sentences in which reinterpretation is unlikely, such as when the disambiguating 
information is presented immediately after an ambiguous word (Rodd, Longe, et al., 
2010) or for dominant-biased sentences (Zempleni et al., 2007).  Not all studies, 
however, have found such supporting evidence. For example, Mason and Just 
(2007) do not report increased activation anywhere in the temporal lobe for their set 
of late-disambiguation sentences compared with unambiguous sentences, even 
when biased sentences, which have the highest likelihood of reinterpretation, were 
analysed separately to balanced sentences. Yet, this may result from a lack of 
power as only nine sentences were used per condition and 12 subjects were tested. 
In addition, the scanning protocol may have been sub-optimal for detecting 
activation in the inferior temporal region since the onset of the ambiguous word was 
synchronised to the acquisition of the most superior axial slice.    
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As with frontal activation, there is variability in the location and extent of ambiguity-
elevated activation reported in the posterior temporal cortex. Activation is not 
confined to a specific anatomical region but often encompasses several functionally 
distinct temporal regions. All studies report responses in the posterior inferior 
temporal gyrus (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; 
Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007), with some studies also 
reporting activation in the posterior middle temporal gyrus (Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007) and/or ventrally within the fusiform 
gyrus (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012). 
One study even found activation that extended more superiorly into the posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Rodd et al., 2005). Again, these discrepancies may 
reflect effects of statistical thresholds, inter-subject functional variability or 
differences in ambiguous stimuli or experimental protocols.  
3.1.4 Theories of the Posterior Temporal Cortex  
The role of the posterior temporal cortex in semantic ambiguity resolution is 
controversial due to the fact that widely different accounts have been proposed for 
its function in language and cognition in general. Unlike LIFG theories that converge 
on cognitive control functions, the posterior temporal cortex has been attributed to a 
more heterogeneous set of processes. Three distinct accounts relate to sound-
meaning mapping (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004, 2007), semantic control (Jefferies, 
2013) or visual-based semantic information (Cohen, Jobert, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 
2004; Martin, 2007; Price & Devlin, 2003, 2011). 
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Sound-meaning Interface 
Hickok and Poeppel propose that the middle and inferior portions of the posterior 
temporal lobe constitute a lexical interface that supports the mapping between 
phonological and semantic representations (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004, 2007). A 
recent version of this theory (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007) emphasises the left posterior 
MTG (pMTG) and neighbouring inferior temporal sulcus (pITS) as the critical sites in 
this process. Less focus is given to the inferior temporal cortex than in earlier 
versions (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004). This theory was initially based on the existence 
of an aphasic syndrome known as transcortical sensory aphasia that presents 
symptoms suggestive of a deficit in sound-meaning mapping. Such patients have 
impaired auditory comprehension with relatively intact syntactic and phonological 
processing and damage is typically observed in the posterior inferior temporal lobe 
(A. R. Damasio, 1991; Kertesz, Sheppard, & MacKenzie, 1982). This hypothesis has 
been supported by several other lines of research. Two large-scale lesion studies 
have found significant associations between pMTG damage and auditory 
comprehension deficits (Bates et al., 2003; Dronkers et al., 2004). Direct cortical 
stimulation of posterior middle and inferior cortex produces speech and auditory 
comprehension problems (Boatman et al., 2000; Lüders et al., 1991). In addition, 
patients with semantic dementia, although typically associated with anterior 
temporal damage, show hypo-perfusion of left posterior temporal areas which also 
show reduced activation during semantic judgement tasks (Garrard & Hodges, 
2000; Mummery et al., 1999). Furthermore, numerous fMRI studies show increased 
activation in pMTG in response to routine lexical-semantic processes such as during 
auditory sentence comprehension (Davis et al., 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rogalsky & 
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Hickok, 2009; Saur et al., 2008) and spoken word recognition (Davis & Gaskell, 
2009). Additionally, word and picture naming, for which sound-meaning mapping 
seems especially important, also produce activation in posterior middle and inferior 
temporal regions (Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; Price, 2012; Price, Wise, Warburton, et 
al., 1996). It is currently uncertain why ambiguous words would engage sound-
meaning mapping processes imputed to this region. Rodd et al. (2012) suggested 
that these kinds of representations may be reactivated in the reinterpretation 
process when the meaning of an ambiguous sentence needs to be recomputed. 
However, there is currently no behavioural research that has tested such a theory. 
There are several aspects of the discussed evidence that suggest that this theory of 
the posterior temporal region’s involvement in language comprehension, and thus 
ambiguity resolution, may be inadequate. First, several observations query the 
localisation of a sound-meaning mapping function to the posterior middle and 
inferior temporal structures. Although activation in auditory sentence comprehension 
and spoken word recognition studies is often found in the pMTG, the corresponding 
cluster often forms part of a superior temporal cluster with the posterior STG and/or 
extends along the MTG, rather than extending into inferior temporal regions in the 
way that is typically seen for studies of ambiguity resolution (Bekinschtein et al., 
2011; Davis et al., 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007). Some other 
studies of sentence comprehension do not even report any activation in the pMTG, 
instead, showing activation restricted to the posterior STG/STS (Adank & Devlin, 
2010; Humphries, Willard, Buchsbaum, & Hickok, 2001; Obleser & Kotz, 2010) 
and/or mid-anterior portions of the MTG (Humphries et al., 2001). Thus, these 
findings demonstrate that sound-to-meaning mapping does not always engage the 
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pMTG/ITS. Hickok and Poeppel’s (2007) current account does not attempt to 
explain these discrepancies. It is possible to reconcile these findings with their 
account if sound-to-meaning mapping is not viewed as a unitary process. Under this 
view, the pMTG/ITS may serve functionally different operations that facilitate the 
mapping between phonological and sound information compared to those served by 
the more superior temporal and anterior regions. Since the former regions are more 
consistently found during ambiguous sentence comprehension than during 
unambiguous sentence comprehension (compared to a low-level baseline) it may be 
serving more high-level mapping processes than those that occur during more 
normal sentence comprehension (Rodd et al., 2005). More research is needed that 
directly examines the extent to which the same temporal regions are engaged by 
different demands on sound-meaning operations.  
Recent lesions studies, however, have reported more problematic findings for 
Hickok and Poeppel’s (2007) account of this region. Specifically, they have called 
into question one of the fundamental aspects of this theory, that this region 
processes verbal information. These studies have found that patients with damage 
to posterior temporal areas show deficits on both verbal and nonverbal semantic 
tasks (Corbett, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2009; Corbett, Jefferies, & Lambon 
Ralph, 2011; Robson, Sage, & Lambon Ralph, 2012). Nonverbal deficits cannot be 
explained by a lexical-focused account. It is, as yet, unclear exactly how to 
accommodate these findings within those of Hickok and Poeppel’s (2007) account. 
For example, the posterior temporal region may perform multiple functions or it may 
serve a more general function that is involved in tasks of sound-meaning mapping 
and nonverbal semantic tasks.  
 125 
 
Semantic Control 
Jefferies and colleagues argue for an alternative theory of the pMTG that explicitly 
accounts for the nonverbal deficits of patients with lesions to this region (Jefferies, 
2013; Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, & Lambon Ralph, 2013; Whitney, Jefferies, & 
Kircher, 2011). According to Jefferies (2013), pMTG supports processes associated 
with semantic control that act to enhance task-relevant activation within the 
semantic system. This theory is supported by the pattern of deficits shown by 
patients with semantic aphasia who have damage to posterior temporal regions (as 
well as inferior parietal and inferior frontal regions). Such patients are impaired on a 
wide variety of semantic tasks across multiple input and output modalities, including 
spoken and written words, pictures, naming, alternative forced choice, nonverbal 
tasks (Corbett, Jefferies, Ehsan, & Lambon Ralph, 2009; Corbett, Jefferies, & 
Lambon Ralph, 2009; Corbett et al., 2011; Jefferies, Baker, Doran, & Lambon 
Ralph, 2007; Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Jefferies, Patterson, & Lambon 
Ralph, 2008; Noonan, Jefferies, Corbett, & Lambon Ralph, 2010). However, their 
performance is inconsistent across tasks, being particularly affected by semantic 
demands of the task. For example, these patients benefit from response cues during 
picture naming (Jefferies et al., 2008), and are also affected by semantic distracters 
that are irrelevant to the task (Noonan et al., 2010). Jeffries (2013) specifically argue 
that these effects derive from a deficit in semantic control processes, since semantic 
demands are lowered by response cues and increased by semantic distracters.  
The localisation of this function to pMTG is corroborated by many neuroimaging 
studies, showing increased activation in this region for semantic control tasks that 
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were aforementioned with regard to the LIFG (e.g., Badre et al., 2005; Gold & 
Buckner, 2002; Noppeney, Phillips, & Price, 2004; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; 
Whitney, Jefferies, et al., 2011). More recent causal evidence has been 
demonstrated in a recent TMS study, where stimulating this region affected 
performance on tasks that had high, but not low, semantic control demands 
(Whitney, Kirk, et al., 2011) as well as by a recent patient study on Wernicke’s 
aphasia, finding that semantic processing deficits were associated with damage to 
this region whereas phonological deficits were associated with pSTG damage 
(Robson et al., 2012). Such a theory is also consistent with the conclusions of other 
researchers that argue for semantic integration as one key function of this region, 
based on the finding that it is more active when demands on integration are high 
such as for sentences with semantic anomalies and ambiguities (Baumgaertner et 
al., 2002; Zempleni et al., 2007). In addition, the semantic control theory can also 
explain why this region is not always activated in language studies, as it depends on 
the semantic demands of the task.  
The role of posterior temporal cortex in semantic control is a relatively recent 
theoretical perspective but seems to fit with the coupling of response with the LIFG 
and provides a straightforward explanation for its involvement in ambiguity 
resolution.  
Visual-based Semantic Information 
Both of the above theories strongly diverge from the traditional view of the posterior 
temporal cortex as a high-level visual association area. The posterior temporal 
cortex is located anterior to amodal visual association areas of the occipital lobe and 
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the lateral and ventral occipitotemporal cortex, whose strong responses to visual 
input have been firmly established by monkey and human research (Grill-Spector & 
Malach, 2004). Visual-based accounts of these regions lead to a radically different 
perspective of the roles they may serve in ambiguity resolution and language 
comprehension more generally. According to one view (Martin, 2007), these 
posterior regions represent conceptual information about the visual features of 
objects, with different types of information being stored in different regions. Martin 
(2007) views semantic representations as grounded in similar networks associated 
with perceptual processing of objects, such that understanding the meaning of word 
that corresponds to a concrete object (e.g., fan) necessarily involves activating its 
visual features. Thus, according to this theory, these regions are more activated 
during ambiguous sentences because such words place greater demands on 
semantic representations.  
Accordingly, in strong contrast with the two previous theories, the pMTG is 
associated with object knowledge and more specifically with motion-related 
attributes of objects. This semantic role of pMTG has received a large amount of 
support from neuroimaging research, with studies showing greater activation in this 
region for motion-related stimuli, such as point-light displays (Beauchamp, Lee, 
Haxby, & Martin, 2003) as well as for words or pictures of tools than other stimuli 
such as animals (e.g., Chao, Weisberg, & Martin, 2002; H. Damasio, Grabowski, 
Tranel, & Hichwa, 1996; Devlin et al., 2002; Devlin, Rushworth, & Matthews, 2005; 
Moore & Price, 1999), for verbs more than nouns or prepositions (e.g., H. Damasio 
et al., 2001; Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, & Chatterjee, 2002; Perani et al., 1999), and 
its activation has been found to predict recall of names of manipulable objects 
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(Polyn, Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005). Various lesion studies have also provided 
direct support for its causal role in action representations (Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1997; Tranel, Kemmerer, Adolphs, Damasio, & Damasio, 2003). Its 
involvement in visual motion information is further strongly supported with the fact 
that it is located just anterior to MT which is the primary visual motion processing 
region. Gennari et al. (2007) provide supporting evidence that this region’s 
involvement during ambiguity resolution may be explained by its role in motion-
related semantics. In this study, participants read noun or verb phrases containing 
an ambiguous word (e.g., “the bowl” versus “to bowl”).  fMRI results showed that 
pMTG had greater activity for ambiguous than unambiguous phrases, supporting its 
involvement in ambiguity processing but, critically, this region was also affected by 
the syntactic context, with verbs producing greater activity than nouns. However, 
this account cannot entirely explain the finding of ambiguity-responses in this region 
when ambiguity is manipulated between two noun definitions rather than between a 
verb and noun (Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012). The more inferior 
posterior temporal regions, commonly referred to as ventral occipitotemporal cortex 
(vOT), have also been attributed to object representation but to the visual form of an 
object rather than motion-related attributes. This conclusion is based on evidence 
that different areas show specificity for certain types of concrete objects (Martin & 
Chao, 2001), is affected by semantic priming of object words (Wheatley, Weisberg, 
Beauchamp, & Martin, 2005) and are active when participants view these objects as 
well as when they imagine them (Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; O'Craven & 
Kanwisher, 2000).  
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Other lines of research, however, demonstrate evidence for a processing gradient in 
vOT, which is not accounted for in the general visual form theory. Such a gradient 
has various implications for the involvement of this region in ambiguity resolution 
and language comprehension in general. Based on a wealth of neuroimaging 
studies as well as more recent functional and structural connectivity work, Price and 
Devlin (2011) argue for a posterior-anterior gradient of information abstractness 
across the occipitotemporal cortex, with a three-way division of labour: the posterior 
portion (y < -60 in MNI space)  is primarily related to visual input, the middle portion 
(-60 > y > -50) integrates visual and non-visual (semantic, phonological) information 
while the anterior portion (y > -50) is associated with multimodal semantic 
processes. Posterior vOT is critically not associated with specific object features per 
se but is driven by high-level visual processing in general. Support for this comes 
from the finding that this region shows greatest activation for an array of visual input, 
regardless of the meaningfulness of the stimulus (Price, Moore, Humphreys, 
Frackowiak, & Friston, 1996; Price, Noppeney, Phillips, & Devlin, 2003; van 
Turennout, Ellmore, & Martin, 2000), is rarely found to respond to non-visual stimuli 
such as auditory words or tactile stimulation (J. Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 
2009; Kassuba et al., 2011; Price, Winterburn, Giraud, Moore, & Noppeney, 2003) 
and lateralization is related to visual feature information (Seghier & Price, 2011). In 
line with this, only one fMRI study on semantic ambiguity resolution has reported 
activation so posteriorly in this region (Bekinschtein et al., 2011: peak at y = -62). 
More often, ambiguity-elevated activation is reported within the anterior-middle vOT 
(Rodd et al., 2005: y = -40; Bekinschtein et al., 2011: y = -48; Rodd et al., 2012: y = 
-38, y = -50). The claim that the anterior vOT supports multimodal semantic 
processing is supported by various neuroimaging studies showing increased 
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activation for visual, auditory and tactile stimuli and for semantic processing more 
than phonological processing in this region (Davis & Gaskell, 2009; Kassuba et al., 
2011; Price, Winterburn, et al., 2003; Sharp et al., 2010). Its role in heteromodal 
semantic processing has been supported further by a recent extensive meta-
analysis that showed overlap in anterior fusiform across neuroimaging studies of 
semantics (J. Binder et al., 2009). However, the exact role this region may serve in 
semantic processing is as yet uncertain.  
The role of middle vOT in ambiguity resolution is less straightforward. According to 
Price and Devlin (2011) this region acts as an interface between visual and 
language areas representing non-visual information such as semantics and 
phonology. This theory is supported by the finding that this region shows greater 
response to visual than non-visual stimuli (Price, Winterburn, et al., 2003) but, unlike 
posterior vOT, is also modulated by object meaningfulness (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & 
Frith, 2002; van Turennout et al., 2000) and language demands on the task, such as 
when semantic or phonological information interferes with or facilitates lexical 
decisions (Devlin, Jamison, Gonnerman, & Matthews, 2006; Twomey, Kawabata 
Duncan, Price, & Devlin, 2011). The influence of these factors on processing in this 
region is argued to reflect a top-down influence of language areas on visual 
information processing.  
Other researchers postulate a more specific role of this region in language, where it 
specifically represents orthographic features of words (Cohen et al., 2004; Dehaene 
& Cohen, 2011; Kronbichler et al., 2004). This is based on the consistent findings 
that this region shows greater activation for visual words and pseudowords than a 
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number of other visual stimuli (e.g., false fonts, checkerboards) (Cohen et al., 2002) 
and is affected by word frequency (Kronbichler et al., 2004). Neither of these 
theories simply explains nor predicts its involvement in ambiguity resolution as they 
both emphasise the visual nature of information processing in this region. However, 
like the explanation based on Martin’s (2007) object account, ambiguity-related 
activation may reflect top-down activation of visual information related to a word’s 
meaning, which is consistent with the regions postulated interaction with the 
language system (Price & Devlin, 2011) or top-down activation of the orthographic 
representation of the word (Dehaene & Cohen, 2011).  
In summary, neural investigations of semantically ambiguous sentences consistently 
report activation within the posterior middle and inferior temporal cortex. Such 
activation has been found over a set of temporal regions that have been proposed to 
have different functions. My review of these regions shows that certain regions, such 
as pMTG and anterior vOT, are strongly predicted to be involved during ambiguity 
resolution. Further work is evidently needed to elucidate the consistent regions 
within the network underlying this process.     
3.1.5 Present Study  
The current literature raises several questions regarding the involvement of the LIFG 
and posterior temporal cortex in semantic ambiguity resolution. What are the 
specific anatomical sub-fields engaged by semantic ambiguity? What roles do they 
play? How consistent is this ambiguity-network across individuals?  
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These questions were investigated using fMRI. Neural responses to a large set of 
late-disambiguation sentences were compared with those to well-matched 
unambiguous sentences. Based on previous research, it was predicted that 
ambiguity-elevated responses would be broadly found in the LIFG and the left 
posterior temporal cortex (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Mason & 
Just, 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 
2010; Zempleni et al., 2007).Various theories of LIFG and posterior temporal cortex 
function predict their involvement in ambiguity resolution. However, they differ in 
terms of the specific anatomical region that is described. The roles of ambiguity-
responsive regions were assessed further by examining 1) their responses to 
unambiguous sentences (compared to a low-level baseline) and 2) their modulation 
by dominance. The “unambiguous contrast” provides an assessment of the nature of 
these roles, specifically whether they reflect operations that are routinely involved in 
sentence comprehension or are more specific to ambiguous stimuli. Only theories 
that advocate a general language mechanism predict greater activation for 
unambiguous sentences than baseline such as the semantic unification account of 
the LIFG (Hagoort, 2005, 2013), and the lexical-semantic processing (Hickok & 
Poeppel, 2007) and object representation accounts of the posterior temporal cortex 
(Martin, 2007). On the other hand, explicit proponents of a non-language-general 
mechanism are the LIFG conflict resolution account (Novick et al., 2009; Novick et 
al., 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) and the pMTG semantic control account 
(Jefferies, 2013). These do not predict responses to unambiguous sentences 
(compared to a low-level baseline).  
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The dominance analysis examines the contribution of these regions to the two key 
functions of ambiguity resolution, initial meaning selection and semantic 
reinterpretation, by comparing responses to biased and balanced sentences. 
Critically, like Mason and Just (2007), the biased sentences were always 
disambiguated toward their subordinate meaning. If these regions are primarily 
involved in semantic reinterpretation, then responses should be greater for biased 
than balanced sentences because they have a stronger frequency bias that makes 
the inappropriate (dominant) meaning likely to be initially selected on most trials and 
thus need reinterpretation. In contrast, any regions that are primarily involved in 
initial semantic selection should show greater activation for balanced than biased 
sentences, because this process is more difficult since listeners have less strong 
preferences for the alternative meanings of these words. If regions are involved in 
both processes (relatively equally), then they should show equivalently strong 
activation to both balanced and biased sentences, since they both load on (at least) 
one of these processes. Two types of biased sentences were also compared: 
strongly-subordinate and weakly-subordinate words. This comparison allows us to 
examine whether responses are merely related to the likelihood of reinterpretation, 
where the dominance pattern would be: “strongly biased” > “weakly biased” > 
“balanced”, or whether a less linear relationship exists between reinterpretation and 
ambiguity-responses. For example, a region may be especially engaged when very 
infrequent meanings need to be integrated, which would produce a pattern of: 
“strongly biased” > “weakly biased” = balanced”. This latter comparison has not yet 
been investigated.  
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Furthermore, inter-subject variability of these ambiguity responses were assessed 
by examining whether the regions that showed reliable activation at the group-level 
were activated in all subjects.  
3.2 Method 
Participants 
20 native monolingual British English speakers, aged 18-35 (M = 23.8) participated 
in the study. All were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
had no known hearing or language impairment. Participants were recruited via the 
University College London (UCL) subject pool and were paid for their participation.  
Stimuli 
92 late-disambiguation sentences and 92 unambiguous sentences were employed. 
90 of them were the ones used in the preceding behavioural experiments (Chapter 
2). The other four sentences (two ambiguous and two unambiguous) were 
constructed in the same way but had to be excluded in the behavioural experiments 
due to constraints on having multiple versions that required sentences to be divisible 
by three.   
The 92 ambiguous words had four types of meaning dominance (see method 
section in Chapter 2). These categorizations were based on categories reported in 
the ambiguity literature (Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; Sereno, 1995; 
Vuong & Martin, 2011). (1) 32 words were strong subordinate-biased, where the 
meaning used in the experimental sentences is very infrequent, on average, 
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preferred by only 6% of listeners (dominance range: 0-0.14); (2) 27 words were 
weak subordinate-biased, where the sentence meaning is fairly infrequent, on 
average preferred by 21% of listeners (dominance range: 0.16-0.30); (3) 27 words 
were balanced, where the sentence meaning is one of two (or more) relatively 
equally  frequent meanings, on average, preferred by 39% of listeners (dominance 
range: 0.31-0.54; (4) six sentences had high dominance scores, where the sentence 
meaning is, on average preferred by 77% of listeners (dominance range = 0.65-
0.84). Only the first three dominance conditions were used to assess the effect of 
meaning dominance on neural responses, since the fourth, “high-dominance”, 
condition had too few sentences. One-way independent-measures ANOVAs showed 
that the strong-biased, weak-biased and balanced conditions did not differ 
significantly on various sentence-level properties (duration in seconds: F(2,83) = 
1.16, p = .317,  number of syllables: F(2,83) = 1.60, p = .208, number of words: 
F(2,83) = .264, p = .768, position of the ambiguous word: F(2,83) = 1.49, p = .232, 
position of the disambiguating word: F(2,83) = 1.22, p = .301, naturalness rating: 
F(2,83) = 1.10, p = .337) nor in terms of the ambiguous words’ lexical properties 
(overall frequency: F(2,83) = 2.45, p = .093, log frequency: F(2,83) = 2.35, p = .102, 
number of letters: F(2,83) = 1.92, p = .153, number of meanings: F(2,83) = 1.06, p = 
.351 or number of senses: F(2,83) = .073, p = .930). See Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 
for descriptive statistics of these properties of the three dominance conditions.  
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Table 3-1: Descriptive statistics (mean(SD)) for properties of the ambiguous 
and unambiguous target words 
Target Word Frequency 
per million 
Log 
frequency 
No. 
letters 
No. 
meanings 
No. 
senses 
Ambiguous (all) 
61.7 3.61 4.72 1.92 10.1 
(78.5) (1.01) (1.16) (0.90) (5.60) 
(N=32) Strong 
Subordinate  
70.1
a
 3.66 4.50 1.81 9.91 
(81.0) (1.16) (1.02) (0.64) (4.79) 
(N = 27) Weak 
Subordinate 
78.5
a
 3.82 5.04 1.89 10.4 
(106) (1.01) (1.43) (0.97) (7.03) 
(N = 27) 
Balanced 
33.7 3.24 4.56 2.15 10.0 
(31.0) (0.81) (0.89) (1.10) (5.06) 
Unambiguous 
56.4 3.63 4.76 1.09 4.90 
(62.6) (0.93) (1.08) (0.32) (3.09) 
aMeans are inflated by an outlier value such that the median value for the strong-
subordinate and weakly-subordinate condition are considerably lower (38.5 and 31.0 
respectively).   
 
 The 92 ambiguous words had a significantly higher mean number of meanings 
(t(91) = 8.14, p < 0.001) and senses (t(91) = 8.31, p < 0.001) than the unambiguous 
targets, as indexed in the Online Wordsmyth English Dictionary-Thesaurus (Parks, 
Ray, & Bland, 1998). There was no significant difference between the ambiguous 
and unambiguous targets' word frequency in the CELEX lexical database (Baayen 
et al., 1995) (t(91) = 1.52, p = .13), log-transformed word frequency (t(91) = .35, p = 
.73) or number of letters (t(91) = .41, p = .68). See Table 3-1 for descriptive statistics 
of these lexical properties. Additionally, the unambiguous and ambiguous sentences 
still did not differ statistically in terms of physical duration (t(91) = .02, p = .99), 
number of syllables (t(91) = 1.49, p = .14) or number of words of the whole 
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sentence. Both sets of sentences had relatively high mean naturalness ratings but 
the ambiguous sentences were rated as significantly less natural than the 
unambiguous sentences (t(91) = 3.98, p < .001). See Table 3-2 for descriptive 
statistics of these sentence properties.   
 
Table 3-2: Descriptive statistics (mean(SD)) for properties of the ambiguous 
and unambiguous sentences 
Sentence Length 
(seconds) 
No. 
syllables 
No. 
words 
Naturalness 
rating 
Ambiguous (all) 
2.97 16.5 12.5 5.46 
(0.29) (1.87) (1.23) (0.62) 
(N=32) Strong 
Subordinate 
2.96 16.3 12.6 5.37 
(0.25) (1.82) (1.34) (0.68) 
(N = 27) Weak 
Subordinate 
3.03 16.9 12.4 5.60 
(0.30) (1.92) (1.18) (0.61) 
(N = 27)  
Balanced 
2.91 16.1 12.6 5.40 
(0.34) (1.69) (1.15) (0.56) 
Unambiguous 
2.97 16.4 12.5 5.80 
(0.31) (1.91) (1.23) (0.61) 
 
 
Additionally, 46 filler sentences were employed with the same structure as the 
experimental sentences. 14 were used in an initial practice block, 24 were catch 
sentences and the remaining 8 were unambiguous sentences that constituted 
dummy trials at the beginning of the fMRI runs. Catch sentences were to be 
presented with a visually presented probe word which participants would need to 
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decide was related or unrelated to the sentence. The aim of the catch-trials was to 
ensure attention was being paid to the sentences. Thus, for each catch sentence, a 
probe word was selected that was either clearly semantically related (50%) or 
clearly unrelated (50%) to the sentence’s meaning. No probes were related to the 
contextually inappropriate meanings of the ambiguous words. All sentences were 
recorded by the same female speaker. 
Furthermore, 32 experimental sentences were randomly selected and converted to 
signal-correlated noise (SCN) using Praat software (http://www.praat.org). These 
SCN stimuli constituted the low-level auditory baseline condition. They are created 
by replacing all the spectral detail with noise, which makes them completely 
unintelligible whilst retaining the original spectral profile and amplitude to maintain 
low-level acoustic properties. An additional two sentences were selected and 
converted to SCN for the practice block.  
The auditory stimuli were delivered over Sensimetrics insert earphones 
(http://www.sens.com/s14/) in the scanner. EQ filtering Software (Sensimetrics, 
Malden, MA, USA) was used to filter all sound files to ensure accurate frequency 
reproduction.  
Finally, the stimuli were divided into four lists constituting the four runs of the 
experiment. The stimuli were pseudo-randomised so that each list had an equal 
number of each stimulus type and no ambiguous sentence was placed in the same 
list as its matched unambiguous sentence in order to avoid potential syntactic 
priming effects.  
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Design and Procedure   
An event-related, within-subject design was employed in which participants were 
randomly presented with all types of sentence trials (ambiguous, unambiguous, 
SCN and catch sentences) as well as silent (rest) trials lasting, on average, the 
same physical duration as the sentence trials. Rest trials were included as another 
baseline condition. The experiment was divided into four sessions, each with 70 
trials: 23 ambiguous, 23 unambiguous, 8 SCN and 8 rest trials as well as two 
dummy trials to allow for T1 equilibrium before the test trials began. Each session 
lasted, on average, 8.47 minutes.  The order of the sessions was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
Each trial commenced with a white fixation cross presented for one second in the 
centre of a black screen, followed by a sentence, SCN or silent period.  For all trials 
except catch trials, a silent period of 1500ms then followed, proceeded by a jittered 
inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1000-3000ms. For catch trials, a silent period of 500ms 
followed the sentence offset. The fixation cross was then replaced by a probe word 
that was presented for 1000ms on the screen in white 36pt bold Helvetica font.  A 
jittered ITI also followed these sentences but ranged from 2000-3000ms to allow 
participants at least 3000ms from probe-onset to respond and prepare for the next 
trial.  
In order to minimise task-related neural effects, participants were asked to 
attentively listen to the sentences while making every effort to understand their 
meaning. Participants were told that on some trials a word would appear on screen 
and they would have to decide whether it was either related or unrelated to the 
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sentence they just heard. They indicated their response by pressing a button with 
their index or middle finger of their right hand. The pairing of “yes” and “no” 
response fingers was counterbalanced across subjects. In order to try to prevent 
participants from actively waiting for a probe to appear and ensure attention to each 
sentence, it was emphasised that responding to the probes would be straightforward 
if they listened carefully to each sentence. Participants practised the task inside the 
scanner before the experimental blocks. There was a higher proportion of catch-
trials in the practice so that participants could familiarize themselves with the probe 
task.  
All stimuli were presented using MATLAB (Mathworks Inc.) and COGENT 2000 
toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent/index.html). The visual stimuli were projected 
onto a screen and participants viewed them through mirrors that were attached to 
the head coil. MRI-compatible insert earphones (Sensimetrics, Malden, MA, USA, 
Model S-14) were used to deliver the auditory stimuli, providing a 20–40 dB level of 
attenuation. Participants wore a second set of ear protectors over the insert 
earphones to attenuate the scanner noise further. The experimenter checked 
participants could hear the sentences clearly over the scanner noise prior to the 
main scanning blocks.  
MRI Acquisition  
Participants were scanned at the Birkbeck-UCL Neuroimaging (BUCNI) Centre in 
London using whole-brain imaging that was performed on a Siemens Avanto 1.5T 
scanner. A gradient-echo EPI sequence was used to acquire the functional data 
(TR=3000 ms; TE=50 ms; 3×3×3mm resolution). Each run consisted of 180 volumes 
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lasting approximately 8.5 minutes. A high-resolution anatomical scan was also 
acquired (T1-weighted FLASH, TR=12 ms; TE=5.6 ms; 1 mm3 resolution) for 
anatomical localization purposes.   
fMRI Data Analysis 
The functional images were preprocessed and analysed using Statistical Parametric 
Mapping software (SPM8, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, 
UK). Preprocessing involved realignment, spatial normalization and smoothing 
(8mm Gaussian kernel) of the functional images. Three participants’ data were 
removed because of excessive motion in the scanner in at least three runs (> 3mm). 
Also, one complete run of another participant was also excluded due to motion.  
Finally, for two participants, the final five and seven scans of one run, respectively, 
were excluded due to motion. Spatial normalization combined an initial affine 
component with subsequent non-linear warping (Friston et al., 1995) to best match 
the Montreal Neurological Institute’s MNI-152 template. The resulting images 
maintained their original resolution (3x3x3mm). Two analyses were conducted with 
separate general linear models. The first model did not take into account the 
dominance conditions of the ambiguous words so that parameter estimates of the 
overall ambiguity effect would not be biased by the differences in sample sizes 
between the dominance conditions. At the first level of this model, three 
experimental conditions (ambiguous, unambiguous and SCN) and one “dummy” 
condition that included the dummy sentences and catch-trials were modelled 
separately. For each trial, the onset of the sentence/SCN and its duration were 
specified. For the catch-trials, 1.5s was added to the duration to incorporate the 
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presentation of the visual word. The estimated movement parameters and temporal 
and dispersion derivatives were included as additional regressors in the model to 
help model structured noise in the data. At the group-level, random effects analyses 
were employed for two contrasts: “unambiguous versus noise” and “ambiguous 
versus unambiguous sentence”. For each, the corresponding contrast parameter 
estimates for each subject were entered into the group-level analysis, where one-
sample t-tests were computed. Activations were considered significant if they 
reached a threshold of p < .05 FWE corrected at the voxel level (Worsley et al., 
1996).  
The second analysis was identical to the first except that dominance was also 
modelled. For this, the ambiguous sentences were modelled as four separate 
regressors corresponding to the four dominance conditions (strong biased, weak 
biased, balanced and dominant). For each subject, parameter estimates were 
obtained for three contrasts: “strong biased > unambiguous sentences”, “weak 
biased > unambiguous sentences” and “balanced > unambiguous”. At the group-
level, these contrasts were used in a one-way repeated measures ANOVA to 
assess effects of dominance across the whole brain and also employed in region-of-
interest (ROI) analyses, described in more detail in the Results section.    
Additionally, participants’ structural images were normalised to the T1 template and, 
for display purposes, a mean structural image was created.    
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3.3 Results 
Behavioural Results 
Participants responded very accurately to the catch trials achieving an average 
accuracy of 92% (range = 79-100%), with a mean RT of 1328 ms (SD = 345), 
indicating that all participants were paying attention to the meaning of the 
sentences.  
Unambiguous Sentences versus Noise  
The contrast between unambiguous sentences and the low-level baseline noise 
condition, SCN, showed a significant broad cluster of activation in the left 
hemisphere centered laterally on the mid STS, extending posteriorly and anteriorly 
along the STS and superiorly to the anterior superior temporal gyrus (STG) (see 
Figure 3-2 and Table 3-3). At a lower threshold (p < .001 uncorrected), the left 
anterior temporal activation spread inferiorly into anterior middle temporal cortex. In 
the right hemisphere, there was a smaller significant cluster of activation that was 
centered in the middle STG, extending predominantly anteriorly within the STG. At 
the lower threshold (p <.001 uncorrected) it also extended posteriorly and inferiorly 
into right STS. There was also significant activation in the left dorsal lateral 
precentral gyrus. The LIFG showed activation when the threshold was lowered to p 
< .001 uncorrected, specifically within dorsal pars opercularis (peak at x = -54, y = 
17, z = 19; z-score = 3.58).   
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Table 3-3: Unambiguous sentences > SCN: peak activations at p<0.05 FWE 
corrected. Sub-peaks that are more than 8 mm from the main peak are 
indented. 
   Co-ordinates 
Brain region p(corrected) Z-Score x y z 
L STS <.001 6.11 -54 -25 -5 
   L anterior STS <.001 5.80 -57 -4 -14 
   L STS .001 5.58 -60 -16 -2 
   L posterior STS .011 5.08 -57 -40 7 
R STG .001 5.60 60 -10 -2 
R anterior STG/STS .030 4.88 60 -1 -11 
Precentral Gyrus .022 4.94 -48 -7 58 
Note: L, Left; R, Right; STS, Superior Temporal Sulcus, STG, Superior Temporal 
Gyrus; MTG, Middle Temporal Gyrus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Unambiguous sentence versus SCN contrast displayed on the 
mean group structural image. Red represents activation significant at p<.05 
FWE corrected and yellow represents activation significant at p<.001 
uncorrected. 
 
 
x = -57 y = -10 y = 10 
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Ambiguous versus Unambiguous Sentences 
Two significant clusters in the left hemisphere showed more signal for ambiguous 
than unambiguous sentences (see Table 3-4). One cluster was located in the LIFG, 
centered in pars triangularis, which extended laterally in this region. At a lower 
threshold (p < .001 uncorrected), the activation spread predominately posteriorly 
through pars opercularis, thereafter extending primarily dorsally in middle frontal 
/precentral gyrus. Activation also extended anteriorly within pars triangularis. The 
second cluster was located in the posterior left inferotemporal cortex (pLITC). Its 
peak was in the posterior occipitotemporal sulcus (OTS) but extended laterally, with 
a significant sub-peak in the inferior temporal gyrus (LITG). At a lower threshold (p < 
.001 uncorrected) this activation extended inferiorly into the posterior and middle 
portion of the fusiform gyrus, as well as superiorly through the pMTG extending 
along the STS. (see Figure 3-3A).  
Table 3-4: Ambiguous versus unambiguous sentences: peak activations at 
p<0.05 FWE corrected. Sub-peaks are indented following main peak. 
Note: L, Left; OTS, Occipitotemporal Sulcus; ITG, Inferior Temporal Gyrus; IFG, 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus. 
     
 
   Co-ordinates 
Brain region p(corrected) Z-Score x y z 
L OTS .011 5.09 -45 -55 -11 
    L ITG .012 5.06 -48 -58 -8 
L IFG (pars triangularis) .027 4.90 -45 32 4 
   L IFG (pars triangularis) .034 4.86 -51 32 7 
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Figure 3-3: (A) Ambiguous versus Unambiguous sentence contrast displayed 
on the mean group structural image. Red represents activation significant at 
p<.05 FWE corrected and yellow represents activation significant at p<.001 
uncorrected. (B) Effect sizes for the Ambiguous > SCN contrast and 
Unambiguous > SCN contrast averaged across the LIFG and pLITC ROIs. (C) 
Effect sizes for the contrasts between each dominance condition and the 
unambiguous sentence condition averaged across the LIFG and pLITC ROIs.   
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The response profiles of the frontal and temporal peak regions that showed a 
significant ambiguity effect were further examined with two region-of-interest (ROI) 
analyses. The first analysis assessed the nature of the ambiguity difference and the 
selectively of these regions’ responses to ambiguous sentences by examining their 
responses to ambiguous and unambiguous sentences, separately, relative to SCN. 
For this, we constructed two 8mm radius spheres, one centred on the LIFG group-
peak coordinate and the other centred on the pLITC group-peak, using the Marsbar 
toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) and obtained averaged 
parameter estimates for the “Ambiguous > SCN” and the “Unambiguous > SCN” 
contrast for the two regions for each participant. As shown in Figure 3-3B, the 
ambiguity difference in both regions was, importantly, driven by increased activity for 
the ambiguous sentences compared to SCN rather than deactivation in the 
unambiguous condition. In addition, one-sample t-tests revealed that neither the 
LIFG nor the pLITC ROIs showed a significant response for the unambiguous 
sentences compared SCN (t(16) = .168, p = .869; (t(16) = 1.88, p =  .253, 
respectively), suggesting that these regions may respond selectively for ambiguous 
sentences.   
A second ROI analysis was conducted to assess the extent to which these two 
regions were affected by meaning dominance. Average parameter estimates for the 
strongly biased, weakly biased and balanced conditions relative to the unambiguous 
conditions were obtained for the LIFG and pLITC ROIs. The resulting effect sizes for 
each region were normalised relative to the average effect size for that ROI across 
all participants and all three contrasts. This was computed by dividing each subject’s 
effect size for each contrast by the average effect size. This normalisation adjusts 
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for differences in overall effect sizes between ROIs that may confound the 
magnitude of the differences found between conditions. The normalized effect sizes 
were entered into a 3 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Dominance (strongly 
biased, weakly biased and balanced) as one factor and Region (LIFG, pLITC) as the 
other factor. The results showed a significant main effect of dominance (F(2,32) = 
3.49, p = 0.042, η2p = .179), no significant main effect of site (F < 1) and no 
significant Dominance x Region interaction (F < 1), indicating that there was no 
reliable differences between the effect of dominance in the frontal and temporal 
regions. Paired t-tests between each pair of dominance conditions (averaged across 
region) showed that strongly biased sentences (mean = 1.23, SD = .80) and weakly 
biased sentences (mean = 1.15, SD = .77) produced significantly greater activation 
than balanced sentences (mean = .62, SD = .79: t(16) = 2.21, p = .042; t(16) = 2.19, 
p = .044, respectively). There was no significant difference between the strongly and 
weakly biased sentences (t(16) = .345, p = .735). See Figure 3-3C for the patterns 
of dominance effects for each of the ROIs.  
Although the above ANOVA demonstrates that both ROIs show a similar pattern of 
dominance effects, it cannot demonstrate the extent to which these results are 
statistically reliable for each region separately. Thus, separate one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted on each ROI separately. The results revealed that there was a 
significant main of dominance for the LIFG ROI (F(2,32) = 3.56, p = 0.39), and 
subsequent paired t-tests confirmed that responses for the strongly and weakly 
biased sentences were significantly, or marginally significantly, higher than the 
balanced sentences (t(16) = 2.76, p = 0.14; t(16) = 1.94, p = 0.70). For the pLITC, 
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these effects approached but did not reach significance (F(2,32) = 1.77, p = .187; 
t(16) = 1.51, p = .151; t(16) = 1.54, p = .143).   
No significant effects of dominance were found in the whole-brain analysis (p < .05 
FWE corrected). 
Inter-subject Variability  
Although peak co-ordinates from the group analysis identify voxels that show the 
most reliable effects across subjects, it is also important to assess the inter-subject 
variability around these peaks. For each subject we obtained the nearest local 
maximum (p < .05 uncorrected) to the frontal (-45, 32 4) and temporal group peaks 
(-45, -55, -11) for the Ambiguous > Unambiguous contrast. The location was then 
examined on each subject’s own structural image and identified according to sulcal 
landmarks. Only peaks that were within the frontal and temporal cortex were 
considered.  
As shown in Table 3-5 and Figure 3-4, all subjects, except one, showed significant 
activation in close proximity to both the frontal and temporal group peaks. Only one 
subject did not show any significant activation around the frontal peak, with the 
nearest local maxima located 28mm from the peak (x = -21, y = 20, z = 13, z-score 
= 2.85). There was no significant difference between the two group peaks in terms 
of the average Euclidian distance of the local maxima (paired t-test: t(15) = 1.37, p = 
.190). Interestingly, the locations of these local maxima were notably more 
anatomically consistent (i.e., residing in the same macroanatomic region) in the 
frontal than in the temporal cortex. For 13 out of the 16 subjects who showed 
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significant activation around the frontal peak, their local maxima resided in pars 
triangularis, with 2 additional subjects showing activation on the border between 
pars triangularis (PTr) and pars orbitalis (POr). In contrast, there was more 
anatomical variability around the temporal peak, with local maxima residing inferiorly 
within the ventral occipital temporal cortex areas, such as OTS and fusiform gyrus 
(FSG), whilst others were located more laterally within MTG/ITG.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Inter-subject variability around the ambiguous vs. unambiguous 
contrast group peaks displayed on the group mean structural image. Red 
circles are the group peaks and the blue are individual subjects’ peaks, with 
darker blue circles representing more than one subject. (a) Variability around 
the LIFG group peak. (b) Variability around the OTS group peak. 
(a) (b) 
  
1
5
1
 
Table 3-5: Individual subjects’ “Ambiguous > Unambiguous” local maxima nearest to the frontal and temporal group peaks. 
 
 
LIFG: -45, 32, 4  OTS:-45, -55, -11 
Subject x y z Z score Distance Region x y z Z score Distance Region 
1 -36 35 7 2.20 9.9 IFS -39 -52 -5 3.24 9.0 FSG 
2 -45 32 10 2.94 6.0 PTr -45 -49 -11 2.56 6.0 OTS 
3 -45 29 -5 1.87 9.5 PTr -48 -55 -5 2.57 6.7 MTG 
4 -48 38 4 4.75 6.7 PTr -48 -58 -11 2.06 4.2 ITG/OTS 
5 -48 38 10 2.32 9.0 PTr -45 -52 -14 2.53 4.2 OTS 
6 -48 32 -5 2.62 9.5 POr/ PTr -45 -58 -20 3.53 9.5 ITG 
7 -48 26 -5 2.54 11.2 PTr -42 -67 -14 2.39 12.7 ITG/FSG 
8 -39 38 1 4.26 9.0 PTr -39 -52 -11 2.61 6.7 OTS/ITG 
9 -54 29 1 2.53 9.9 PTr -48 -52 -14 1.81 5.2 MTG/ITG 
10 n/a   -36 -52 -17 1.76 11.2 FSG 
11 -51 29 -2 2.84 9.0 PTr -57 -61 -14 3.31 13.7 MTG 
12 -48 29 10 2.52 7.3 PTr -51 -61 -20 2.83 12.4 ITG 
13 -54 32 13 1.87 12.7 PTr -48 -46 -17 2.42 11.2 OTS 
14 -54 26 1 3.62 11.2 PTr -48 -58 -11 2.13 4.2 MTG 
15 -51 32 7 2.07 6.7 PTr -36 -58 -14 3.11 9.9 FSG 
16 -42 41 -2 2.02 11.2 POr./PTr -51 -58 -11 3.63 6.7 MTG 
17 -42 29 -5 1.79 9.9 PTr -42 -61 -8 1.82 7.3 FSG 
Mean -47 32 3 2.67 9.3mm  -45 -56 -13 2.60 8.3mm  
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3.4 Discussion 
The results replicated the involvement of the LIFG and posterior temporal cortex in 
processing (temporarily) semantically ambiguous sentences seen in previous 
studies (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd et 
al., 2005; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 2007), and showed interesting 
effects of meaning dominance.  
3.4.1 Ambiguity-Responsive Regions and Their Response Profiles 
Significant activation for semantically ambiguous sentences was found in the middle 
portion of the LIFG and in the inferior region of the posterior temporal cortex. At a 
lower threshold, it was clear that these clusters belonged to larger clusters of 
activation that extended both anteriorly and posteriorly in the LIFG, and superiorly 
and ventrally within the posterior temporal cortex (see Figure 3-3A). These 
subthreshold activations are discussed later (section 3.4.3), mainly in terms of their 
implications for neural models of ambiguity resolution. Until then, discussions focus 
on the involvement and response profiles of the regions that reached a corrected 
level of significance, namely left mid-LIFG and pLITC.  
The significant LIFG cluster was located in pars triangularis. This converges with the 
majority of published studies examining semantically ambiguous sentences, further 
demonstrating this to be the most consistent site of significant ambiguity-elevated 
peaks in the frontal cortex (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Mason & 
Just, 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 2007). The 
temporal cluster was located in pLITC, where significant peaks were found in the left 
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posterior occipitotemporal sulcus and pLITG. This location of temporal activation is 
most consistent with recent studies by Rodd et al. (2012) and Bekinschtein et al. 
(2011), but is more inferior than other studies where activation centre around 
pMTG/ITG (Davis et al., 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007).  
The potential functions and mechanisms underlying the ambiguity-elevated 
responses of these two regions were further assessed by examining their response 
profiles to various sentence conditions (based on ROIs surrounding the frontal and 
temporal group peak). First the contrast between unambiguous sentences and SCN 
revealed that both the mid-LIFG and pLITC showed no significant response to 
sentences that did not contain an ambiguous word. This finding suggests these 
regions may not be routinely involved during speech comprehension of low-
ambiguity speech and that they may therefore perform functions that are more 
pertinent to ambiguity resolution than sentence processing in general. These results 
are discussed in more detail later with regard to their implications for theories of 
LIFG and pLITC function.  
Second, the contrast between the three types of ambiguous words (strongly biased, 
weakly biased and balanced) revealed that the responses of both regions were also 
modulated by the dominance of the ambiguous word’s meaning. Specifically, 
activation was greater for sentences in which the contextually appropriate meaning 
of the ambiguous word was its subordinate meaning (i.e., infrequently preferred by 
listeners) than for sentences whose meaning was one of two more equally preferred 
meanings. It must be noted that these dominance effects were significant for the 
LIFG but not for the pLITC when the ROIs were assessed separately, indicating that 
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some caution needs to be taken when drawing conclusions about the latter region. 
However, the dominance effects in pLITC did not differ significantly from the LIFG 
and there were clear numerical effects in the same direction, which, together, 
provides no evidence that these regions are differently modulated by dominance.  
The specific direction of modulation, where biased sentences produced greater 
activation than balanced sentences, suggests that these regions are especially 
involved when the meaning of an ambiguous word needs to be reinterpreted based 
on subsequent contextual information. In these sentences, disambiguating 
information was delayed for several words after the ambiguous word, making it likely 
that listeners would have committed to a single interpretation before the 
disambiguating information is heard (Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2010; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979; Twilley & Dixon, 
2000). In the case of biased sentences, this interpretation would often be the 
incorrect, dominant, meaning and, thus, require updating to the subordinate 
meaning later in the sentence. Balanced sentences would require reinterpretation 
less often since meaning preferences are more equal across the alternative 
meanings. Although no significant dominance effects were found in the whole-brain 
voxel-wise analysis, the increased sensitivity using an average ROI analysis is likely 
due to it reducing noise in the dominance-responses across voxels and subjects, 
which is likely to be high considering that meaning preferences are inherently 
variable across subjects (Rodd et al., 2013) and because the exact time-course of 
disambiguation is likely to vary across sentences and across individuals depending 
on comprehension ability (Gernsbacher & Robertson, 1995; Gernsbacher et al., 
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1990). Such variability may render the whole-brain analysis particularly insensitive 
due to the relatively modest number of trials per condition (25-33 trials).  
The dominance findings converge with and extend the growing literature that report 
dominance effects on this neural network associated with semantic ambiguity. The 
results directly replicate Mason and Just’s (2007) finding of greater LIFG activation 
for biased than balanced sentences. The trend in the temporal cortex was new. 
Mason and Just (2007) did not report any evidence of such a response pattern in 
the temporal cortex. This may be because it is a less robust effect. However, their 
study also did not find a significant main effect of ambiguity in this region, 
suggesting a general lack of sensitivity to the ambiguity response. Nevertheless, the 
finding that both frontal and temporal regions showed effects of dominance (albeit 
only numerically for the latter) is consistent with two previous studies. First, it 
converges with Zempleni et al.’s (2007) study in which a very similar region of the 
LIFG (pars opercularis/triangularis) and a slightly less inferior temporal region to that 
found in this study (pMTG/ITG) showed more activation for late-disambiguation 
sentences that biased the subordinate than dominant meaning. Second, these 
results also complement research on syntactically ambiguous sentences conducted 
by Rodd et al. (2010) in which activation in the LIFG and pMTG negatively 
correlated with the dominance of syntactically ambiguous sentences. Rodd et al. 
(2010) also examined semantically ambiguous sentences but they did not find any 
significant dominance correlations for these sentences. The authors hypothesised 
that this null finding may have been due to the position of the context. The 
ambiguous word was disambiguated immediately by the subsequent word in the 
sentence which may have limited the effect of meaning dominance as the correct 
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meaning could be selected straight away for both biased and balanced words. The 
dominance effects found in the current study provide important, albeit indirect, 
support for this hypothesis, as the sentences employed here had a considerably 
longer delay between the ambiguous word and disambiguating information. 
Semantic reinterpretation is a key process of ambiguity resolution that has been 
strongly associated with the LIFG and left posterior middle/inferior temporal cortex 
(Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007). Because dominance is an 
important indicator of semantic reinterpretation load, the finding that this network 
was modulated by this factor provides important evidence supporting its role in this 
process.  
Interestingly, the results did not show a linear relationship between dominance and 
neural response, which would be expected if dominance simply reflects the 
likelihood of semantic reinterpretation. In fact, the two types of biased sentences 
patterned together: activation for strongly-biased and weakly-biased sentences was 
each greater than for balanced sentences but not significantly different from each 
other. One possible reason is that dominance scores may also index how difficult 
reinterpretation is because they also indicate how likely it is that alternative 
meanings are initially activated and, thus, how available the contextually appropriate 
meaning is when the disambiguating information is later encountered. The 
psycholinguistic literature does not distinguish between strongly and weakly biased 
words. Instead, the general consensus is that if a word has a more dominant 
meaning then the subordinate meaning is either not accessed or is quickly 
suppressed (Duffy et al., 2001; Simpson, 1994; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). In this study, 
the subordinate meanings of both the strongly and weakly biased sentences were 
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much less frequent than the dominant meaning. In fact the weakly-biased sentences 
had an average dominance of only 21%. Thus, in both cases the subordinate 
meaning may not be strongly activated. In contrast, for balanced words, multiple 
meanings are likely to be activated and maintained for longer (Duffy et al., 2001; 
Simpson, 1994; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). Thus, although multiple meanings are 
unlikely to be maintained in parallel until disambiguating context is encountered 
(Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979), the 
non-selected meanings of balanced words may be easier to process than those of 
biased words because they may have a higher level of activation. Computationally, 
this difference in activation may arise because initially-selected, balanced meanings 
may not produce as much suppression as dominant meanings (Gernsbacher & St 
John, 2001; MacDonald et al., 1994). An alternative explanation for the similar 
pattern between the two types of biased words is that dominant meanings may be 
harder to override than those of balanced words, regardless of their level of 
dominance per se (Vuong & Martin, 2011). As discussed earlier, this may be 
because dominant meanings are more likely to be preferred, and thus integrated, 
more quickly than balanced meanings (Duffy et al., 2001; Gernsbacher & St John, 
2001; Simpson, 1994; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). Thus, the dominance pattern 
suggests that this fronto-temporal network may be particularly important to integrate 
a less available meaning and/or suppress incorrect representations. This is highly 
consistent with a recent patient study demonstrating that patients with damage to 
the LIFG had particular difficulty in resolving subordinate-biased sentences 
compared to sentences with balanced ambiguous words (Vuong & Martin, 2011).   
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Interestingly, there was no interaction between the dominance pattern of the frontal 
and temporal cortex. Previous fMRI research has suggested a dissociation of 
ambiguity-related function between the LIFG and posterior temporal cortex, whereby 
the LIFG supports reinterpretation as well as initial meaning selection while the 
temporal cortex is only involved in reinterpretation (Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; 
Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 2007). Similarly, neural theories of LIFG 
function that argue for a general conflict or semantic unification role also suggest 
that this region should be important for both ambiguity processes (Hagoort, 2013; 
Novick et al., 2005). These dominance results, however, demonstrated that the 
LIFG was primarily affected by reinterpretation demands. There are various reasons 
why it may not have shown an evident response to initial selection demands, which 
cannot be examined within this dataset. The simplest account is that these particular 
regions of the LIFG or pLITC are not involved in the initial selection between 
meanings, and that this process loads, instead, on other brain areas. In this current 
study it was not possible to distinguish whether other brain regions were important 
for this process as voxel-wise whole-brain analyses were found to be insensitive in 
detecting dominance effects, as discussed above. The alternative possibility is that 
the mid-LIFG, and even the pLITC, are involved in initial selection but that initial 
selection and reinterpretation place different demands on the processing of these 
regions such that processing associated with reinterpretation is more sensitive to 
being detected with fMRI. There are two reasons that this might be the case. First, 
initial selection may be a more transient process than semantic reinterpretation such 
that processing associated with this demand is not substantially reflected in BOLD 
signal which is predominately affected by local-field potentials resulting from 
integration of excitatory and inhibitory inputs and soma-dendritic processes 
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occurring within a population of neurons (Logothetis, 2008). Alternatively, fMRI 
insensitivity to initial selection may not be due to physiological reasons per se but 
may be concealed by reinterpretation-related responses if they are much larger than 
those associated with initial selection, since both processes occur within the 
balanced sentences. In current models of ambiguity resolution, there is no 
distinction made between the relative demands arising at initial selection and 
semantic reinterpretation, yet, it is a possibility. Future research needs to employ 
experimental paradigms that can separate out the brain responses to these two 
processes. For example, it would be particularly useful to use methods that have a 
higher temporal resolution than the fMRI protocol used here as these processes 
occur at different times during sentence processing, such as 
magnetoencephalography (MEG), TMS or time-sensitive fMRI techniques (Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2012).  
It is possible that the ambiguity-elevated responses also reflect regions responsible 
for anomaly detection, as oppose to reinterpretation per se, since the 
reinterpretation process must have been initiated by the detection of an anomaly. 
Consistent with this explanation are various neuroimaging studies which have found 
increased activation in the LIFG and/or posterior temporal cortex for semantically 
anomalous sentences compared to semantically congruent sentences (e.g., 
Baumgaertner et al., 2002; Hagoort et al., 2004; Kiehl, Laurens, & Liddle, 2002). 
However, the reinterpretation view seems to account for the wider range of tasks 
that engage these two regions across fMRI studies. In particular, these regions are 
engaged for various tasks that do not have any obvious anomalies, such as high-
competition verb generation or picture naming tasks (e.g., Kan & Thompson-Schill, 
 160 
 
2004a; Persson et al., 2004; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) and cue-target semantic 
comparisons (e.g., Badre et al., 2005). Thus, it may actually be the case that 
anomalous sentences elicit activation in these regions because they initiate 
processes associated with reinterpretation, such as selection, inhibition and 
semantic retrieval, which are merely unable to be completely resolved in the 
anomalous cases. The fMRI data, therefore, is compatible with both anomaly 
detection and/or reinterpretation but the latter is more compatible with the larger 
neuroimaging literature.       
3.4.2 Theoretical Account of Mid-LIFG  
The finding of a significant ambiguity-response in the mid-LIFG region that is 
modulated by meaning dominance is consistent with two prominent theories of LIFG 
function: the conflict resolution account (Novick et al., 2009; Novick et al., 2005; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) and the semantic unification theory (Hagoort, 2005, 
2013) as both attribute functional roles to this region that are relevant for semantic 
reinterpretation. However, the proposed roles and their underlying mechanisms are 
different, suggesting alternative ways by which this region may support this process.  
According to the conflict resolution account, the LIFG’s role in ambiguity resolution is 
to resolve conflict between simultaneously active representations. In terms of 
semantic reinterpretation, conflict is caused when contextual information is 
encountered that is inconsistent with the current interpretation of an ambiguous 
word. In this account, the LIFG supports conflict resolution by sending top-down 
signals that bias information in other brain regions to support the selection of one 
alternative. The strong claim that this region is driven by conflict is supported by the 
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additional finding that this region showed no significant response to unambiguous 
sentences over a low-level auditory baseline. Although it may be considered that 
unambiguous words also induce representational competition because they map 
onto concepts that have many alternative features which are unlikely to all be 
relevant to a given context , these features are not incompatible with each other and 
thus are unlikely to produce as much conflict as the alternative, incompatible, 
meanings of ambiguous words. For example, rabbits are furry, small, domesticated 
and shy but in the sentence “the schoolgirl was told that the rabbit was a very timid 
animal” only its behavioural characteristic is relevant.    
The alternative, semantic unification account (Hagoort, 2005, 2013), argues that the 
LIFG serves to combine units of information to form larger representations of a 
sentence by enabling the maintenance of information online. Ambiguous words are 
likely to increase the demand on combinatorial processes, particularly during 
reinterpretation, when inconsistent contextual information needs to be integrated 
into a new understanding of the ambiguous word and sentence. However, the 
results of this study do not support one critical aspect of this theory that unification 
occurs for all types of sentences as there was no significant evidence that the mid-
LIFG responded to unambiguous sentences. It must be noted that a more posterior 
cluster of the LIFG, in pars opercularis, showed a response to ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentences (albeit at an uncorrected threshold). Although this finding is 
compatible with the unification theory, this cluster was confined to posterior LIFG 
which is specifically attributed to syntactic and phonological unification. According to 
this theory, the more anterior regions should also have also shown an unambiguous 
response, as they support semantic unification but there was no evidence of this. 
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Thus, the fMRI data is not completely compatible with the claims of the unification 
theory, particularly with regard to the proposed role of the anterior/middle regions in 
semantic processing. Various other neuroimaging studies have also failed to find 
significant LIFG responses to sentential stimuli (Crinion et al., 2003; Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Spitsyna et al., 2006). It is not, however, straightforward to 
draw conclusions from a null-result as the lack of a significant effect in the 
experimental condition may merely be masked by the fact that this region may also 
be active during the baseline conditions (J. Binder et al., 1999). Yet, patient data 
provide some corroborating evidence that the LIFG may not be necessary and, thus, 
not always involved in language comprehension. Patients with LIFG lesions have 
relatively preserved comprehension of words and of, albeit relatively simple, 
sentences (Caplan et al., 1996; Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; Novick et al., 2009; Yee 
et al., 2008). Thus, together the results of this study provide support for the conflict 
resolution account of LIFG function and, perhaps, for a revised version of the 
unification account in which the LIFG is viewed as mandatory for language 
comprehension.  
3.4.3 Role of the Posterior Inferior Temporal Cortex in Ambiguity Resolution  
Ambiguity-elevated activation in the pLITC was located within the middle portion of 
the ventral occipitotemporal cortex (vOT) (Price & Devlin, 2011). This locus was 
somewhat surprising as it is posterior to regions that have been associated with 
multimodal semantic processing (anterior fusiform/vOT: J. Binder et al., 2009; Price 
& Devlin, 2011) and the cluster had a more inferior distribution than that associated 
with sound-to-meaning mapping (MTG/ITS: Hickok & Poeppel, 2007) or semantic 
control (MTG: Jefferies, 2013). Instead, this region has been more generally 
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attributed to high-level visual processing associated with either the visual form of 
words (Dehaene & Cohen, 2011) or with visual features of objects or meaningful 
stimuli more generally (Martin, 2007; Price & Devlin, 2011). In addition, it is not 
consistently found in auditory single word or spoken sentence studies (J. Binder et 
al., 2000; Davis & Gaskell, 2009; Obleser & Kotz, 2010; Spitsyna et al., 2006; Xiao 
et al., 2005).  
However, a large body of research shows that the response of this region is strongly 
modulated by non-visual processes such as semantics and phonological information 
(Devlin et al., 2006; Song, Bu, Hu, Luo, & Liu, 2010; Twomey et al., 2011; 
Yoncheva, Zevin, Maurer, & McCandliss, 2010) and can be activated in the absence 
of visual information (e.g., Mellet, Tzourio, Denis, & Mazoyer, 1998; Price, 
Winterburn, et al., 2003).Thus, activation in response to ambiguity may reflect top-
down accessing of visual information that may be related to orthographic 
representations or to visual attributes of the objects referred to in the sentence. 
Because two previous studies of ambiguity resolution have also found activation in 
this vicinity it (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012), it is 
important to understand the potential reasons why this may occur. Various reasons 
are considered here. Activation in this region may be driven by explicit visual 
imagery of the ambiguous word forms or content of the ambiguous sentence 
(Dehaene & Cohen, 2011; Martin, 2007). This is a possibility as the ambiguous 
words were the main focus of the sentence (e.g., the man thought the plant should 
never have been built) and the majority referred to concrete, imageable objects. The 
finding that this region was particularly affected by semantic reinterpretation further 
supports this possibility as misinterpretations may highlight the ambiguity and, thus, 
 164 
 
evoke a visual image of the word form or may evoke an image of the wrong 
interpretation of the sentence. This explanation is supported by a large body of 
research showing increased activation of visual processing areas during a variety of 
imagery tasks, including when participants are explicitly asked to imagine the 
meaning of spoken concrete nouns (D'Esposito et al., 1997; Mellet et al., 1998) and 
the form of visual objects (Ishai et al., 2000; O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000) as well 
as when they perform a visual property verification task on pairs of words (Kan, 
Barsalou, Olseth Solomon, Minor, & Thompson-Schill, 2003). Alternatively, visual 
information may be driven automatically by inherent connections between semantic 
representations and perceptual attributes (Gennari et al., 2007; Kan et al., 2003; 
Martin, 2007; Price & Devlin, 2011; Sabsevitz, Medler, Seidenberg, & Binder, 2005). 
Strong support for implicit accessing of visual information comes from masked 
priming studies in which posterior ventral temporal responses to a written word or 
picture are reduced when it is preceded by a conceptually identical yet 
unconsciously perceived item (Kherif, Josse, & Price, 2011). This visual processing 
account is compatible with a recent fMRI study that showed that ambiguous verbs 
(“to bowl”) produced greater activation in motion-semantic areas (Gennari et al., 
2007) and, thus, further suggests that different types of ambiguous words may elicit 
activation in different semantic areas depending on their semantic properties. Under 
this view, the temporal activation found in this current study may reflect the fact that 
the ambiguous stimuli were loading on visual semantics. However, it is not possible 
to test this prediction within this set of stimuli. Future research is needed to directly 
compare different types of ambiguous words during sentence comprehension.   
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If such activation reflects visual involvement, then an important question is what 
function does it serve? Accessing of visual information may be merely a by-product 
of the comprehension process (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) or may play an 
essential role in resolving the competition by way of sending signals that 
support/inhibit the contextually appropriate/inappropriate meanings (Gennari et al., 
2007). It is important to note that not all ambiguity studies have shown activation in 
this region. More often, activation is more lateral and superior, located more 
specially to the inferior and middle temporal gyri (Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 
2007). This may be due to additional sensitivity achieved in this study by having a 
large number of trials or may reflect differences between stimuli across studies. 
Future research is needed that manipulates ambiguity with imageability or varies 
task demands to focus attention on the visual properties of the sentence to assess 
whether these factors interact with ambiguity-related activation. Thus, it is clear that 
there are various possible explanations for ambiguity-elevated activation in the 
ventral temporal region primarily associated with visual processing. Further research 
is needed to disentangle these explanations and to understand why other areas 
associated with non-visual semantics are not also strongly engaged by ambiguous 
words.     
Like accounts of LIFG function, these visual-based accounts of pITC also differ in 
terms of whether these imputed processes are general to sentence processing. The 
finding that this region showed no significant response to unambiguous sentences 
provides no evidence in support of a general sentence function that is, for example, 
argued by Martin’s (2007) theory of object knowledge. The finding, instead supports, 
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other accounts that do not assume involvement in general sentence comprehension 
(Dehaene & Cohen, 2011; Price & Devlin, 2011).    
While the locus of this temporal activation is most consistent with regions discussed 
in visual processing accounts, it must be emphasised that it is also close to regions 
imputed in other accounts of posterior temporal function. In particular, this region is 
just inferior to pMTG/ITS that is argued to support sound-meaning mapping (Hickok 
& Poeppel, 2007). Thus, the finding of an ambiguity effect in the broad vicinity of this 
region may also be considered consistent with this account, as the mapping 
between sound and meaning is more uncertain for ambiguous than unambiguous 
words. Presumably, this mapping needs re-computing when the meaning of word is 
not supported by contextual information (Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012), which is 
further supported by the finding that this region was affected by reinterpretation load. 
In addition, the individual subject analyses showed that for a sub-set of subjects, the 
ambiguity-elevated peak that was closest to the pLITC group peak was located in  
pMTG rather than in the inferior temporal cortex per se. This may provide some 
evidence for a role of this region in semantic control (Jefferies, 2013) but it is not 
consistent across subjects.     
In summary, the results showed ambiguity-elevated activity in the vicinity of regions 
associated with high-level visual processing. There are various possible reasons 
why visual information may be elicited by ambiguous words, including that they 
evoke explicit imagery of the words’ referents or enhance activation of semantic 
features to support competition amongst alternative meanings. As these regions are 
close to those associated with sound-to-meaning mapping and semantic control, 
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future research needs to assess the functional properties of the specific regions that 
are engaged by ambiguity to examine what kinds of information and processes they 
may serve in ambiguity resolution.  
3.4.4 Inter-subject Variability  
As this study confirms, the involvement of both frontal and temporal regions in the 
processing of semantically ambiguous sentences is emerging as a highly consistent 
finding across fMRI studies. However, these results are based on group-level 
analyses, which do not indicate the extent to which this reflects a network in which 
all components are engaged by all subjects. To investigate this, inter-subject 
variability was assessed in relation to the frontal and temporal two group peaks. 
Interestingly, all subjects (apart from one) showed ambiguity-elevated local maxima 
within the LIFG and posterior temporal cortex. These peaks were, on average, 
within 10 mm of the group peak co-ordinates. These findings validate that the group-
level results reflect genuine activation patterns occurring within the majority of 
subjects (although it is possible that some of these activations are false positives 
since these effects were found at low significance thresholds).  
Other interesting findings also came out of this analysis. First, the anatomical 
locations of the LIFG individual peaks were highly consistent, being located within 
pars triangularis in over 80% of subjects. This further highlights the potential 
importance of this particular LIFG sub-division in semantic ambiguity resolution. In 
contrast, the locations of the temporal peaks were more anatomically variable. While 
almost all subjects showed peaks in inferior temporal regions (ITG, occipitotemporal 
sulcus, fusiform gyrus), validating the group peak location, there was no clearly 
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consistent anatomical field that was engaged. The nature of this variability is 
currently unclear. It may reflect the fact that high-level cognitive processes, such as 
ambiguity resolution, do not map tightly onto anatomically-defined regions (Duncan, 
Pattamadilok, Knierim, & Devlin, 2009; Tahmasebi et al., 2012). Alternatively, it may 
be more functionally relevant, perhaps reflecting the fact that individual subjects use 
different strategies to resolve semantic ambiguities, such as visual, phonological 
and/or cognitive control processes. Nevertheless, these inter-subject findings clearly 
show the importance of both frontal and temporal regions in processing ambiguous 
sentences.  
3.4.5 Additional Ambiguity-responsive Regions  
Inspecting the data at a lower statistical threshold revealed that ambiguity-elevated 
activations occurred across substantially larger clusters within the frontal and 
temporal cortex than that shown when applying stringent statistical threshold.  The 
frontal cluster extended both anterior and posteriorly across the LIFG, throughout 
pars triangularis and pars opercularis. However, interestingly, activation was not 
found in its most anterior sub-division, pars orbitalis.  This is particularly noteworthy 
as anterior LIFG has been specifically attributed to semantic processing (Badre & 
Wagner, 2007; Gough et al., 2005; Hagoort, 2005, 2013; Poldrack et al., 1999; 
Vigneau et al., 2006). It is currently unclear why these regions were not found to 
respond to the semantic ambiguity manipulation in this study which instead 
highlighted middle and posterior portions of the LIFG. This result, however, is not 
completely surprising as the response of anterior LIFG to semantically ambiguous 
sentences is the least consistent of the three sub-divisions, with some previous 
ambiguity studies showing the posterior pattern found in this study (Mason & Just, 
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2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007), and others reporting activation 
across all three sub-divisions (Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 
2010). One potential explanation is that this region serves a specific semantic-
related function that is not important to resolve all types of ambiguous sentences. 
For example, one current theory of the anterior LIFG is that it supports controlled 
semantic retrieval (Badre & Wagner, 2007). In this current study, the ambiguous 
sentences were disambiguated by the sentence-final word only, which meant that 
this word had to be strongly related to the correct meaning of the ambiguous word. 
As result, resolving the meaning of the ambiguous word may not have required 
additional controlled retrieval of semantic information that is supported by this 
region. Future research is clearly needed to examine the relationship between the 
anterior LIFG and semantic ambiguity resolution.   
Another interesting observation was the notable extension of ambiguity-related 
activation into frontal and temporal regions that have been strongly implicated in 
phonological processing, namely the posterior and mid-STS as well as the posterior 
LIFG extending to precentral gyrus (Hagoort, 2013; Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; 
Rauschecker & Scott, 2009). Such activation may, thus, reflect a replaying of the 
heard sentence in an attempt to reanalyse the meaning of these sentences. This 
may be examined in variety of ways. For example, behaviourally a dual-task 
interference paradigm can be used to assess the effect of a concurrent phonological 
task on sentence comprehension (Rogalsky et al., 2008), or, a neuroimaging study 
could assess the neural effect of manipulating the load on phonological re-activation 
by manipulating the delay between an ambiguous word and the disambiguating 
information.  
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Furthermore, cognitive models of ambiguity resolution are vague in terms of the 
specific processes that underlie ambiguity resolution and semantic reinterpretation. 
It is possible that controlled semantic retrieval, phonological re-activation and/or 
many other processes are important. These results may provide working 
hypotheses for both cognitive and neural models of ambiguity resolution. 
Alternatively, it is possible that these less robust regions may reflect inter-subject 
variability in the processing of ambiguous sentences.    
3.4.6 Conclusions  
In conclusion, this study examined the neural responses to late-disambiguation 
sentences and replicated the involvement of the inferior frontal and posterior 
temporal cortex in ambiguity resolution. The results, furthermore, demonstrated that 
both regions were particularly sensitive to dominance, indicating important roles in 
reanalysing the meaning of a sentence during language comprehension.  The next 
chapter examines the function of the LIFG further by using TMS to examine whether 
this region is causally involved in the reinterpretation process.  
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Chapter 4 TMS Investigation of the LIFG’s Role in Ambiguity 
Resolution 
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4.1 Introduction 
An increasing number of neuroimaging studies, including the one presented in the 
previous chapter, support the involvement of the LIFG and posterior temporal 
regions in semantic ambiguity resolution (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Mason & Just, 
2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; 
Zempleni et al., 2007). However, increases in BOLD signal do not indicate that 
these regions are necessary for ambiguity resolution because fMRI is a correlational 
measure. Blood oxygen levels are measured during the course of an event, which 
means that it records activity that is both necessary and incidental activity for the 
task. For example, detecting a visual feature of a word produces activation that is 
not confined to areas associated with visual processing but engages widespread 
activity in classical language areas (Price, Wise, & Frackowiak, 1996). Areas that 
process non-visual information are clearly not necessary for a non-linguistic visual-
detection task. In the same manner, it is possible that some regions that show 
increased BOLD activity to ambiguous sentences do not play a critical role in 
resolving the ambiguity per se. For example, listeners may reflect on the incorrect 
interpretation of the ambiguous word after the correct meaning has been 
understood, and, thus, some activation may be a by-product of listener’s awareness 
that a word has multiple interpretations.  
4.1.1 Patient Studies 
The traditional way of determining causality is by examining patients who have 
suffered damage to the brain region of interest. If such patients are impaired on a 
task, then the affected regions must be necessary for cognitive processes 
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underlying the task. Over thirty years of patient research has focused on the function 
of the frontal cortex in semantic ambiguity resolution, converging on it having a 
causal role in this process (Bedny, Hulbert, & Thompson-Schill, 2007; Grindrod, 
2012; Grindrod & Baum, 2003; Hagoort, 1993; Milberg et al., 1987; Swaab et al., 
1998; Swinney et al., 1989; Vuong & Martin, 2011). Initial support came from 
patients with Broca’s aphasia as this syndrome is associated with left frontal lobe 
damage. Although the specific pattern of deficits varies across studies, each study 
demonstrates that such patients process ambiguous words differently to 
neurologically healthy adults. For example, some researchers report that Broca’s 
aphasics fail to automatically activate meanings of ambiguous words, evinced by a 
lack of lexical decision priming to target words presented after an ambiguous word 
across various priming contexts. This has been interpreted as a general deficit in 
automatically accessing lexical representations of words (Milberg et al., 1987). 
Others have found that in sentence contexts, these patients automatically activate 
dominant but not subordinate meanings regardless of sentence bias, which has 
been attributed to a slowing, rather than an absence, of lexical activation (Swinney 
et al., 1989). Still others report no deficit in initial lexical access, finding priming for 
multiple meanings, but find that patients have difficulties in using preceding context 
to bias activation toward the contextually appropriate meaning (Grindrod & Baum, 
2003). Studies have also shown deficits in maintaining activation of the contextually 
appropriate meaning, as priming is found for short inter-stimulus intervals (100-
500ms) between ambiguous words and targets related to these meanings but not for 
long ISIs (750-1250ms) (Grindrod, 2012; Grindrod & Baum, 2003; Hagoort, 1993). In 
contrast, another study that measured ERP to targets related to the contextually 
appropriate or inappropriate meanings of ambiguous sentences, showed prolonged, 
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rather than reduced, maintenance of contextually inappropriate meanings. This 
suggested a deficit in using context to select the appropriate meaning that delays 
this process (Swaab et al., 1998). There is clearly controversy regarding the exact 
nature of the ambiguity-related deficits but these studies clearly converge on the 
broad finding that ambiguity resolution is disrupted in patients with Broca’s aphasia 
and, thus, that the frontal lobe may be critical for this process.  
Inferring a brain-behaviour relationship based on this group of patients, however, is 
problematic for various reasons. In all these studies patients were not specifically 
selected because of lesions to Broca’s area. Patients were selected if they 
presented with the clinical syndrome that was initially discovered in patients with 
damage to this region (Broca, 1861) with lesion location either not being taken into 
account (Hagoort, 1993; Milberg et al., 1987; Swaab et al., 1998; Swinney et al., 
1989) or simply being used to include patients with only left, but not right, 
hemisphere lesions (Grindrod, 2012; Grindrod & Baum, 2003). This is problematic 
because various studies have shown that this syndrome is usually not produced 
when lesions are restricted to the LIFG but is, instead, frequently accompanied with 
damage that extends beyond the LIFG and is even found in patients with non-LIFG 
damage, suggesting that other regions may be critical in producing this type of 
aphasia (Dronkers, Plaisant, Iba-Zizen, & Cabanis, 2007; Fridriksson, Bonilha, & 
Rorden, 2007; Mohr et al., 1978). Accordingly, in all of the aforementioned ambiguity 
studies, some patients either did not have damage to the LIFG or their lesion 
extended far beyond this region. However, a causal relationship between LIFG 
damage and ambiguity resolution has recently been corroborated by Vuong and 
Martin (2011) who showed that two patients with relatively circumscribed lesions to 
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this region were impaired in processing the subordinate meaning of ambiguous 
sentences. Specifically these patients had greater difficulty than controls in reading 
subordinate-biased sentences compared to sentences with balanced ambiguous 
words or unambiguous sentences. Bedny et al. (2007) also showed that a patient 
with extensive damage to LIFG was impaired in suppressing the contextually 
inappropriate meaning of an ambiguous word. Together, such patient research 
suggests that LIFG is causally involved in processing the meaning of semantically 
ambiguous words. However, there are inconsistencies in the deficits reported across 
studies and, thus, it is unclear what the functional contributions are of the LIFG to 
this process.  
In addition, all of the above studies focused on the initial processing of an 
ambiguous word as oppose to when the meaning of this word needs to be 
reanalysed based on subsequent contextual information. Neuroimaging research 
emphasises an important role of this region in this later process but there is no direct 
patient data testing this hypothesis. Some indirect support, however, comes from 
patient research on syntactic reinterpretation. Patients with damage to LIFG show 
impairments in understanding syntactic garden-path sentences, in which an early 
commitment to an incorrect syntactic construction is initially made, which needs to 
reanalysed when more of the sentence is encountered (Novick et al., 2009). This 
may require similar sets of cognitive processes as those needed to reanalyse the 
meaning of a semantically ambiguous word (MacDonald et al., 1994; Rodd, Longe, 
et al., 2010).    
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Patients with brain lesions are undoubtedly necessary for testing hypotheses 
regarding the causal relationship between brain regions and cognitive processes. 
However, such research has various experimental difficulties that affect the 
methodological approach that can be employed and may limit the interpretation of 
results. For example, the location and spread of brain damage is uncontrollable. 
Lesions are often large and their distribution varies widely across patients. In 
addition, brain damage may lead to compensatory neural changes that may lead to 
misinterpretations about the nature of patients’ deficits. There is also the possibility 
that patients have a different pre-morbid ability to control subjects, which potentially 
confounds results when patients are compared with other populations. A number of 
techniques have been developed to overcome these difficulties. For example, lesion 
variability can be dealt with by using voxel-based lesion symptom mapping analysis, 
which evaluates the behavioural effects of a lesion on a voxel-by-voxel basis (Bates 
et al., 2003; Dronkers et al., 2004), while neural re-organisation can be assessed by 
measuring patients’ brain activity with PET or fMRI (Meltzer, Wagage, Ryder, 
Solomon, & Braun, 2013; Price & Crinion, 2005; Schofield et al., 2012). However, 
these techniques still rely on patient data that cannot overcome the issue of pre-
morbid abilities, control lesion diversity or avoid functional reorganisation confounds. 
4.1.2 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) is an alternative neuroscientific tool that 
can be used to test causal relationships between brain and behaviour.  One of its 
major advantages is that it is a non-invasive technique and thus can be used to test 
neurological healthy adults noninvasively, enabling it to avoid many of the limitations 
of patient data discussed above. TMS permits causal inference because it 
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temporarily disrupts neural activity, producing a “virtual lesion” in the subject (Walsh 
& Cowey, 2000). Thus, if TMS to a brain region affects task performance then it can 
be concluded that that region serves a causal role in the cognitive processes 
underlying the task. TMS works on Faraday’s principle of electromagnetic induction, 
where a changing magnetic field induces an electrical current in a nearby conductive 
object. In TMS a rapidly changing current is delivered through a coil that produces a 
rapidly changing magnetic field. This generates an electric field in the brain region 
under the coil, affecting the underlying neuronal activity by inducing action potentials 
in neurons and/or changing the resting membrane potentials (T. Wagner, 
Rushmore, Eden, & Valero-Cabre, 2009). The consequence is that transient noise is 
added into the information processing that is occurring in the region, which will affect 
tasks that depend on these operations, usually manifesting as increases in RTs 
and/or errors (Devlin & Watkins, 2007; Walsh & Cowey, 2000).  
TMS has several features that render it a powerful tool for examining the causal role 
of specific brain regions in cognitive processes such as semantic ambiguity 
resolution. One of the most important features is that it has both relatively high 
spatial and temporal resolution, which are much higher than other non-invasive 
stimulation techniques such as transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS) and 
that are sufficiently high to allow testing dissociations between nearby brain regions 
and temporal dynamics.               
Magnetic fields are inevitably produced under the whole coil.  However, the ability to 
stimulate a cortical region depends on the strength of the field and the threshold that 
a region needs for being stimulated (Jahanshahi & Rothwell, 2000; Walsh, Pascual-
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Leone, & Kosslyn, 2003). Certain configurations of TMS coils can make the field 
stronger at specific points on the coil, which has the effect of focalising stimulation to 
a relatively small region surrounding the strongest spot (Brasil-Neto et al., 1992; 
Ueno, Tashiro, & Harada, 1988; Wassermann, McShane, Hallett, & Cohen, 1992). 
Empirically, various TMS studies demonstrate that the effective spatial resolution of 
a figure-of-eight coil can be as precise as 0.5 – 1cm in width. For example, early 
studies showed that different upper limb muscles can be selectively stimulated by 
administering TMS to motor cortex areas that are only 0.5 - 1 cm apart (e.g., Brasil-
Neto et al., 1992; Wassermann et al., 1992). In addition, TMS effects on cognitive 
tasks, such as semantic judgements and visual search, have been found and lost by 
moving the coil approximately 1 cm along the scalp (Ashbridge, Walsh, & Cowey, 
1997; Gough et al., 2005). The effective focality has further been validated in a 
growing set of studies showing that TMS can successfully dissociate functions of 
nearby brain regions, including visual attention from saccades in the right superior 
parietal cortex (Ashbridge et al., 1997), semantic processing from phonological 
processing in the left inferior frontal gyrus (Gough et al., 2005) and body from face 
from object processing in three adjacent regions in the right extrastriate cortex 
(Pitcher, Charles, Devlin, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2009). Together these studies 
suggest that TMS can be used to target and assess the functional contribution of a 
relatively precise area of cortex.    
TMS also has an experimentally powerful temporal resolution that can be used to 
target neural processing that occurs at specific time-points during a task. Some 
stimulation protocols such as theta-burst stimulation or repetitive low-frequency TMS 
induce behavioural disruption that lasts for several minutes after stimulation 
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(Acheson & Hagoort, 2013; Hilgetag, Theoret, & Pascual-Leone, 2001; Kosslyn et 
al., 1999; Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2010). However, the effects of TMS 
can be considerably more precise when short trains of high frequency pulses (> 
1Hz) are delivered “online” during a task. For example, various studies have 
demonstrated that single or double pulses of TMS produce different behavioural 
effects at different time-points separated by as little as 10 or 40 ms (Duncan, 
Pattamadilok, & Devlin, 2010; Juan & Walsh, 2003; Pitcher, Goldhaber, Duchaine, 
Walsh, & Kanwisher, 2012; Pitcher, Walsh, Yovel, & Duchaine, 2007; Sliwinska, 
Khadilkar, Campbell-Ratcliffe, Quevenco, & Devlin, 2012). These results 
demonstrate that TMS can have a temporal resolution of tens of milliseconds. 
However, it must be noted that this is in stark contrast with animal research that 
have demonstrated that single pulses to neurons in the visual cortex of a cat 
produce a physiological response that can last up to seconds (Moliadze, Zhao, 
Eysel, & Funke, 2003). Yet, the physiological response found in animals may not 
equate to the durations of behaviourally-measurable disruption for a number of 
reasons. For example, the extent to which task performance will be disrupted 
depends on the extent to which the brain region can recover from the noise 
introduced into its processing, which may differ across individual neurons due to 
their different physiological properties such as size and orientation (Walsh et al., 
2003). In addition, the physiological effects of brain stimulation are affected by the 
state of the brain region. For example, Antal, Terney, Poreisz, and Paulus (2007) 
showed that effects of brain stimulation are only long-lasting (i.e., for several 
minutes) when subjects are not using the stimulated brain region, which is the case 
in animal studies where the animals are anaesthetised.  
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The length of disruption can be flexibly adjusted by increasing the number of pulses 
delivered. This is particularly useful for many cognitive processes such as ambiguity 
resolution when it is unknown precisely when a brain region is critically involved. For 
example, stimulating with 3 to 5 pulses at 10Hz (i.e., for 300 – 500 ms) has been a 
useful protocol to induce robust behavioural impairments during a number of 
cognitive tasks, including visuospatial and motor attention (e.g., Rushworth, Paus, & 
Sipila, 2001), visual attention (e.g., Beck, Muggleton, Walsh, & Lavie, 2006), face 
perception (e.g., Pitcher, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2011), semantic and phonological 
processing (e.g.,Sliwinska et al., 2012). It is uncertain the exact temporal 
consequence of administering more than two TMS pulses as no time-course or 
animal studies have been conducted. However, insights can be gained by looking at 
its effects on task performance. Many TMS studies show that 3-5 pulses of 10Hz 
typically i) increase reaction times rather than increases errors (Devlin & Watkins, 
2007; Jahanshahi & Rothwell, 2000; Walsh & Cowey, 2000), ii) slow reaction times 
by as little as 30-70 ms when compared to no-TMS performance (Devlin, Matthews, 
& Rushworth, 2003; Gough et al., 2005), and iii) can be used successfully in event-
related designs such that TMS trials produce no behavioural effects on subsequent 
trials that do not have TMS (e.g., Devlin et al., 2003; Fuggetta, Pavone, Walsh, Kiss, 
& Eimer, 2006; Ganaden, Mullin, & Steeves, 2013; Gough et al., 2005). Together, 
these findings demonstrate that short trains of high-frequency TMS is a useful tool to 
assess specific time-windows that a brain region may be involved during task 
performance.  
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4.1.3 TMS Studies on Language Processing 
Many studies have fruitfully used TMS to investigate the function of LIFG and many 
other regions in language processes (Acheson & Hagoort, 2013; Gough et al., 2005; 
Nixon et al., 2004; Pascual-Leone, Gates, & Dhuna, 1991; Sliwinska et al., 2012; 
Stewart, Meyer, Frith, & Rothwell, 2001; Watkins, Strafella, & Paus, 2003; Whitney, 
Kirk, et al., 2011). For example, research has demonstrated a double dissociation 
between the anterior and posterior LIFG in semantic and phonological processing 
(Gough et al., 2005) and has shown evidence for the more specific role of the 
anterior LIFG in semantic control (Whitney, Kirk, et al., 2011). However, despite its 
experimental advantages, only one study to date has used TMS to investigate 
semantic ambiguity resolution. Harpaz, Levkovitz, and Lavidor (2009) examined the 
role of left and right Wernicke’s areas in processing the dominant and subordinate 
meanings of semantically ambiguous words by using a semantic relatedness task in 
which participants judged whether an ambiguous word was semantically related to a 
subsequent visual word (e.g., “pen-farmer”). Online TMS was employed where 5 
pulses at 10Hz were delivered at the onset of the second word. Results 
demonstrated that stimulating the left Wernicke’s area improved accuracy for 
dominant meaning trials whereas right hemisphere stimulation improved subordinate 
meaning trials. Although it is unclear why and how TMS improved performance 
rather than disrupting it as TMS operates by introducing interference into neural 
processing, the results showed that ambiguity-related processing can be 
successfully affected by TMS. Ambiguity studies using isolated word stimuli are 
undoubtedly important for understanding ambiguity processing. However, 
ambiguous words are usually embedded within wider contexts, such as sentences 
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or discourses, such that processing of the ambiguous word is more naturally 
resolved by the surrounding context. Thus, it is particularly important to assess the 
neural processing of these words when they occur within sentences. Various studies 
have successfully investigated sentence comprehension with TMS, demonstrating 
involvement of the motor system in speech comprehension (Buccino et al., 2005; 
Tremblay, Sato, & Small, 2012), the role of LIFG in syntactic processing (Acheson & 
Hagoort, 2013; Sakai, Noguchi, Takeuchi, & Watanabe, 2002) and the role of the 
temporal cortex in idiom comprehension (Oliveri, Romero, & Papagno, 2004) and 
contextual integration (Franzmeier, Hutton, & Ferstl, 2012). Yet TMS has not yet 
been used to investigate the comprehension of semantically ambiguous sentences.  
4.1.4 The Current Study 
The current experiment investigated the role of LIFG in the reinterpretation of 
semantically ambiguous sentences by using the semantic relatedness paradigm 
employed in the behavioural experiments reported in Chapter 2. To reiterate, in this 
paradigm, participants hear late-disambiguation ambiguous sentences and 
unambiguous sentences, which are followed by a visual probe word that they need 
to decide is related or unrelated to the preceding sentence. The disambiguating 
information in the ambiguous sentences is delayed until the last word when 
reinterpretation is assumed to take place based on a wealth of ambiguity research 
(Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010; Seidenberg et 
al., 1982; Swinney, 1979; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). The role of LIFG in semantic 
reinterpretation can be assessed by stimulating LIFG at the end of the sentence, 
when the disambiguating information is encountered, and assessing the effect of 
such stimulation on the semantic relatedness task. This particular behavioural task 
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has a further functional advantage. It allows us to assess which specific functions 
this region serves in semantic reinterpretation because different probe conditions 
are sensitive to different cognitive aspects of the resolution process that are 
reflected in behavioural effects as demonstrated in Chapter 2. For example, RTs to 
related probes of ambiguous sentences (e.g., “tree” for the ambiguous sentence “the 
man thought the bark was going to be very damp”) relative to unambiguous 
sentences index activation of the contextually appropriate meaning while RTs to 
inappropriate probes (e.g., “sound”) compared to unrelated probes index activation 
of the contextually inappropriate meanings. Thus, the specific functions of LIFG on 
ambiguity processing can be assessed by examining the effects of stimulating the 
LIFG on these different probe conditions. Neural theories of ambiguity resolution do 
not specify which aspects of semantic reanalysis are served by the LIFG but several 
hypotheses can be generated. For example, if the LIFG is critical for suppressing 
irrelevant meanings, stimulating the LIFG should slow down responses to the 
inappropriate probe condition. If the LIFG is critical for using context to access the 
contextually appropriate meaning, LIFG stimulation should slow-down responses for 
related probes.  
4.2 Method 
Participants  
26 (15 female) native English speakers took part in this experiment. Their mean age 
was 24 years (range: 18-47), all were right-handed, had no known reading or 
language impairment, nor any personal or family history of epilepsy or other 
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neurological condition. Participants were recruited via the UCL subject pool, board 
notices and student mailing lists. Participants were paid for their participation.  
Stimuli 
The stimuli were the same as for the behavioural experiments (Chapter 2). The only 
exception was that there was one less lead-in sentence presented per block (three 
instead of four) because, for methodological reasons, the trials were divided into 
more blocks (six instead of five) (see Design section).  
Design 
A 2 X 5 repeated-measures design was employed with TMS site (LIFG, Vertex) and 
probe condition (ambiguous related, ambiguous inappropriate, ambiguous 
unrelated, unambiguous related and unambiguous unrelated) as the two factors. As 
for the behavioural study, there were six versions of the stimuli, with participants 
performing one only version. In this TMS experiment, however, version was also 
divided into six blocks to enable stimulation site to be alternated across blocks. 
Accordingly, participants performed three blocks with LIFG stimulation and the other 
three with Vertex stimulation. Due to the number of unambiguous sentence items, 
half the blocks had an extra related probe whilst the other half had an extra 
unrelated probe word. Within each condition the blocks were matched on sentence 
dominance and on the probes’ relatedness rating, frequency, log frequency, length, 
number of meanings and number of senses (all ps > .1). Block assignment to TMS 
site was counterbalanced across participants (see Procedure section).  
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Procedure 
Participants were tested in the UCL Cognitive, Perceptual and Brain Sciences (CPB) 
TMS laboratory. The task was the same as the second behavioural experiment 
presented in Chapter 2 which employed a 300 ms sentence-probe delay. 
Participants heard a sentence which was followed, 300 ms later, by a visual probe 
word which they had to indicate was related or unrelated to the sentence. The 
procedure was identical to that experiment except for the following changes. TMS 
was delivered during the delay (see Figure 4-1) to impact processes associated with 
ambiguity resolution and not those related to the visual probe task. The 300 ms 
delay was chosen because the behavioural study demonstrated that disambiguation 
processing occurs during this time.  Four pulses of TMS were administered, starting 
at the offset of the sentence-final disambiguating word. These pulses had a 
frequency of 10 Hz. Thus, the last pulse was delivered 300 ms post sentence offset. 
TMS was administered via a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator (Magstim, Carmarthenshire, 
UK) and a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil. The stimulation intensity was set to 50% of the 
maximum stimulator output for all participants. The visual probe word was presented 
at the end of the TMS train, simultaneous to the last pulse. 
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Figure 4-1: Example of a TMS trial. A spoken sentence is presented, followed 
by four pulses of TMS, followed by a visual probe word. 
 
The experiment consisted of six blocks. Block order was counterbalanced using 
Latin squares to ensure that the same blocks did not always follow each other. Each 
block commenced with three lead-in items to help participants adjust to the 
stimulation before the experimental trials. Stimulated sites were alternated across 
blocks; half the participants started with LIFG stimulation whilst the other half started 
with Vertex stimulation. The LIFG site was centered on the MNI group peak 
activation co-ordinate from the fMRI experiment presented in Chapter 3 that showed 
a greater response to ambiguous than unambiguous sentences (x = -45, y = 32, z = 
4). The LIFG and Vertex sites were localized on each participant’s anatomical MRI 
scan. Frameless stereotaxy (Paus et al., 1997) was used to locate the TMS coil on 
the corresponding region of the scalp. A Polaris infrared camera (Northern Digital, 
Ontario, Canada) tracked the position of the participant’s head and BrainSight 
computer software (Rogue Research, Montreal, Canada) registered the participant’s 
head to the MRI scan. The TMS coil was positioned on an estimated location of this 
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region and adjusted until, on the MRI scan, the estimated direction of maximum field 
intensity met the desired stimulation site.   
Participants performed a practice block without TMS to familiarise themselves with 
the task. Then the practice with repeated with TMS administered to the LIFG to 
accustom participants to the sound and sensation of stimulation.    
4.3 Results 
One participant’s data was excluded from all analyses due to low accuracy, 
achieving only 50% correct responses in the ambiguous sentence conditions. Only 
reaction times for correct responses were analysed. Reaction times less than 300ms 
were removed. Inspection of the data revealed long outliers that could be reduced 
by trimming to the data to exclude responses more than three standard deviations 
above the individual subject’s mean RT. The data were analysed in the same 
manner as for the behavioural experiments (Chapter 2). Two main analyses were 
conducted. 1) A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with Ambiguity (ambiguous vs. unambiguous), 
Relatedness (related vs. unrelated) and, now, Site (LIFG vs. Vertex) as repeated-
measures factors and 2) an ANOVA comparing the ambiguous-inappropriate 
condition to the ambiguous-unrelated condition. Version was not included as dummy 
variable as there was double the number of versions as in the behavioural study 
rendering it less statistically useful. Items analyses were not conducted because 
only a small number of subjects (N = 2 – 7) contributed to the average value of each 
item, rendering the analyses low in statistical power and, thus, any non-significant 
results would be difficult to interpret.  
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Accuracy  
The 2 x 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x Relatedness x Site) ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of Ambiguity where responses were less accurate for ambiguous than 
unambiguous sentence probes (F(1,24) = 24.7, p < .001, η2p = .507; see Figure 4-2). 
The main effect of Relatedness was also significant with related probes less 
accurate than unrelated probes (F(1,24) = 48.1, p < .001, η2p = .667). There was 
also a significant Ambiguity x Relatedness interaction (F(1,24) = 21.2, p < .001, η2p = 
.469) such that accuracy was especially low for ambiguous sentence probes that 
were related to the sentence. There was a marginally significantly main effect of Site 
(F(1,24) = 3.89, p = .060, η2p = .139) which was, importantly, qualified by a 
significant Site x Relatedness interaction  (F(1,24) = 5.84, p = .024, η2p = .196). This 
interaction showed that LIFG stimulation reduced accuracy for related probes only 
(t(24) = 2.43, p = .023). There were no other significant two or three-way interactions 
(all Fs < 1).          
The ANOVA assessing the ambiguous-inappropriate condition revealed that these 
probes had significantly lower accuracy than the ambiguous-unrelated probes 
(F(1,24) = 78.6, p < .001, η2p = .766). However, there was no effect of Site nor a 
significant interaction between the stimulation site and probe condition (all Fs < 1).     
 
 
 189 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Mean accuracy (% correct) for the five probe conditions performed 
with LIFG (white) and Vertex (black) stimulation. Error bars show standard 
errors adjusted to remove between subjects variance.  
 
Reaction times 
The 2 x 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x Relatedness x Site) ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of Ambiguity: responses were slower for ambiguous than unambiguous 
sentences (F(1,24) = 10.41, p = .004, η2p = .302). See Figure 4-3. The main effect of 
Relatedness and the Ambiguity x Relatedness interaction were not significant 
(F(1,24) = < 1, η2p = .033; F(1,24) < 1, η
2
p = .001, respectively). The main effect of 
Site was significant: responses were, on average slower with LIFG than Vertex 
stimulation (F(1,24) = 9.27, p = .006, η2p = .279). Neither the Ambiguity x Site 
interaction nor the Relatedness x Site interactions was significant (F(1,24) < 1, η2p = 
.001; F(1,24) = 1.48, p = .235, η2p = .058, respectively).  
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Importantly, the main effect of Site was qualified by a significant three-way 
interaction between Ambiguity, Relatedness and Site (F(1,24) = 7.64, p = .011, η2p = 
.242) The three-way interaction was evaluated in two ways. First, the effect of Site 
was assessed for each condition. Bonferroni-corrected paired t-tests showed that 
responses were only significantly slower with LIFG than Vertex stimulation for two 
conditions: for related probes of ambiguous sentences (t(24) = 3.15, p = .012) and 
for unrelated probes of unambiguous sentences (t(24) = 2.92, p = .032). The related 
probes of unambiguous sentences showed a relatively large numerical slow-down 
with LIFG stimulation, but this was not statistically reliable. This effect was half the 
size of that for the ambiguous-related probes and, importantly, the difference 
between the LIFG effect for ambiguous and unambiguous-related probes 
approached significance (t(24) = 2.1, p = .094).  
The nature of the three-way interaction was also assessed separately for the LIFG 
and Vertex sites so that effects could be compared with those found in the 
behavioural study (see Chapter 2). Both sites produced a significant Ambiguity x 
Relatedness interaction (LIFG: F(1,24) = 5.07, p = .034, η2p = .174; Vertex: F(1,24) = 
5.00, p = .035, η2p = .172). However, the interaction patterns were opposite to each 
other. Under Vertex stimulation, the ambiguity of the sentence affected responses 
only to unrelated probes (t(24) = 3.36, p = .003) with no significant difference 
between the related probes of ambiguous and unambiguous sentences (t(24) = 
.275, p = .786). Yet, under LIFG stimulation related probes were slower when they 
belonged to ambiguous sentences (t(24) = 2.81, p = .010) but there was no effect of 
ambiguity on the unrelated probes (t(24) = .293, p = .772).    
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The ANOVA analysing the ambiguous-inappropriate condition showed no significant 
difference between the RTs of these probes and the ambiguous-unrelated probes 
(F(1,24) = < 1, η2p = .033). There was also no main effect of Site (F(1,24) = < 1, η
2
p = 
.002) nor a significant interaction between the stimulation site and probe condition 
(F(1,24) = < 1, η2p < .001). 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Mean reaction times for the five probe conditions performed with 
LIFG (white) and Vertex (black) stimulation. Error bars show standard errors 
adjusted to remove between subjects variance. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
This experiment investigated the causal role of the LIFG in ambiguity resolution by 
administering TMS to this region whilst participants listened to sentences with and 
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without an ambiguous word. The results showed that stimulating the LIFG disrupted 
processing of ambiguous as well as unambiguous sentences. However, the level of 
disruption depended on the semantic relationship between the sentence and the 
probe word, which provides insights into the cognitive processes that may be 
supported by the LIFG.      
The accuracy results were straightforward. Participants made more errors on related 
probes when stimulation was delivered to the LIFG compared to Vertex, regardless 
of the ambiguity of the sentence. Because TMS was never administered during the 
probe task itself, this disruption must result from interference to processes 
associated with sentence comprehension rather than to those associated with 
making the probe decision per se. The finding that both ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentence probes were disrupted by LIFG stimulation suggests that 
this region is not specific to ambiguity resolution but supports processes that are 
critical for comprehending even semantically straightforward sentences. Interestingly 
no additional reduction in accuracy was found for the ambiguous-related probes, 
suggesting that disrupting the LIFG functioning does not prevent disambiguation.  
The reaction time data, however, showed a qualitatively different pattern of 
disruption. These results demonstrated a significant three-way interaction between 
sentence ambiguity, probe relatedness and stimulation site. Specifically the LIFG 
stimulation reversed the interaction pattern between sentence ambiguity and probe 
relatedness found under Vertex stimulation, such that ambiguity had a larger effect 
on the related probes than on the unrelated probes. Interestingly, this modulation 
resulted from LIFG stimulation increasing response times in different probes 
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conditions of the ambiguous and unambiguous sentences. LIFG stimulation 
significantly slowed responses to related probes of ambiguous sentences but 
slowed responses to the unrelated probes of unambiguous sentences. Although 
only one probe condition per sentence type was significantly affected by TMS, this 
fits with the accuracy results in demonstrating that ambiguous as well as 
unambiguous sentence processing is disrupted by interfering with LIFG functioning.   
The reaction time results showed some evidence that LIFG stimulation may be 
differently disruptive for ambiguous than unambiguous sentences. Responses for 
related probes of ambiguous sentences, but not those of unambiguous sentences, 
were significantly slower with LIFG than Vertex stimulation. Although some caution 
must be taken when interpreting this ambiguity difference as the direct contrast only 
approached significance, there was a strong trend in this direction and the numerical 
difference was relatively large. LIFG stimulation slowed ambiguous-related probes 
by on average 37ms more than the unambiguous-related probes. Related probes 
specifically correspond to the contextually appropriate meaning of the ambiguous 
word or, in the case of the unambiguous sentences, to the meaning of the 
unambiguous target word. Unlike the unambiguous word, the meaning of the 
ambiguous word critically depends on the disambiguating information that is 
presented at the end of the sentence when TMS is delivered. Thus, the greater 
slow-down for ambiguous-related probes suggests a disruption in selecting the 
meaning of an ambiguous word that is supported by the context.  
This ambiguity disruption is highly consistent with an increasingly large set of fMRI 
research that show increased activation in the LIFG when participants read or listen 
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to semantically ambiguous sentences (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2007; 
Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; 
Zempleni et al., 2007).  Importantly activation is found to be greater for sentences in 
which semantic reinterpretation of the ambiguous word’s meaning is more likely as 
is this case for the sentences used in this present study (Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007). Patient studies additionally support a 
causal role of the LIFG in ambiguity resolution. Patients with Broca’s aphasia show 
disruptions in using sentence context to select the correct meaning of an ambiguous 
word especially when the subordinate meaning is required (e.g., Grindrod, 2012; 
Swaab et al., 1998; Swinney et al., 1989). Although Broca’s aphasics generally have 
lesions that extend further than the LIFG, ambiguity resolution deficits have also 
been reported in patients with relatively circumscribed lesions to the LIFG including 
pars triangularis (Novick et al., 2009; Vuong & Martin, 2011). The TMS effect on 
ambiguity resolution is also in line with a recent TMS study by Acheson and Hagoort 
(2013) that investigated syntactically ambiguous sentences. Stimulating the LIFG 
affected ambiguity effects on reading times at the disambiguating region of the 
sentences. The nature of these ambiguity modulations was, however, somewhat 
unclear. On some reading measures, stimulation appeared to facilitate processing of 
the unambiguous sentences (e.g., produced fewer regressions into the 
disambiguating region than the control group) rather than impaired the ambiguous 
sentences (e.g., did not produce more regressions for these sentences). In contrast, 
the increased ambiguity effects found in this current experiment were clearly driven 
by the ambiguous sentence condition, providing strong evidence that the LIFG is 
critical for ambiguity resolution.  
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This finding is consistent with conflict resolution accounts of the LIFG whereby this 
region exerts top-down cognitive control to resolve conflict amongst representations 
(Novick et al., 2009; Novick et al., 2005) and select an option amongst competing 
alternatives (Thompson-Schill et al., 1997). In fact, selection has been particularly 
associated with the pars triangularis region stimulated in the current study (Badre & 
Wagner, 2007).  
The full pattern of results, however, suggest that neither ambiguity resolution nor 
conflict resolution more generally is the only function of this LIFG region since 
stimulation also affected responses to unambiguous sentences, which induce 
minimal representational conflict. The effect of LIFG stimulation on unambiguous 
sentence processing was not completely unexpected as other theories of LIFG 
function argue for its importance in the semantic processing of sentences in general 
(e.g., Hagoort, 2005, 2013).  The more surprising finding was that LIFG stimulation 
interacted with sentence ambiguity and probe relatedness such that it particularly 
disrupted the unrelated probes of unambiguous sentences. There seem to be (at 
least) two potential explanations for this effect. On the one hand, it is possible that 
the LIFG serves multiple distinct functions: one related to ambiguous sentences, 
such as conflict resolution (Novick et al., 2009), and another that affects 
comprehension of unambiguous sentences. Understanding what the latter 
processes might be requires understanding of the cognitive processes underlying 
the unrelated probe decision as this was the only unambiguous condition 
significantly affected by stimulation. Deciding that a probe (e.g., “rock”) is not related 
to a sentence (e.g., “the student had to wrap the wrist with a very old bandage”) 
requires a deeper consideration of the meaning of the sentence than deciding that a 
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probe (e.g., “arm”) is related to the sentence which simply relies on noticing a 
semantic relationship between that word and another one in the sentence. Thus, 
one possible process that may be more relevant for unrelated than related probe 
decisions is “sentence wrap-up”. Various researchers argue that sentence wrap-up 
processes occur at the end of a sentence which serve to fully integrate the 
information presented in a sentence and resolve any representational 
inconsistencies that may have been encountered in order to achieve an overall 
coherent representation of the meaning of the sentence (Fallon, Peelle, & Wingfield, 
2006; Hagoort, 2003; Just & Carpenter, 1980; Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978; Rayner, 
Kambe, & Duffy, 2000). Thus, the outcome of this comprehension process seems 
particularly important for deciding that a probe word is not related to the sentence.  
The results, however, can also be explained more parsimoniously within a single-
function account of the LIFG’s role in language comprehension.  Specifically, these 
results are compatible with Hagoort’s account of the LIFG as a general unification 
space that combines various sources of information to form larger complex 
representations of a sentence or discourse (Hagoort, 2005, 2013; Hagoort et al., 
2009). All sentences require some level of unification as they contain multiple words 
that have different meanings. Although the meanings of unambiguous words do not 
depend critically on other words in the sentence as is the case for ambiguous words, 
the combination of their meanings is important to create a coherent understanding of 
a sentence. Both ambiguity resolution and sentence-wrap can be re-viewed as 
processes that are supported by general unification operations without needing to 
impute specific “conflict” or “wrap-up” operations.   
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Importantly, this single unification account can also suggest reasons why significant 
effects were not found for the other two unrelated probe conditions (ambiguous-
inappropriate and ambiguous-unrelated) and neither for the unambiguous-related 
condition. Unambiguous-related probes (e.g., “arm”) correspond to unambiguous 
target words (e.g., “wrist” in the sentence “the student had to wrap the wrist with a 
very old bandage”). Disrupting integrational processes may not have affected the 
comprehension of these words because, being unambiguous, their meanings do not 
substantially rely on being integrated with other words in the sentence. Alternatively, 
critical integrational processes may still be necessary for these words but may have 
occurred before the end of the sentence, before TMS was delivered. This is possible 
as these words were presented relatively early in the sentence materials, on 
average, six words before the end of the sentence (e.g., “the student had to wrap 
the wrist with a very old bandage”), and, hence, would not have been disrupted by 
the stimulation.  
The lack of disruption for the ambiguous-inappropriate and ambiguous-unrelated 
probes may be explained by a different reason related to unification processes. 
These probes may tap into aspects of the sentence meaning for which unification is 
so neurally demanding that information processing is insensitive to neuronal noise 
introduced by the TMS. Several reasons point to this conclusion. Under control site 
stimulation, responses to these two probe conditions were much slower than those 
of the other three conditions. The control site data further showed that the unrelated 
probes were significantly affected by the ambiguity of the sentence whereas related 
probes showed no ambiguity effect. This difference was supported by a significant 
interaction between sentence ambiguity and probe relatedness. Together, these 
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findings suggest that settling on an overall understanding of a sentence, which is 
more important for unrelated probe decisions, is more difficult when it contains an 
ambiguous word and is also more difficult than merely integrating the contextually 
appropriate meaning of the ambiguous word. Some of this unification difficulty may 
arise from competition from inappropriate meanings as responses were not faster 
for ambiguous-inappropriate probes than ambiguous-unrelated probes, suggesting 
that inappropriate meanings had not been fully suppressed. My behavioural study 
(see Chapter 2) provides supporting evidence that suppressing inappropriate 
meanings is delayed relative to integrating correct meanings. One method is test 
this explanation is to alter the timing of TMS so that it is delivered at later stages of 
ambiguous sentence comprehension when processing is more advanced and, thus, 
according to this theory, should be more sensitive to disruption by TMS. Another 
method is to use offline TMS which may be less sensitive to processing difficult as it 
modifies the excitability of neural cells prior to a task (Thickbroom, 2007) rather than 
induces noise during the task. Evidently, such insensitivity to TMS disruption may 
also be argued to relate to conflict resolution processes (Novick et al., 2009; Novick 
et al., 2005), which, in the same manner, may be more neurally complex for 
suppressing inappropriate meanings and for building an overall representation of an 
ambiguous sentence. However, viewing the LIFG as important for unification 
processes seems to provide a parsimonious explanation for both the positive effects 
of disruption to the ambiguous-related and unambiguous-unrelated probe conditions 
as well as suggests why the remaining conditions were not significantly affected by 
stimulation.   
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Patient studies corroborate the findings of a sentence-general disruption produced 
by LIFG stimulation. It is well-established that patients with Broca’s aphasia or 
lesions to the frontal cortex have impaired sentence comprehension. Although 
patients have greater difficulty understanding sentences that are more semantically 
or syntactically complex (e.g., Caplan et al., 1996; Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; 
Grodzinsky et al., 1999; Schwartz et al., 1980; Yee et al., 2008), some patients also 
show deficits for relatively simple sentences (e.g., Caplan et al., 1996; Schwartz et 
al., 1980) and when comprehension is successful it may result from strong lexical, 
semantic or pragmatic constraints (Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; Schwartz et al., 1980). 
Patient studies also support the importance of the LIFG in semantic processing 
more generally, showing that semantic priming is qualitatively different in these 
patients compared to neurologically-healthy participants (Grindrod, 2012; Hagoort, 
1993; Swinney et al., 1989; Utman, Blumstein, & Sullivan, 2001; Yee et al., 2008).  
It is interesting to note that my fMRI study (see Chapter 3) did not show increased 
activation in the stimulated LIFG region for this set of unambiguous sentences 
compared to a low-level baseline condition. This is not totally surprising as 
neuroimaging studies do not consistently show significant LIFG responses to 
unambiguous sentences (Crinion et al., 2003; Friederici, Ruschemeyer, Hahne, & 
Fiebach, 2003; Obleser & Kotz, 2010; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Spitsyna et al., 
2006). Increased LIFG activation is more robustly found for sentences that are 
semantically or syntactically demanding, including those containing ambiguous or 
anomalous words (Friederici et al., 2003; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, 
Longe, et al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 2007). TMS may be a more sensitive method to 
examine the neural response of a region to a stimulus because it directly affects 
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neuronal activity, inducing action potentials in cortical axons (Siebner, Hartwigsen, 
Kassuba, & Rothwell, 2009) whereas fMRI assesses blood oxygenation levels, 
which may decouple from the extent of neuronal signalling occurring in a region 
(Ekstrom, 2010; Logothetis et al., 2010).  TMS may also be a more sensitive method 
because its effects are not affected by the choice of baseline in the same manner as 
fMRI results are. In fMRI protocols, the baseline is another task whereas in TMS 
protocols the baseline is the same task but performed under different stimulation 
parameters. The difficulty with using another task as a baseline is that it is not 
always clear the extent to which it may engage the region of interest. Thus, the lack 
of frontal activation for unambiguous sentences in fMRI studies may reflect the fact 
that frontal regions may be engaged during “baseline” tasks as well. Another 
explanation why the fMRI and TMS results may have diverged is that TMS may 
have stimulated two functionally-distinct regions in the LIFG. Although TMS targeted 
pars triangularis, which did not show an unambiguous responses in the fMRI study, 
the stimulation may have unintentionally also affected the posterior part of the LIFG 
that did show an unambiguous response (pars opercularis: -54, 17, 19). Although 
this region is beyond the spatial resolution of TMS, being 2.3 cm away from the pars 
triangularis stimulation site, it is possible that TMS affected this region indirectly. 
Neurophysiological studies have shown that TMS produces physiological responses 
in areas that are directly connected to the stimulation site (e.g., Civardi, Cantello, 
Asselman, & Rothwell, 2001; Mars et al., 2009). However, TMS studies on cognitive 
processes demonstrate that the functional consequences of a region being 
stimulated directly as oppose to indirectly are fundamentally different. The strongest 
evidence for this is that TMS can produce functional dissociations between adjacent 
regions that are directly connected. For example, Gough et al. (2005) showed a 
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dissociation between the semantic and phonological functions of the anterior LIFG  
and posterior LIFG, respectively. Dissociations have also been demonstrated 
between adjacent regions of the extrastriate cortex for different perceptual 
processes (e.g., Pitcher et al., 2009; Sadeh et al., 2011).  Thus, these dissociations 
suggest that the TMS disruption found for ambiguous and unambiguous sentences 
is unlikely to reflect the indirect stimulation of pars opercularis. Instead, the results 
most likely reflect disruption to the targeted pars triangularis region, highlighting a 
function(s) that is associated with both types of sentences. Nevertheless, future 
studies are needed to assess the validity of this conclusion which directly compare 
the effects of stimulating these two regions.   
There is one caveat of this study that deserves some attention and this is the fact 
that TMS is also not impervious to baseline choice. The effects of LIFG stimulation 
are calculated relative to the control site, Vertex, data. The effects are, thus, 
predicted on the assumption that performance under Vertex stimulation is not 
different to that without TMS. Unexpectedly, the pattern of reaction times in the 
Vertex data showed some differences to the pattern in my behavioural experiment 
that employed the same task with a 300 ms sentence-probe delay (Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2). RTs were faster in this TMS experiment by approximately 200ms 
compared to the behavioural data. This is not particularly concerning as this may be 
simply due to nonspecific intersensory facilitation resulting from the auditory clicking 
sound that accompanies TMS pulses (Terao et al., 1997). More surprisingly was the 
different pattern of ambiguity effects. Under Vertex stimulation there was a 
significant interaction between sentence ambiguity and probe relatedness such that 
responses were slower for ambiguous than unambiguous sentences but only when 
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the probes were unrelated to the sentence. In my behavioural study there was no 
significant interaction, with both related and unrelated probes showing an effect of 
ambiguity. In addition, here there was no significant difference between response 
times for ambiguous-inappropriate and ambiguous-unrelated probes whereas the 
behavioural study showed significantly longer responses to inappropriate probes. 
These findings suggest that the mere act of stimulation may have some effects on 
task performance that are not specific to the site that is stimulated, although it is not 
clear what the nature of these effects might be. As such influences may interact with 
the impact of LIFG stimulation, it, unfortunately, complicates the interpretation of 
LIFG effects and requires investigation.   
In summary, the results provide novel evidence that the LIFG is necessary for 
resolving the meaning of ambiguous sentences as well as for comprehending 
sentences more generally. These disruptions may be explained by imputing 
multiple, ambiguity-specific and sentence-general, functions to the LIFG or by 
merely viewing this region as a unification space. The latter is more parsimonious 
and seems to fit the overall pattern of results more powerfully as it provides possible 
explanations for both the effects and lack of effects in all five probe conditions. 
However, before investigating the nature of the LIFG disruptions in more detail, it is 
imperative to ensure that these LIFG effects were not substantially affected by the 
control data. The next chapter reports a set of methodologically-driven experiments 
that investigates this issue.  
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Chapter 5 Follow-up TMS Experiments: Methodological  
Investigations  
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5.1 Experiment 6: TMS Control Condition and Order of Ambiguity Conditions 
 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The previous TMS experiment revealed several interesting effects of LIFG 
stimulation which suggested that this region plays a causal role in sentence 
comprehension. However, there were also several surprising results. Because this 
was the first experiment of its kind, it was particularly important to examine the 
extent to which such effects were influenced by theoretically uninteresting factors 
related to the methodological set-up. This current experiment concentrated on two 
potential factors, the TMS control condition and the presentation order of the 
ambiguity conditions, as they relate to two particularly surprising aspects of the 
results.        
One of the most unexpected results was the RT pattern that was found in the control 
site (Vertex) condition because it did not show any behavioural effects of ambiguity 
that were found in the non-TMS behavioural study (Chapter 2, Experiment 2). This 
suggested that the stimulation itself may induce some non-site-specific effects on 
performance, making it unclear the extent to which these effects may have 
influenced the nature or magnitude of the LIFG effects. The second, potentially, 
controversial finding was the significant effect of LIFG stimulation on unambiguous 
sentence comprehension, since various theories and neural studies of LIFG function 
suggest that it is not necessary for understanding relatively straightforward 
sentences (Dronkers et al., 2004; Novick et al., 2009; Novick et al., 2005; Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2012). It is possible that some aspect of the TMS experimental 
set-up affected the way the unambiguous sentences were processed, making 
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comprehension dependent on LIFG processes. For example, the unambiguous 
sentences may have been influenced by the ambiguous sentences because they 
were presented amongst each other. One possible way is as follows. The ambiguity 
in the ambiguous sentences is relatively salient due to the high likelihood that 
listeners will initially choose the wrong interpretation of the ambiguous word and 
need to reanalyse its meaning. As a result, participants may have experienced 
general uncertainty in their understanding of the sentences presented in this 
experiment and thus may have examined the semantic coherence of the sentence 
more deeply in both unambiguous and ambiguous cases.    
Thus, this experiment examined the effect of 1) changing the TMS control condition 
and 2) presenting the unambiguous sentences separately to the ambiguous 
sentences. The Vertex control condition was removed. Instead, performance under 
LIFG stimulation was compared with that achieved when no stimulation was 
administered, by randomly intermixing trials where TMS was administered to the 
LIFG with trials without TMS. If delivering TMS during the task produces a non-site-
specific effect on task performance then the pattern of responses produced without 
TMS should parallel those seen in the behavioural experiment data (Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2). If the choice of control condition has a minimal effect on the degree 
of LIFG disruption then we should replicate the LIFG effects found in the first 
experiment. That is, TMS to the LIFG should slow responses for the ambiguous-
related and unambiguous-unrelated condition compared to the no-TMS condition. In 
addition, ambiguous and unambiguous sentences were blocked to different halves 
of the experiment with the unambiguous sentences presented first. If the LIFG is 
only recruited when there is ambiguity in the comprehension environment, LIFG 
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stimulation should not affect the unambiguous sentence conditions. It is possible 
that the behavioural effects of ambiguity may be inflated by blocking ambiguity as 
the ambiguous sentences will not be concealed by the unambiguous sentences 
which may draw attention to the ambiguity manipulation. However this effect of 
blocking is unlikely to be substantial because the ambiguity is relatively salient in the 
ambiguous sentences (as mentioned above). Thus it is unlikely that the ambiguity 
manipulation would be noticed substantially more if the ambiguous sentences are 
presented without unambiguous sentences.  
5.1.2 Method 
Participants  
10 (3 female) native English speakers took part in this experiment. The sample size 
is smaller than the previous experiment as this was an exploratory experiment to 
assess the RT effects of presenting the unambiguous sentences in a block on their 
own prior to the ambiguous sentences and when using a different baseline. These 
participants were on average 29 years old (range: 18-47), all were right-handed, had 
no known reading or language impairment, nor any personal or family history of 
epilepsy or other neurological condition. Participants were recruited from the same 
population as the previous experiments and were paid for their participation.  
Stimuli 
The stimuli were the same as in the previous TMS experiment. 
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Design 
The design was also the same except for the following changes. Vertex stimulation 
was replaced with trials without TMS. These trials were randomly interleaved with 
trials where stimulation was administered to LIFG (i.e., there were no separate no-
TMS blocks). To assign items to TMS or no-TMS trials, the items within each probe 
condition were divided into two lists. For each version of the experiment, the two 
lists of each probe condition were matched on the mean reaction time from the 
behavioural experiment that employed the same 300 ms probe delay (Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2). Such matching was conducted to ensure that any differences 
between TMS and no-TMS trials would not be driven by differences in baseline 
reaction times. Additionally, these experimental items were then divided into six 
blocks. In contrast to the first TMS experiment, ambiguity was blocked to different 
halves of the experiment such that the first three blocks contained only 
unambiguous sentences and the other three blocks contained only ambiguous 
sentences. All blocks had an even distribution of the probe conditions relevant to the 
ambiguity condition and an approximately equal number of TMS and no-TMS trials.   
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as the first TMS experiment except for the following 
changes. In all blocks of the experiment on half of the trials participants received 
stimulation to LIFG exactly as was administered in the first TMS experiment whilst 
on the other half of trials participants received no stimulation. TMS and no-TMS 
were randomly presented. In addition, the first three blocks contained only 
unambiguous sentences whereas the last three blocks contained the ambiguous 
 208 
 
sentences. This ambiguity manipulation was never explicitly mentioned to the 
participants. However, participants performed two practice blocks: one prior to the 
first unambiguous block and the other before the first ambiguous block. Both 
practices contained randomly-interleaved TMS and no-TMS trials. Before the first 
practice, participants were given written instructions with examples of unambiguous 
sentences only. After the unambiguous blocks, participants were given another set 
of instructions. These instructions were similar to the unambiguous sentence 
instructions, except that they contained examples of sentences with ambiguous 
words. It was important to ensure that participants treated the ambiguous 
inappropriate probes as unrelated to the sentences. Thus, one of the examples was 
of an ambiguous sentence with an ambiguous inappropriate probe and participants 
were informed why this probe was unrelated (i.e., that it does not fit the meaning of 
any of the words in that sentence). However, importantly, ambiguity was not 
explicitly mentioned and participants were simply told that this second set of 
instructions and practice block was to refresh their memory of the instructions and to 
ensure they still understood the task. Participants then completed the ambiguous 
blocks.  
5.1.3 Results 
The same analyses were conducted as for the previous experiment, except that the 
Site factor was replaced with a TMS factor (TMS vs. no-TMS).  
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Accuracy 
The 2 x 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x Relatedness x TMS) ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of Ambiguity: responses were less accurate for ambiguous than unambiguous 
sentence probes (F(1,9) = 5.32, p = .046, η2p = .372). See Figure 5-1. The main 
effect of Relatedness was also significant: related probes were less accurate than 
unrelated probes (F(1,9) = 12.8, p = .006, η2p = .586). The interaction between 
Ambiguity and Relatedness was marginally significant (F(1,9) = 4.20, p = .071, η2p = 
.318) such that accuracy was lowest for ambiguous sentence probes that were 
related to the sentence. The main effect of TMS was not significant (F(1,9) = .431, p 
= .528, η2p = .046) and neither were any other two-way or three way interactions (all 
Fs < 1). The ANOVA assessing the ambiguous-inappropriate condition revealed that 
these probes had significantly lower accuracy than the ambiguous-unrelated probes 
(F(1,9) = 13.9, p = .005, η2p = .608). The main effect of TMS was not significant 
(F(1,9) = 2.73, p = .133, η2p = .233). However, there was a TMS x Probe Condition 
interaction (F(1,9) = 7.08, p = .026, η2p = .440), such that accuracy for the 
ambiguous-inappropriate probes only was significantly better with LIFG stimulation 
that without TMS (t(9) = 2.56, p = .031).       
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Figure 5-1: Mean accuracy (% correct) for the five probe conditions performed 
with LIFG stimulation (white) and with no TMS (light grey). Error bars show 
standard errors adjusted to remove between subject variance.  
 
Reaction Times 
It was apparent that there was substantially larger variance in the unambiguous-
unrelated condition with LIFG stimulation than in the other conditions. Inspection of 
the data showed that this was primarily driven by one subject whose reaction time in 
this condition was more than 2 standard deviations above his overall mean. 
Removing his data did not affect the pattern of results and thus he was kept to 
maintain power due to the small sample size.  
The 2 x 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x Relatedness x TMS) ANOVA showed a marginally 
significant effect of Ambiguity: responses were slower for ambiguous than 
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unambiguous sentence probes (F(1,9) = 3.94, p = .079, η2p = .304). See Figure 5-2. 
The main effect of Relatedness was also marginally significant: responses were 
faster for related than unrelated probes (F(1,9) = 3.46, p = .096, η2p = .278). The 
main effect of TMS was not significant (F(1,9) < 1, η2p = .001) nor were any two-way 
or three-way interactions between the factors (all ps > .2). The ANOVA assessing 
the ambiguous-inappropriate condition revealed that these probes were marginally 
slower than the ambiguous-unrelated probes (F(1,9) = 4.42, p = .065, η2p = .330). 
Neither the main effect of TMS nor its interaction with these probe conditions was 
significant (both Fs > 1). 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Mean reaction times for the five probe conditions performed with 
LIFG stimulation (white) and no TMS (light grey). Error bars show standard 
errors adjusted to remove between subject variance. 
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5.1.4 Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to examine the impact of changing the TMS control 
condition and blocking the order of ambiguity conditions on the pattern of 
behavioural effects produced under LIFG stimulation and those produced when no 
TMS was administered. Interestingly, the results from the no-TMS conditions 
replicated all the main accuracy and RT effects found in the data of the no-TMS 
behavioural study (Chapter 2, Experiment 2). Notably, many of these effects were 
marginally significant but this is most likely due to limited power resulting from the 
small sample size (N = 10). Ambiguity effects were evident in both the accuracy and 
RT data. This is particularly important for the RT data as it diverges from the pattern 
of RTs found in the Vertex data of the first TMS experiment (Chapter 4, Experiment 
5). In contrast to the Vertex data but in line with the behavioural study, the no-TMS 
data showed ambiguity effects for both related and unrelated probes with no 
evidence of an interaction between sentence ambiguity and probe relatedness. 
Responses to the ambiguous-inappropriate probes were also (marginally) slower 
than those for the ambiguous-unrelated probes. Because these findings diverge 
from the Vertex data, it suggests that the act of delivering TMS during the task in 
Experiment 5 may have had some non-site-specific effects on task performance. 
Such effects may be related to the sound and sensation of stimulation that 
accompanies each TMS pulse. The TMS pulses were delivered during the delay 
between the sentence and probe word, which may have affected comprehension 
processes by modulating attention to the sentence task by, for example, cueing the 
onset of the probe word. Such effects may differently impact different aspects of 
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sentence processing which may render certain probe conditions more sensitive to 
these effects.  
Despite these important replications in the no-TMS conditions, the results failed to 
replicate any effects of LIFG stimulation found in Experiment 5. In fact, the only 
significant effect of TMS was found for the ambiguous-inappropriate probe condition, 
which surprisingly, improved with stimulation. It seems too premature to interpret 
this significant result because of the failure to replicate previous results. Instead, it is 
first important to consider reasons why LIFG stimulation was not found to affect task 
performance. One potential reason is the nature of the TMS control condition. It was 
important that the ambiguity effects were replicated in the no-TMS data as it 
provides strong validation of the behavioural paradigm being sensitive to the 
ambiguity resolution process. However, the divergence from the Vertex data 
suggests that using a no-TMS baseline may not be appropriate as it does not control 
for the non-site-specific effects of TMS that would occur when stimulation is 
delivered to the LIFG. This difference may have masked the effect that stimulating 
the LIFG has on performance, particularly if some probe conditions are more 
sensitive to these effects as discussed above.  
An additional explanation for the lack of TMS effects concerns the level of 
disambiguation-related variability that may exist across items and participants. 
Specifically, ambiguous sentences are variable in terms of when disambiguating 
processes occur. The experimental sentences were created such that the last words 
in the sentences disambiguated the ambiguous word to its less frequent meaning. 
This was done to increase the likelihood that key disambiguation processes would 
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occur upon encountering the disambiguating information, hence when TMS would 
be administered to the LIFG. Dominance tests confirmed that for the majority of 
sentences participants were more likely to select the incorrect meaning of the 
ambiguous word prior to the disambiguating word. However the extent to which the 
incorrect meaning was selected was variable across the set of sentences. Although, 
importantly, the correct meaning was selected on only 38% of all trials, the 
proportion of participants that selected the correct meaning per any individual 
sentence ranged from 0 – 96%. This indicates that for a small proportion of 
sentences participants may resolve the ambiguity before TMS is administered. Such 
variability suggests that TMS may not have been timed optimally for all sentences 
for each participant. This may have been particularly problematic in this TMS 
experiment because the number of trials per condition was relatively low (N = 15).  
In summary, the results of this TMS experiment diverged from those found in the 
previous TMS experiment both in terms of effects found in the TMS control condition 
and regarding the effect that LIFG stimulation has on sentence comprehension. 
These differences may relate to the influence of non-site-specific effects of TMS on 
task performance or may be merely caused by high item variability that reduces 
sensitivity to detect effects of experimental manipulations.    
5.2 Experiment 7: Larger and More Homogeneous Stimulus Set     
5.2.1 Introduction 
This experiment examined the degree to which high item-variability contributed to 
the inconsistencies between the two TMS experiments. For this, a subset of more 
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homogeneous and better controlled ambiguous sentences was employed and the 
number of trials per condition was doubled by only testing the related probes of 
these sentences (unrelated probes of non-experimental items were included as 
fillers). Vertex stimulation was again adopted as the control condition in order to 
compare the results with those of the first TMS experiment (Chapter 4, Experiment 
5).  
5.2.2 Method 
Participants  
9 (5 female) native English speakers took part in this experiment. Like the previous 
follow-up experiment only a sample size was tested because this was also an 
exploratory experiment. Participants had a mean age of 25 years (range: 20-38), all 
were right-handed, had no known reading or language impairment, nor any personal 
or family history of epilepsy or other neurological condition. Participants were 
recruited from the same population as the previous experiments and were paid for 
their participation.  
Stimuli 
(i) Sentences 
To increase statistical power, a subset of 60 ambiguous sentences and their 
matched unambiguous sentences was selected from the set of 90 sentences used 
in the previous TMS experiments using several criteria. First, ambiguous sentences 
that had > 0.7 dominance scores at the sentence or single-word level were excluded 
 216 
 
(N = 17) as such scores indicated a high probability that these sentences would 
already be disambiguated prior to the sentence-final disambiguating word (i.e., prior 
to stimulation). Second, sentences which had at least one probe that achieved less 
than an average of 70% accuracy in the behavioural study were excluded (N = 4)  to 
ensure that all items were performed well without stimulation without any particularly 
difficult items. Third, ambiguous sentences whose related probe had a low mean 
relatedness rating (M < 4.65) were removed (N = 6) in order to statistically match the 
relatedness ratings of the ambiguous and unambiguous related probes. This was to 
ensure that any differences between the TMS effects on the ambiguous and 
unambiguous probe response could not be attributed to differences in relatedness 
ratings. Lastly, because stimulation would be administered at the offset of the 
sentence disambiguating word, three sentences were removed in order to better 
equate the frequency and number of senses of the ambiguous and unambiguous 
disambiguating words (N = 3). In this subset of sentences, there were no significant 
differences between the target words (i.e., ambiguous word or unambiguous control 
word) of the ambiguous and unambiguous sentences in terms of their frequency, log 
frequency and number of letters (paired t-tests: t(59) = .937, p = .353; t(59) = .173, p 
= .863; t(59) = .853, p = .397, respectively). Importantly, the ambiguous target words 
had a significantly higher number of meanings and senses (paired t-tests: t(59) = 
.853, p = .397; t(59) = .853, p = .397). There were also no significant differences 
between the sentence-final words of the ambiguous and unambiguous sentences in 
terms of their frequency, log frequency , number of letters, number of meanings and 
number of senses (paired t-tests: t(59) = 1.48, p = .144; t(59) = 1.75, p = .085; t(59) 
= 1.30, p = .199; t(59) = .830, p = .410, t(59) = 1.88, p = .065, respectively). Table 
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5-1 presents the descriptive statistics for characteristics of the ambiguous and 
unambiguous target words and the sentence-final words.  
 
Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics (mean (SD)) for properties of the ambiguous 
and unambiguous target words and the sentence final words 
 
Frequency 
per million 
Log 
frequency 
No. 
 letters 
No. 
meanings 
No. of 
senses 
Ambiguous sentences 
  
  
Target word 
54.1 3.58 4.57 1.88 9.42 
(56.3) (0.95) (1.18) (0.94) (4.25) 
Sentence-
final word 
122 3.39 6.93 1.08 4.43 
(497) (1.47) (2.34) (0.28) (3.59) 
Unambiguous sentences 
  
  
Target word 
50.4 3.57 4.68 1.05 4.70 
(45.2) (0.93) (1.11) (0.22) (2.73) 
Sentence-
final word 
305 3.77 6.60 1.13 5.73 
(1437) (1.76) (2.02) (0.43) (5.28) 
 
 
Additionally, between the ambiguous and unambiguous sentences there were also 
no significant differences between their physical duration (paired t-tests: t(59) = 
.671, p = .505), number of syllables (t(59) = 1.43, p = .156) and number of words. 
The ambiguous sentences, however, had a significantly lower naturalness rating 
than the unambiguous sentences (t(59) = 3.03, p = .004). Table 5-2 presents 
statistics for characteristics of the whole ambiguous and unambiguous sentences.   
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Table 5-2: Descriptive statistics (mean (SD)) for properties of the ambiguous 
and unambiguous sentences 
Sentence 
Length in 
seconds 
No. of 
syllables 
No. 
 of words 
Naturalness 
rating 
Ambiguous 
2.94 16.2 12.5 5.47 
(0.30) (1.77) (1.33) (0.60) 
Unambiguous 
2.92 16.0 12.5 5.81 
(0.26) (1.74) (1.33) (0.60) 
Fillers 
2.99 16.7 12.4 n/a 
(0.30) (1.93) (1.12) n/a 
 
(ii) Probe words 
To enhance power I also increased the number of trials per probe condition. To do 
this, I employed only the related probes, resulting in 30 trials per condition, which is 
double that used in the previous experiments. The related condition was chosen 
because, unlike the other probe conditions, only correct responses for related 
probes indicate that participants have successfully disambiguated and understood 
the meaning of the ambiguous and unambiguous sentences. There was no 
significant difference between the ambiguous and unambiguous related probes in 
terms of their relatedness rating (paired t-test: t(59) = 1.86, p = .068), frequency 
(t(59) = .212, p = .833), log frequency (t(59) = .336, p = .738), number of letters 
(t(59) < .001, p > .9), number of meanings (t(59) <.001, p > .9) and number of 
senses (t(59) = .499, p = .620). Table 5-3 presents descriptive statistics for the 
probe words. 
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Table 5-3: Descriptive statistics (mean (SD)) for properties of the probes 
Probe Related-
ness rating 
Freq. 
per 
million 
Log 
freq. 
No. 
letters 
No. 
meanings 
No. 
senses 
Ambig. 
Related 
5.69 61.8 3.38 6.15 1.08 5.50 
(0.61) (82.9) (1.29) (1.97) (0.33) (5.31) 
Unambig. 
Related 
5.87 65.4 3.45 6.15 1.08 5.13 
(0.58) (99.0) (1.24) (1.68) (0.28) (3.95) 
Unrelated 
Fillers 
n/a 76.2 3.49 5.98 1.08 5.16 
n/a (105) (1.44) (1.67) (0.35) (4.42) 
 
(iii) Filler sentences 
Another 60 ambiguous and unambiguous sentences were employed as filler 
sentences to be presented with unrelated probes. These sentences were 
constructed in a similar way to the experimental sentences. These filler sentences 
had significantly fewer syllables than the set of experimental sentences 
(independent t-test: t(238) = 2.52, p = .012), however there were no significant 
differences between their number of words (t(238) = .315, p = .753) or physical 
duration (in seconds) (t(238) = 1.81, p = .072). See Table 5-2 for descriptive 
statistics for the filler sentences. An unrelated probe was chosen for each filler 
sentence. There were no significant differences between the unrelated and related 
probes’ frequency (independent t-test: t(238) = .991, p = .323), log frequency (t(238) 
= .414, p = .679), number of letters  (t(238) = .775, p = .439), number of meanings 
(t(238) = .197, p = .844) and number of senses (t(238) = .270, p = .787). See Table 
5-3 for descriptive statistics of the unrelated probes.  
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Because there were two stimulation sites (LIFG and Vertex), the stimuli were divided 
into two lists. This division was performed for each type of sentence separately (i.e., 
experimental ambiguous, experimental unambiguous and filler sentences). Each 
pair of lists was matched on the number of syllables, number of words and physical 
duration (in seconds) of their sentences (independent t-tests, all ps > .1) as well as 
on the target words’ and sentence-final words’ frequency, log frequency, length (in 
letters), number of meanings and number of senses (independent t-tests, all ps > 
.075). The lists were also matched on the probe words’ frequency, log frequency, 
length (in letters), number of meanings and number of senses (independent t-tests, 
all ps > .1). Each stimulation-site list was then randomly divided into three blocks 
(see Procedure section). 
20 practice sentences were employed for use in an initial practice block and a 
further 18 filler sentences were employed to be presented at as lead-in items at the 
beginning of the experimental blocks. The sentences were constructed in the same 
way as the experimental sentences. Half the practice and lead-in sentences were 
ambiguous sentences and the other half unambiguous. All sentences were recorded 
by the same female speaker. For each of these sentences, one probe word was 
selected such that probe conditions were of roughly the same proportion as in the 
experimental task.  
Design and Procedure 
A 2 x 2 repeated-measures design was employed with TMS site (LIFG vs. Vertex) 
as one factor and ambiguity (ambiguous vs. unambiguous sentence) as the second 
factor. Accuracy and reaction times for probe judgments were the dependent 
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variables. The two stimuli lists (see Stimuli section) were counterbalanced across 
stimulation sites between participants. Additionally, in contrast to the first TMS 
experiment, the site of stimulation was kept the same in each half of the experiment, 
such that in the first half participants performed three blocks of the task with 
stimulation to one site and in the second half they performed the remaining three 
blocks with stimulation to the other site. This modification was an attempt to 
increase consistency with which the coil was positioned on the target site. The order 
in which the sites were stimulated was counterbalanced across participants. The 
order of blocks was controlled using Latin squares to ensure that the same blocks 
did not always follow each other. The rest of the procedure and TMS protocol was 
the same as in the first TMS experiment.  
5.2.3 Results 
As only the related probes were of interest in this experiment, only a 2 x 2 repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted with Ambiguity (ambiguous vs. unambiguous) 
and Site (LIFG vs. Vertex) as the two factors.  
Accuracy 
This ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Ambiguity: responses were less 
accurate for ambiguous than unambiguous sentence probes (F(1,8) = 7.36, p = 
.027, η2p = .479). There was no significant effect of Site (F(1,8) = .800, p = .397, η
2
p 
= .091) and no significant Ambiguity x Site interaction (F(1,8) = .893, p = .372, η2p = 
.100).  See Figure 5-3.  
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Figure 5-3: Mean accuracy (% correct) for the related probes of ambiguous 
and unambiguous sentences, performed with LIFG (white) and Vertex (black) 
stimulation. Error bars show standard errors adjusted to remove between 
subject variance.  
 
Reaction Times 
The ANOVA on RTs showed no significant effect of Ambiguity (F(1,8) = 1.14, p = 
.316, η2p = .125). Of note, the lack of an ambiguity effect in the Vertex condition was 
particularly evident as there was less than one millisecond difference between the 
mean RT of the ambiguous and unambiguous probes. There was also no significant 
effect of Site (F(1,8) = 1.07, p = .332, η2p = .118) or Ambiguity x Site interaction 
(F(1,8) < 1, η2p = .023).  
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Figure 5-4: Mean reaction times for the related probes of ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentences, performed with LIFG (white) and Vertex (black) 
stimulation. Error bars show standard errors adjusted to remove between 
subject variance.  
 
5.2.4 Discussion  
The aim of this experiment was to assess the potential effect of high item-variability 
on the ability to replicate the results of the first TMS experiment. To reduce the 
influence of item variability, a more homogenous and better controlled set of 
ambiguous sentences was used with more trials per condition than that used in 
Experiments 5 and 6. To achieve the latter, only the related probes of each 
ambiguity condition were able to be included. Unrelated probes were merely 
included as fillers so the task would be performed properly.   
Unlike the first TMS experiment, the accuracy data showed little effect of LIFG 
stimulation on performance. This may have resulted from removing particularly 
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difficult items which may have reduced their sensitivity to TMS disruption, causing 
stimulation to slow their responses as oppose to preventing their comprehension. 
However, in contrast to the accuracy results, the reaction time analyses showed a 
highly similar pattern of results as that in the first experiment. Although there were 
no significant effects, which was likely due to the small sample size, the trends were 
strikingly apparent. First, LIFG stimulation produced slower responses, on average, 
than Vertex stimulation and, again, this difference was larger for the ambiguous than 
the unambiguous sentences. Second, the Vertex control condition showed no effect 
of ambiguity. In fact, the average difference between the two ambiguity conditions 
was less than a second. Thus, despite replication of the LIFG effects, the Vertex 
condition still produced a different pattern of ambiguity effects to the behavioural 
study, in spite of the set of better controlled ambiguous sentences and larger trial 
size. If Vertex stimulation is systematically affecting task performance, producing a 
pattern of results that is different to that seen in the behavioural experiments, then 
this limits the interpretability of the LIFG stimulation effects. Together, this 
experiment strongly suggested that the differences between the TMS results of 
Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 were due to the different TMS control conditions 
(Vertex and no-TMS, respectively) rather than being due to item variability.  
5.3 Experiment 8: Vertex Stimulation versus No-TMS  
5.3.1 Introduction 
The preceding TMS experiments converge on the conclusion that the stimulation 
protocol has non-site-specific effects on task performance. This experiment directly 
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tested this hypothesis by directly comparing participants’ performance under Vertex 
stimulation with their performance when no TMS is delivered.   
5.3.2 Method 
Participants  
14 (9 female) native English speakers took part in this experiment. A relatively small 
sample was used as the aim was to explore whether task performance was different 
under Vertex stimulation than when no stimulation was administered. Participants’ 
mean age was 23 years (range: 18-34), all had no known reading or language 
impairment, nor any personal or family history of epilepsy or other neurological 
condition. 13 of the participants were right handed; one was left handed. 
Participants were recruited from the same population as the previous experiments 
and were paid for their participation.  
Stimuli, Design and Procedure 
All was the same as the previous experiment except that participants performed the 
task blocks either with stimulation to Vertex or with no TMS.  
5.3.3 Results 
The same analyses were conducted as the previous TMS experiment except that in 
the 2 x 2 ANOVA, the Site factor was replaced with a TMS (Vertex vs. no TMS) 
factor. One participant was identified as an outlier because the difference between 
her mean reaction time for the Vertex block and the no-TMS block (191 ms) was 
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more than two standard deviations above the group’s mean difference (M = 58 ms, 
SD = 55), regardless of the ambiguity condition. As the two stimulation blocks were 
performed in different halves of the experiment, this may indicate an unusually large 
effect of block order. Thus, this participant’s data were excluded from all subsequent 
analyses. 
Accuracy 
This 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x TMS) ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Ambiguity: 
responses were less accurate for ambiguous than unambiguous sentence probes 
(F(1,12) = 10.2, p = .008, η2p = .459). There was no significant effect of TMS 
(F(1,12) < 1, η2p = .012) and no significant Ambiguity x TMS interaction (F(1,12) < 1, 
η2p = .041).  See Figure 5-5. 
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Figure 5-5: Mean accuracy (% correct) for the related probes of ambiguous 
and unambiguous sentences, performed with Vertex (black) and no TMS 
(grey) stimulation. Error bars show standard errors adjusted to remove 
between subject variance.  
 
Reaction Times 
The 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x TMS) ANOVA on RTs showed no significant main effect of 
Ambiguity (F(1,12) = 2.91, p = .114, η2p = .195) or TMS (F(1,12) = 2.95, p = .112, η
2
p 
= .197). See Figure 5-6. However, critically, there was a significant Ambiguity x TMS 
interaction (F(1,12) = 6.07, p = .030, η2p = .336) such that there was a significant 
ambiguity effect only when the task was performed without TMS (t(12) = 2.19, = 
.049). The mean ambiguity difference with Vertex stimulation was only just over 1 
ms, whereas the ambiguity effect in the no TMS condition was 45 ms.      
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Figure 5-6: Mean reaction times for the related probes of ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentences, performed with Vertex (black) and no TMS (grey) 
stimulation. Error bars show standard errors adjusted to remove between 
subject variance.  
 
5.3.4 Discussion 
Confirming the previous patterns of Vertex effects, the results showed significant 
effects of Vertex stimulation on reaction times. Specifically, the significant interaction 
between ambiguity and TMS indicated that stimulating Vertex accelerated 
responses for ambiguous related probes but not for unambiguous ones. To be able 
to interpret the mechanisms behind the effects of LIFG stimulation on task 
performance, it is important to employ a control condition that produces effects 
similar to when the task is performed without stimulation.  
740 
720 
700 
680 
660 
640 
620 
600 
Unambiguous  Ambiguous  
Related Probes  
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 (
m
s
) 
  
No TMS 
Vertex TMS 
 229 
 
One possible reason that Vertex stimulation may have facilitated ambiguous probe 
responses concerns the TMS parameters. In these experiments, TMS was 
administered at a frequency of 10 Hz for the whole duration of the probe delay. 
Specifically, pulses were separated by 100 ms, with the first applied at sentence 
offset and the last coinciding with presentation of the probe. This frequency 
produces a very rhythmic pattern of auditory clicks that may make the duration of 
the delay salient, highlighting the amount of time participants have to comprehend 
the sentence before the probe word appears. As briefly considered earlier 
(Experiment 5 Discussion), this may qualitatively alter the way sentences are 
processed during the delay period. The results demonstrated that this stimulation 
protocol had a specific facilitatory effect on ambiguous related probes compared to 
unambiguous related probes, suggesting that it particularly facilitated the processing 
of ambiguous sentences. It is possible that the TMS pulses acted as a “temporal 
cue” that substantially accelerated the disambiguation of these sentences by, for 
example, invoking more processing resources to discern the contextually 
appropriate meaning of ambiguous words such that comprehension was at an equal 
level for both the ambiguous and unambiguous sentences when the probe word 
appeared.  
Although the proposed explanation is speculative, these results unquestionably 
demonstrate that the TMS method produces non-site-specific effects that influence 
the sentence-probe task in a way that appears to interact with the ambiguity 
manipulation. As it is unclear the extent to which LIFG functioning is modulated by 
these non-specific effects of TMS, the TMS parameters need to be changed to 
eliminate potential confounds arising from these effects.  
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5.4 Experiment 9: 20Hz Stimulation to Vertex vs. No-TMS     
5.4.1 Introduction 
This experiment sought to examine the non-specific effects of a different set of TMS 
parameters on the sentence-probe task. The aim was to employ a set of parameters 
that reduces the distinct rhythmic pattern of the pulses produced with 10 Hz and that 
also reduces its ability to cue the length of the probe delay. Thus, frequency was 
increased to 20 Hz which reduces the rhythmic pattern as the pulses are much 
closer in time. The same number of pulses (four) was delivered starting from the 
sentence offset so that the same amount of auditory and tactile stimulation occurred 
as the previous experiments. This has the additional effect of making the last pulse 
occur 150ms into the delay, which does not coincide with, and thus should not “cue”, 
the presentation of the probe word that is still presented 300ms post sentence-
offset. See Figure 5-7. If the pattern of Vertex data found in the previous TMS 
experiments (Experiment 5, 7, 8) were due to attentional cueing effects of 10 Hz 
stimulation, then these effects should be reduced with 20 Hz stimulation.   
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Figure 5-7: Example of a TMS trial. A spoken sentence is presented, followed 
by four pulses of TMS, followed by a visual probe word. The red arrows 
represent 20 Hz stimulation and the black arrows represent 10 Hz stimulation 
for comparison. 
 
5.4.2 Method 
Participants  
The same sample size was tested as the previous TMS experiment: 14 (9 female) 
native English speakers. Their mean age was 26 years (range: 19-44), all were 
right-handed, had no known reading or language impairment, nor any personal or 
family history of epilepsy or other neurological condition. Participants were recruited 
from the same population as the previous experiments and were paid for their 
participation.  
 
 
 0 100 200 300        
“the woman said that the jam was on the other motorway” 
traffic 
(ms post sentence-offset) 
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Stimuli, Design and Procedure 
All was the same as the first TMS experiment (Chapter 4, Experiment 5) except that 
the frequency of TMS was changed to 20 Hz, such that 4 pulses of TMS were 
administered from sentence offset, each separated by 50ms.   
5.4.3 Results 
Results were analysed in the same way as the previous TMS experiment. As in the 
previous experiment’s data, one participant was identified as an outlier because the 
difference between her mean reaction time for the Vertex block and the no-TMS 
block (164 ms) was more than two standard deviations above the group’s mean 
difference (M = 47 ms, SD = 49), regardless of the ambiguity condition. As the two 
stimulation blocks were performed in different halves of the experiment, this may 
indicate an unusually large effect of block order. Thus, this participant’s data were 
excluded from all subsequent analyses. 
Accuracy 
Accuracy was high across the four conditions. See Figure 5-8. The 2 x 2 (Ambiguity 
x TMS) ANOVA showed no significant effect of Ambiguity, TMS or interaction 
(F(1,12) < 1, η2p = .028; F(1,12) = 1.39, p = 261, η
2
p = .104; F(1,12) < 1, η
2
p = .053, 
respectively).  
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Figure 5-8: Mean accuracy (% correct) for the related probes of ambiguous 
and unambiguous sentences, performed with 20Hz Vertex TMS (striped) and 
no TMS (grey) stimulation. Error bars show standard errors adjusted to 
remove between subject variance.  
 
Reaction Times 
The 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x TMS) ANOVA on RTs showed no significant main effect of 
Ambiguity, although there was a trend for responses to be slower for ambiguous 
than unambiguous sentence probes (F(1,12) = 2.86, p = .117, η2p = .192). See 
Figure 5-9. There was also a significant main effect of TMS such that responses 
were faster with Vertex stimulation than without TMS (F(1,12) = 5.91, p = .032, η2p = 
.330). However, critically, TMS did not significantly interact with Ambiguity (F(1,12) < 
1, η2p = .056) such that both TMS conditions showed an ambiguity effect that 
approached significance. The mean ambiguity difference was 25 ms under Vertex 
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stimulation and 38 ms without TMS (t(12) = 1.66, p = .123; t(12) = 1.56, p = .144, 
respectively).  
 
Figure 5-9: Mean reaction times for the related probes of ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentences, performed with 20 Hz Vertex TMS (striped) and no 
TMS (grey) stimulation. Error bars show standard errors adjusted to remove 
between subject variance. 
 
5.4.4 Discussion 
The reaction times analyses revealed a significant main effect of TMS but this is not 
of great concern as it is likely due to simple intersensory facilitation that is induced 
by the auditory clicks that accompany TMS pulses (Terao et al., 1997). The 
important finding was that this general TMS effect did not interact with sentence 
ambiguity, indicating that stimulation did not differently affect ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentences. In addition, there was evidence of ambiguity effects in both 
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the TMS condition and the no-TMS condition. These results are clearly different to 
those produced by 10 Hz stimulation and, reassuringly, are highly consistent with 
the results of the behavioural study. Thus, this protocol was subsequently used to 
test the effect of LIFG stimulation in the next TMS experiment.    
5.5 Experiment 10: Re-examining the Effects of LIFG Stimulation on 
Sentence Comprehension 
 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this experiment was to re-examine the effects of LIFG stimulation on 
sentence comprehension by employing the new TMS parameters (4 pulses at 20 
Hz). In contrast to 10 Hz TMS, these parameters produce similar behavioural effects 
of ambiguity resolution when administered to a control site as that produced without 
TMS. This, importantly, eliminates potential confounds on the interpretation of 
effects found for LIFG stimulation. If the LIFG plays a necessary role in ambiguity 
resolution then LIFG stimulation should affect responses to ambiguous sentence 
probes relative to Vertex stimulation. If the LIFG is also involved in sentence 
comprehension more generally, then LIFG stimulation should also affect responses 
to unambiguous sentence probes. To maximise power only the related probes of the 
ambiguous and unambiguous sentences were examined as in Experiments 6 – 8.  
5.5.2 Method 
Participants  
21 (15 female) native English speakers took part in this experiment. Their mean age 
was 21 years (range: 18-33), all were right-handed, had no known reading or 
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language impairment, nor any personal or family history of epilepsy or other 
neurological condition. Participants were recruited from the same population as the 
previous experiments.  
Stimuli, Design and Procedure 
All was the same as TMS Experiment 3 except that the frequency of TMS was 
changed to 20 Hz, such that 4 pulses of TMS were administered from sentence 
offset, each separated by 50 ms.  In addition, the stimulation sites were alternated 
across blocks, as in Experiment 1, in order to eliminate general effects of block 
order.  
5.5.3 Results 
One participant’s data was excluded from all analyses due to low accuracy (mean 
accuracy = 58%). By-items analyses (F2) were conducted because a reasonable 
number of observations contributed to each item’s average due to the experiment 
having only versions. One ambiguous item (ambiguous word: ‘pack’, related probe: 
‘herd’) was also excluded from these analyses due to low accuracy (30%), which 
may result in unreliable mean estimates. Its unambiguous counterpart was also 
removed.     
Accuracy 
The 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x Site) ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Ambiguity in 
the by-subjects analysis such that accuracy was lower for ambiguous than 
unambiguous sentence probes (F1(1,19) = 5.28, p = .033, η
2
p = .218; F2(1,58) = 
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1.89, p = .174, η2p = .032). There was, however, no significant effect of Site and no 
Site x Ambiguity interaction (both Fs < 1). See Figure 5-10. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: Mean accuracy (% correct) for the related probes of ambiguous 
and unambiguous sentences, performed with 20 Hz LIFG TMS (white) and 20 
Hz Vertex TMS (striped) stimulation. Error bars show standard error adjusted 
to remove between subject variance. 
 
Reaction Times 
The 2 x 2 (Ambiguity x Site) ANOVA on RTs showed a marginally significant main 
effect of Ambiguity: responses were slower for ambiguous than unambiguous 
sentence probes (F1(1,19) = 4.01, p = .060, η
2
p = .174; F2(1,19) = 2.66, p = .108, η
2
p 
= .044). See Figure 5-11. Critically, the main effect of TMS was significant in both 
the by-subjects and by-items analyses: responses were slower under LIFG than 
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Vertex stimulation (F1(1,19) = 4.42, p = .049; η
2
p = .189; F2(1,19) = 10.14, p = .002, 
η2p = .149). The Ambiguity x TMS interaction was not significant (all Fs < 1).  
 
 
Figure 5-11: Mean reaction times for the related probes of ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentences, performed with 20 Hz LIFG TMS (white) and 20 Hz 
Vertex TMS (striped) stimulation. Error bars show standard error adjusted to 
remove between subject variance.  
 
5.5.4 Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to re-investigate the effects that LIFG stimulation 
has on sentence comprehension using the modified set of TMS parameters (20 Hz 
for 150 ms). Experiment 9 showed that these parameters reduced the non-site-
specific effects of stimulation that interacted with the ambiguity manipulation in the 
task found with 10 Hz stimulation (Experiment 8). As a result, any effects of LIFG 
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stimulation with these modified parameters can be more confidently interpreted as 
resulting from disruptions to critical comprehension-related processes occurring 
within the LIFG, since they are not confounded with artefactual performance in the 
comparison site (Vertex) condition.  
The results showed that participants were slower to decide that a probe was 
semantically related to the previously heard sentence, regardless of ambiguity, 
when stimulation was delivered to the LIFG than to Vertex. This LIFG effect is 
particularly convincing because performance in the Vertex control condition was 
comparable to that in the behavioural study in that ambiguity effects were found in 
both the accuracy and reaction time data. Although these ambiguity effects in the 
baseline Vertex data were only marginally significant, this is not unsurprising as the 
behavioural study (Chapter 2, Experiment 3) demonstrated that such effects are 
more robust with shorter probe delays. It was more critical that they were in the 
same direction as those of the behavioural study. Therefore, together, the control 
site data indicate that it is unlikely, in this experiment, that the LIFG effects are 
confounded by non-site-specific effects of stimulation but, instead, reflect genuine 
effects of disruption to LIFG functioning on sentence comprehension. Hence, these 
findings support the change in stimulation parameters from the first TMS experiment 
and confirm the Vertex condition as an appropriate control against which to compare 
the LIFG effects.  
As found in the first TMS experiment, the disruptive effects of stimulation were not 
restricted to the ambiguous sentences. These findings converge on the conclusion 
that the LIFG serves a critical and routine role in comprehending the meaning of 
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sentences. Again (see discussion of Experiment 5), this is highly compatible with 
sentence general theories of LIFG functioning, such as Hagoort’s semantic 
unification account (Hagoort, 2005, 2013) whilst being more difficult to reconcile with 
sentence-specific theories, such as conflict resolution accounts (Novick et al., 2009; 
Novick et al., 2005). In addition, this pattern is, again, inconsistent with the results of 
the fMRI experiment presented in Chapter 4 and various other neuroimaging studies 
which show no significant LIFG response to unambiguous sentences (e.g., Crinion 
et al., 2003; Friederici et al., 2003; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2000; 
Spitsyna et al., 2006). Such a finding highlights the mismatch that can be found 
between different neuroscientific techniques, which may be attributable to 
differences in their physiological basis (e.g., neuronal spikes vs. blood flow) or 
experimental factors (e.g., baseline) and emphasises the difficulty in interpreting null 
results (see Chapter 4 for further discussion). Thus, in contrast to conclusions drawn 
in many of these fMRI studies, the TMS LIFG effect provides positive evidence that 
this region is important for sentence comprehension in general.  
The results, however, are inconclusive with regard to the LIFG’s role in ambiguity 
resolution because there was no interaction between LIFG disruption and sentence 
ambiguity. That is, there was no evidence that LIFG stimulation differently affected 
the ambiguous sentences compared to the unambiguous sentences. The simplest 
interpretation of these results is the LIFG serves sentence-general processes that 
occur in both types of sentences and that these processes are not more critical for 
comprehending ambiguous than unambiguous sentences. For example, TMS was 
administered at the end of both sentences, which is when various researchers argue 
that important integrational processes occur, known as sentence wrap-up (Just & 
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Carpenter, 1980). The role of the LIFG in integrational processes is consistent with 
the kinds of operations proposed in Hagoort’s theory of semantic unification, 
although Hagoort argues that ambiguous sentences place greater demand on these 
processes (Hagoort, 2005, 2013). The alternative possibility is that stimulating the 
LIFG disrupted functionally different processes in the two sentences, which 
manifested in equivalent behavioural slow-downs because reaction times are 
general indexes of processing efficiency. For example, it is possible that semantic 
reinterpretation was disrupted in the ambiguous sentences while wrap-up processes 
were disrupted in the unambiguous sentences. The behavioural data presented in 
Chapter 2 support the notion that reinterpretation occurs when TMS is administered 
at the offset of these ambiguous sentences. Under this view, the lack of interaction 
must then arise because sentence wrap-up occurs later in the ambiguous sentences 
such that it was not yet occurring, and thus not disrupted, when TMS was 
administered. Otherwise, if both processes were affected in the ambiguous 
sentences, then an additive effect of stimulation would be expected.  
Although this current data cannot test these suggestions, some preliminary evidence 
supporting the dual-process hypothesis comes from comparing these results with 
those of the first TMS experiment (Chapter 4, Experiment 5). In contrast to this 
current experiment, Experiment 5 showed a clear trend for stimulation to affect 
ambiguous-related probes more than unambiguous-related probes. Although the 
results of Experiment 5 are likely to have been influenced by artefactual task 
performance caused by the specific type of TMS parameters that was employed 
(Chapter 5, Experiment 8), it is possible that the LIFG effects were also different 
because stimulation was delivered for a longer period of time (300 ms versus 150 
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ms). For example, the interaction may have arisen in that experiment because 
stimulating a 300 ms time-window may have been long enough to disrupt both 
reinterpretation and sentence wrap-up processes in the ambiguous sentences. 
Unfortunately, the two sets of data cannot be directly compared due to the 
differences in baseline performance and, thus, prevent any strong conclusions from 
being drawn. However, they highlight TMS as a useful tool for testing such temporal 
hypotheses. For example, the current set of parameters (20 Hz, 4 pulses, 150 ms) 
could be administered at different time-points during sentence comprehension to 
examine whether, and when, the LIFG is critical for ambiguous and unambiguous 
sentence processing. Their results may then help guide behavioural experiments to 
investigate the precise processes occurring during these time points, in order to be 
able to attribute specific functions (e.g., reinterpretation versus sentence wrap-up) to 
the regions that TMS shows are involved at these times.  
These temporal-based investigations that are afforded by TMS are also important 
because they may reveal transient involvements of a brain region in a particular 
process, to which other methods such as fMRI, may be less sensitive. For instance, 
while these TMS data showed evidence that the LIFG is necessary for unambiguous 
sentence processing, the fMRI study did not reveal a significant BOLD response to 
these sentences in this region (Chapter 3). While the fMRI null-result may be 
attributed to baseline effects (see above), it may also be possible that the LIFG is 
only transiently involved at certain points during comprehension, such as at the end 
of the sentence. Thus, the fMRI study may not have detected this response because 
the whole sentence was modelled in the analyses (Chapter 3).     
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The lack of interaction leaves open another more trivial interpretation. Responses 
may have been slower under LIFG stimulation because TMS to this site is more 
distracting than Vertex stimulation since it can produce some stimulation of facial 
nerves or muscles surrounding the LIFG site. This is unlikely to be a major 
contributing factor for a few reasons. First, stimulation was never presented at the 
time when the probe was presented and  was only presented in the first 150 ms of 
the probe delay so cannot have any direct influence on the probe response. Second, 
the first TMS experiment (Chapter 4, Experiment 5) showed that LIFG stimulation 
did not all affect probe conditions (i.e., there was a probe condition x stimulation site 
interaction), suggesting that behavioural disruptions are not an inevitable outcome of 
LIFG stimulation. Furthermore, various other TMS studies that have controlled for 
the sensation of TMS on the LIFG have also found that disruption is specific to the 
task and to the area of the LIFG that is stimulated, which cannot be attributed to 
non-specific effects of distraction (Devlin et al., 2003; Gough et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, future experiments need to include control conditions to directly 
examine the contribution of distraction to the LIFG effects.   
In contrast to the first TMS experiment, the effects of LIFG stimulation were limited 
to reaction times. LIFG stimulation showed no evidence of affecting task accuracy, 
indicating that disrupting LIFG function did not prevent comprehension but affected 
the efficiency of this process. This is consistent with the pattern of result in 
Experiment 7 where 10 Hz stimulation was employed. As discussed there, this may 
have resulted from removing particularly difficult items, making reaction times the 
more informative and sensitive measure of LIFG disruption.  
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In summary, these results converge on the conclusion of the first TMS experiment, 
that the LIFG has a critical role in the semantic processing of both ambiguous and 
unambiguous sentences. These findings clearly indicate that a theory that focuses 
on ambiguity (or conflict) resolution is inadequate and provide support for a more 
general role of the LIFG in sentence comprehension, such as Hagoort’s semantic 
unification account, where the LIFG serves to unify semantic information into larger 
representations of a sentence or discourse (Hagoort, 2005, 2013). However, the 
finding of a main effect of stimulation in the absence of an interaction raises several 
questions about the exact nature of these effects. While the current data cannot test 
alternative explanations of these results, the set of TMS experiments demonstrates 
a useful TMS paradigm that can be used to investigate these questions. For 
example, further insights into the exact role of this region may be gained by re-
investigating the full set of probe conditions (unrelated and inappropriate probe 
conditions), as well as varying the time when stimulation is administered during the 
task.  Importantly, this last experiment has demonstrated that, with carefully chosen 
and examined stimulation parameters, TMS can be successfully administered during 
spoken sentence comprehension without affecting behavioural performance, 
enabling the assessment of causal relationships between specific brain regions and 
sentence processing.  
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Chapter 6 General Discussion  
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6.1 Overview 
The aim of this thesis was to increase our understanding of the cognitive and neural 
processes underlying the comprehension of semantically ambiguous words that are 
encountered during spoken sentences. More specifically, this thesis focused on how 
listeners reinterpret the meaning of these words when they encounter context late 
on in the sentence. The process of semantic reinterpretation has received little 
research attention, despite providing a window into various key aspects of language 
comprehension, including semantic flexibility, the influence of context on meaning 
comprehension and the involvement of high-level cognitive abilities in language 
processing such as selection, inhibition, and integration. Together, this thesis has 
revealed various cognitive and neural effects of semantic reinterpretation that 
extend understanding into ambiguity resolution as well as have implications for 
models of language comprehension more generally.  
6.2 Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Semantic Ambiguity Resolution 
The first part of this thesis (Chapter 2) investigated the cognitive processes 
underlying semantic reinterpretation by employing a semantic-relatedness 
judgement paradigm that allowed the examination of two important aspects of 
reinterpretation that have not been and/or cannot be investigated with previous 
methods (i.e., eye-movement and non-linguistic dual-tasks). Specifically, the 
paradigm allowed the simultaneous investigation of 1) the effectiveness of 
reinterpretation and 2) the efficiency of this process, which, importantly, included 
being able to disentangle the relative time course of (re)activating the contextually 
appropriate meaning and suppressing the contextually inappropriate meanings.  
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The accuracy results showed that participants were highly effective at reinterpreting 
their understanding of ambiguous words in line with contextual information that was 
encountered at the end of the sentence. Importantly, they were highly accurate at 
both deciding that probes related to the contextually appropriate meaning of the 
ambiguous word (e.g., “speech”) were related to the sentence (e.g., “the woman had 
to make the toast with a very old microphone”) as well as in deciding that words 
which were associated with the inappropriate meaning (e.g., “bread”) were not 
related to the sentence. Together, these results demonstrate that semantic 
representations generated during comprehension can be flexibly and fully revised.  
The reaction time data provided complementary findings about the efficiency of this 
process. First, the results showed that reinterpreting the meaning of a sentence 
carried a processing cost, as evinced by the finding that participants were slower to 
make a semantic judgement about the meaning of ambiguous sentences than 
unambiguous sentences when comprehension was probed 100 ms after the 
sentence. This behavioural cost concurs with the majority of previous research 
demonstrating that semantic reinterpretation is a time-consuming process.  Second, 
the results revealed novel insights into the nature of these processing costs.  
Participants had difficulty in both accepting related probes (“speech”) as well as in 
rejecting inappropriate probes (“bread”) with this probe delay, indicating that 
integrating the contextually appropriate meaning as well as suppressing the 
contextually inappropriate meaning are both time-consuming. However, these RT 
costs were differently affected by the length of the probe delay, suggesting a 
computational dissociation between these two processes. Specifically, the results 
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suggested that the suppression of inappropriate meanings is delayed relative to the 
integration of the contextually appropriate meanings.  
Together, the results are particularly consistent with constraint-based theories of 
sentence processing, wherein comprehension is a dynamic process in which 
contextual (and other) information continually modulate comprehension but whose 
impact is dependent on how such information is weighted relative to others sources 
(MacDonald et al., 1994; MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006). However, the way by 
which such information is weighted and how it affects different meanings is 
uncertain and in need for further investigation. The particular direction of the 
meaning dissociation that was found (i.e., delayed suppression of the inappropriate 
meaning) supports two potential alternatives. It is consistent with Gernsbacher and 
St John’s (2002) model in which suppression is triggered by sentence-level 
representations rather than by the activation of the correct meaning of the 
ambiguous word per se. Alternatively, this dissociation may merely arise because 
the contextually inappropriate meaning is strongly weighted when the contextual 
information is encountered having been part of the initial interpretation of the 
sentence such that it takes more processing cycles to reduce its activation 
(MacDonald et al., 1994).  
6.3 Neural Mechanisms Underlying Semantic Ambiguity Resolution     
The second part of the thesis (Chapter 3, 4 and 5) examined the neural processes 
underlying the comprehension of the sentences investigated in Chapter 2. First, an 
fMRI study was conducted to investigate the network of brain regions that are 
engaged when listeners process these sentences that also examined the functional 
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contributions of these ambiguity-related regions as well as the inter-subject 
variability surrounding these responses. The results demonstrated that these 
sentences produced greater activity in the mid-LIFG and left posterior inferior 
temporal cortex than unambiguous sentences, which broadly replicated the results 
of previous studies. The functional properties of these regions were further 
examined by investigating the response of these regions to various sentence 
conditions. First, there was no significant evidence that these regions responded to 
sentences that did not contain ambiguous words, suggesting that these specific 
regions of the frontal and temporal cortex may not be routinely involved in sentence 
processing. Second, both regions’ responses showed evidence of being modulated 
by meaning dominance, such that responses were greater for sentences in which 
reinterpretation, rather than initial selection, was more demanding (i.e., biased > 
balanced). Since this dominance pattern is a fundamental prediction of ambiguity 
models, it constitutes key evidence that these regions play a role in semantic 
reinterpretation.  
Furthermore, the inter-individual variability analysis revealed that both of these 
regions responded to ambiguity in nearly all participants, which further highlights 
them as fundamental regions associated with semantic reinterpretation. 
Interestingly, participants’ responses were more anatomically consistent around the 
frontal group-level peak than the temporal group-peak, such that the majority of 
participants showed a peak that was located in pars triangularis. This finding, 
therefore, further suggested that the mid-LIFG may be particularly important for 
ambiguity resolution. Thus, the final part of this thesis (Chapter 4 and 5) examined 
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the role of the LIFG further by using TMS to investigate whether this region has a 
causal role in semantic reinterpretation.  
The first TMS experiment (Chapter 4) employed the behavioural paradigm 
presented in Chapter 2, as it was shown to be sensitive to the ambiguity of the 
preceding sentence. The findings showed preliminary evidence that the LIFG serves 
a necessary function for reinterpreting the meaning of sentences. Interestingly, it 
specifically showed that this region may support the integration of the contextually 
appropriate meaning since LIFG stimulation slowed participants decisions to 
ambiguous-related probes but not to the other ambiguous probes (i.e., ambiguous-
inappropriate or ambiguous-unrelated), compared to when a control site was 
stimulated. However, two unexpected findings also came out of the data. First, the 
results showed that LIFG stimulation also affected unambiguous sentence 
comprehension, causing participants to be less accurate for unambiguous-related 
probes and slower to respond to unambiguous-unrelated probes. This appeared to 
contradict the results of the fMRI study in which the LIFG showed no significant 
response to unambiguous sentences (compared to a low-level auditory baseline). 
The second surprise was that the behavioural ambiguity effects found under control 
site (Vertex) stimulation were different than those in the previously-conducted 
behavioural experiment (Chapter 2, Experiment 2). This suggested that the LIFG 
effects may have been confounded by non-site-specific effects of TMS on task 
performance occurring in the control condition. As a result, the last part of the thesis 
conducted a set of TMS experiments to examine potential reasons behind these 
unexpected findings. Together, this final body of work revealed evidence that the 
mere act of administering TMS, regardless of head site, affected task performance 
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in such a way that it facilitated responses to ambiguous-related probes more than 
unambiguous-related probes. This highlighted the need to change the TMS 
parameters to find a set that did not interact with ambiguity in order to be confident 
that any effects of LIFG stimulation would not be confounded by non-site-specific 
effects of stimulation. Increasing the rate of stimulation from 10 Hz to 20 Hz 
eliminated the specific effect that TMS had on ambiguous sentence processing 
(Chapter 5, Experiment 8), perhaps because this higher frequency changed the 
rhythmic sound of the TMS clicks and ensured that the last pulse did not coincide 
with, and thus cue, the occurrence of the probe word.  
The final experiment (Chapter 5, Experiment 9) employed the improved set of TMS 
parameters and, like the first TMS experiment (Chapter 4) revealed a significant 
effect of LIFG stimulation on both ambiguous and unambiguous sentence 
comprehension. This supported the conclusions of the first experiment that the LIFG 
has a necessary role in the comprehension of both types of sentences and, thus, 
supports sentence-general theories of LIFG function such as the semantic 
unification account (Hagoort, 2005, 2013). It is, therefore, inconsistent with 
sentence-specific theories such as the conflict resolution account which argues that 
the LIFG supports sentence comprehension only when there is representational 
conflict (Novick et al., 2009; Novick et al., 2005). The “unambiguous LIFG effect” 
and, ensuing conclusion is different to that drawn from the fMRI results which 
showed no significant response to unambiguous sentences compared to a low-level 
auditory baseline. The TMS effect suggests that the lack of an effect in the fMRI 
study may have resulted from reduced sensitivity to responses to the unambiguous 
sentences. The fMRI null-result, for example, may have been concealed by 
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activation in the baseline condition. Together the TMS and fMRI results, thus, 
highlight the difficulty in interpreting null-result and thus the importance of using 
converging methods for testing assumption of neural models of language and 
cognition in general.  However, there was no evidence that the LIFG differently 
affected the ambiguous sentences, which leaves the results inconclusive regarding 
the precise role of the LIFG in ambiguity resolution. The main effect of stimulation 
may only indicate that this region is not specific for ambiguity resolution but cannot 
indicate whether stimulation affected functionally different processes in the 
ambiguous and unambiguous sentences such that, for example, reinterpretation 
processes were affected in the former. Clearly, future research is needed to 
investigate this hypothesis further. The TMS paradigm developed in this thesis is a 
useful tool to examine some of these outstanding questions, as it can be modified in 
various ways to examine whether, when and how the LIFG is involved in sentence 
comprehension more generally by, for example, manipulating the time when TMS is 
administered during sentence processing and examining different types of 
sentences and probe conditions. Importantly, the TMS experiments presented here 
highlight the need to pilot any subtle changes in the TMS parameters (timing, 
frequency) to ensure that they do not produce non-site-specific effects on task 
performance.      
A methodological strength of this thesis is that the same stimuli were examined 
across experiments and, in addition, the same task was used in the behavioural and 
TMS studies. This methodological choice enhances the interpretation of the 
cognitive and neural effects. For example, this enables the behavioural study to 
provide support for the conclusions drawn in the fMRI study about the cognitive 
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operations imputed to the ambiguity-elevated neural responses of the LIFG and 
posterior inferior temporal cortex. In addition, using the same behavioural paradigm 
in the TMS experiment as used in the behavioural study enabled the direct 
comparability of results, which helped highlight discrepancies that were due to 
methodological artefacts (e.g., the TMS artefact in Chapter 4).  
6.4 Limitations and Future Directions 
The results of this thesis, also, highlighted various unanswered questions for further 
research. Four important questions are considered here.  
1) What is semantic reinterpretation? 
The behavioural study (Chapter 2) showed that semantic reinterpretation incurs 
processing costs and extended previous research by demonstrating that these costs 
are associated with integrating the contextually appropriate meaning as well as 
suppressing inappropriate meanings. However, it is unknown what are the precise 
processes operating on these meanings. One of the reasons for this is that it is 
uncertain what “selection” entails. The assumption of current models of semantic 
ambiguity resolution is that when semantically ambiguous words are encountered 
prior to biasing contextual information one meaning is selected relatively quickly 
after encountering that word (Duffy et al., 2001; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 
1979; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is unclear what 
are the states of contextually appropriate meanings that are not initially selected and 
the states of contextually inappropriate meanings that are selected. If non-selected 
meanings are maintained at a lower level of activation (McRae et al., 1998), then 
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reinterpretation would entail boosting their activation. If these meanings are 
suppressed/decay to baseline levels by the time that context is encountered (Duffy 
et al., 2001; Gernsbacher, 1990; Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; MacDonald et al., 
1994), then reinterpretation would also entail “accessing” them. It is likely that these 
alternatives are dependent on the dominance of an ambiguous word’s meaning. For 
example, eye-movement research, in particular, has presented a large body of 
evidence showing that, if words have a more dominant meaning, then the 
subordinate meanings may be quickly disregarded, whereas words with more 
balanced meanings may be maintained for longer or to a higher level of activation 
(Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988; Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; Twilley & 
Dixon, 2000). Unfortunately, it was not possible to test effects of dominance in the 
behavioural study (Chapter 2) as there were too few items per dominance category 
when probe condition was factored in.  However, dominance effects were able to be 
tested in the fMRI data as no probe task was included so the sentence trials did not 
need to be divided across probe conditions. These results showed that meaning 
dominance modulated neural responses, suggesting that reinterpretation processes 
may be functionally different depending on the frequency of an ambiguous word’s 
meaning.     
There is more agreement about the state of initially-selected meanings: these 
meanings are integrated into sentence-level representations (Duffy et al., 2001; 
Duffy et al., 1988; Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; MacDonald et al., 1994; 
Seidenberg et al., 1982). Thus, reinterpretation must involve suppressing this high-
level sentence representation but the unresolved question is whether this is 
independent of suppressing the inappropriate meaning? The behavioural study 
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(Chapter 2) demonstrated that the inappropriate meaning still causes interference 
several hundred milliseconds after inconsistent context is encountered. But is this 
because it takes time to suppress the inappropriate meaning itself or to suppress the 
sentence-level representation that encompasses that meaning? In addition, the 
latter results also raise the question of why suppression of the inappropriate 
meaning is delayed. Is this an inevitable consequence of their strong level of 
activation (Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; MacDonald et al., 1994) or does this 
reflect a more deliberate process, where incorrect meanings are maintained (or 
slowly reduced) in case revision is needed later on (Faust & Chiarello, 1998)?     
2) How does context trigger reinterpretation?  
Another important question is how context instigates reinterpretation: how direct is 
its influence? Reinterpretation may be initiated because contextual information 
activates semantic representations that directly conflict with the initially selected 
meaning of the ambiguous word and/or it may be initiated more indirectly by way of 
activating the alternative meaning of the ambiguous word which competes with the 
inappropriate meaning. The possibility of different mechanisms is apparent in 
various models of ambiguity resolution. For example, an indirect process is 
suggested by Duffy et al.’s (1988) reordered access model, which assumes that 
context only has a facilitatory role and, therefore, cannot suppress the inappropriate 
meanings directly. In contrast, constraint-based connectionist models assume that 
multiple constraints, including contextual information, can directly inhibit and 
facilitate alternative meanings (MacDonald et al., 1994). One way that these 
hypotheses can be examined is by assessing the time-course of their activation with 
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more sensitive measures of the activation levels of the appropriate and 
inappropriate meanings. The behavioural study employed an explicit semantic 
judgement task in which participants needed to judge the semantic relationship 
between the sentence and probe word. This complex decision may have masked 
subtle differences in activation levels. That is, although the results showed that the 
inappropriate meanings are suppressed more slowly than the appropriate meanings 
are integrated, they are inconclusive as to whether this is because the former has a 
slower time-course, where the decrements are too small to be detected by the 
explicit-semantic task, or because this process was initiated later (i.e., as by the 
appropriate meaning). More sensitive measures may be non-explicit semantic tasks, 
such as lexical decision (Klepousniotou, 2002; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 
1979) or event-related potentials that are measured whilst participant passively read 
the different probe words (Swaab et al., 2003) as they reduce the decision 
components.  
3) How should future research take into account individual differences in 
meaning preferences? 
This thesis examined semantic reinterpretation by employing sentences in which 
ambiguous words were disambiguated to their subordinate meaning at the end of 
the sentence. The decision about which meaning was subordinate was initially 
based on meaning dominance scores conducted on a similar set of stimuli (Rodd, 
Johnsrude, et al., 2010) and were then checked for the specific set of sentences 
used in this thesis via word association and sentence-completion tasks (see Chapter 
2, Experiment 1 method section). However, a dominance score is the average 
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preference of a separate group of participants who do not take part in the main 
experiment and, thus does not take into individual differences in meaning 
preferences. Nevertheless, it is currently the standard way to determine the relative 
frequencies of a word’s meanings in semantic ambiguity research (Colbert-Getz & 
Cook, 2013; Leinenger & Rayner, 2013; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Sereno et al., 
2006; Swinney, 1979). The rationale behind using average preference scores is two-
fold: 1) they are an efficient index of meaning frequency as individual participant’s 
preferences do not need to be measured and 2) they have been validated in many 
studies, in that behavioural effects of meaning frequency that are based on these 
scores are found (e.g., Duffy et al., 2001; Simpson, 1994; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). 
The potential problem with averages is that not all individuals have the same 
preferences, such that for some people the “subordinate” meaning may actually be 
their preferred meaning. As a result, some subtle effects of dominance may be 
potentially masked by trials in which the subordinate meaning is not employed for 
certain participants. This may have contributed to the failure to find dominance 
effects in the behavioural study and at the whole brain level in the fMRI study. 
Therefore, it would be useful for future research to either acquire meaning 
preferences for each individual basis prior to the main experiment or explicitly 
control individual’s preference, for example, using a priming task before the main 
task.   
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4) What are the specific functions of regions in semantic ambiguity 
resolution?  
The results also raise questions regarding the neural processes underlying 
ambiguity resolution. The fMRI results demonstrated that the LIFG and posterior 
temporal cortex are both engaged by semantic reinterpretation but the current 
results cannot indicate the functional relationship between these regions. How do 
they interact during this process? Does information flow from the temporal cortex to 
the inferior frontal cortex or vice versa, or are they performing independent 
functions? These questions need to be investigated with methods that have high 
temporal resolution, such as MEG, or with causal modelling of BOLD responses, 
such as dynamic causal modelling (DCM). The TMS paradigm developed in this 
thesis is another potentially useful tool to investigate the temporal relationship 
between these different regions, since TMS can be administered at different time-
windows during sentence comprehension. The final TMS experiment (Chapter 5, 
Experiment 10) showed that TMS can produce significant effects of LIFG stimulation 
on sentence processing, suggesting that this region may have a necessary role in 
this process. However, it was also clear that the some further modifications to this 
paradigm are needed before strong conclusions can be drawn from its results. In 
particular, control tasks and conditions need to be included in the TMS paradigm 
that do not require processes associated with the region under investigation in order 
to be able to assess whether the stimulation effects reflect non-specific effects that 
are not related to disturbing processing in that cortical region (e.g., distraction by 
facial nerve stimulation). In addition, the TMS results did not show conclusive 
evidence that this region serves a causal role in ambiguity resolution, since 
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stimulating the LIFG did not differently affect both ambiguous and unambiguous 
sentence processing. However, it did provide a methodological foundation for future 
research to use this paradigm to tease apart the role of this region (and other 
regions) in ambiguity resolution and sentence comprehension more generally. For 
example, future experiments could use this paradigm to assess whether specific 
regions have different temporal involvements in the processing of these two types of 
sentences.         
Furthermore, the results also cannot identify the specific functions of these regions 
during semantic reinterpretation. The neural findings show activation in regions that 
have been attributed to various different functions, including conflict resolution, 
semantic unification, visual imagery, sound-to-meaning mapping, but currently there 
has been no direct investigation about the relationship between these functions and 
ambiguity resolution. Such a knowledge gap highlights the need for future 
psycholinguistic work to go beyond viewing semantic reinterpretation as an 
interaction between integration and suppression of meanings and investigate these 
other processes which, in turn, may help specify the roles that ambiguity-elevated 
regions are serving in ambiguity resolution. Thus, this further highlights the need for 
psycholinguistic and neural research to continue guiding each other in order to 
achieve a comprehensive understanding of ambiguity resolution and language 
comprehension in general.  
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Appendix 
Experimental Sentences and Probe Words.  
In the ambiguous sentences, the ambiguous word is underlined and the 
disambiguating information is italicised.  A = Ambiguous, U = Unambiguous, Rel. = 
Related, Unrel. = Unrelated, Inapp. = Inappropriate.  
 
 
 Probe 
 Sentence Rel. Unrel. Inapp. 
A the students believed that the 
plant should never have been built manufacture launch bush 
U the students believed that the hill 
could never have been climbed valley dollar   
A the couple hoped that the court 
they had chosen was good for 
tennis arena backward lawyer 
U the couple hoped that the church 
they had chosen was good for 
weddings chapel hazard   
A the man chose the new foil and 
hoped that it would improve his 
fencing sword baboon oven 
U the man chose the new herbs and 
hoped that they would improve his 
cooking parsley clutter   
A when the mother saw the clip, she 
knew that her daughter would like 
the movie 
 
scene 
 
 
rum 
 
 
clasp 
U when the mother finished the 
scarf, she hoped that her daughter 
would like the colour wool fork   
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A the woman explained that 
although the ticks were small they 
were particularly harmful mite temple 
 
correct 
U the woman explained that 
although the stains were small 
they were particularly stubborn dirty future   
A her boyfriend explained that the 
deed he had seen had been 
extremely courageous action table contract 
U her boyfriend explained that the 
pond he had seen had been 
extremely overgrown nature delay   
A the man found the file difficult to 
use as he had never worked with 
metal tool belly folder 
U the man found the lake difficult to 
find as he had never used a 
compass lagoon sleek   
A her husband found the coat 
difficult to put on with his new 
paint-roller 
 
 
layer 
 
 
history 
 
 
jacket 
U her husband found the bus difficult 
to count on with his new shift-
pattern transport wisdom   
A the woman had to make the toast 
with a very old microphone speech blanket bread 
U the student had to wrap the wrist 
with a very old bandage  arm rock   
A the company was certain that the 
post would be quickly filled employ slender 
 
package 
U the family were certain that the 
farm would be quickly sold  ranch sunset   
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A she was worried that the coach 
they had chosen was too 
inexperienced instructor lemon 
 
vehicle 
U she was worried that the path they 
had chosen was too inaccessible route funny   
A as soon as the woman noticed the 
large mole, she called a local 
doctor 
 
blemish 
 
carnival 
 
 
agent 
U as soon as the woman noticed the 
broken fridge, she called a local 
plumber appliance sincerity   
A the man believed that the scoop 
given to his daughter would make 
the news gossip picnic shovel 
U the man thought that the blouse 
bought for his girlfriend would suit 
her taste clothing engineer   
A his girlfriend was surprised that 
the punch was not at all fruity drink briefcase beat 
U her boyfriend was surprised that 
the mouse was not at all scary rat strategy   
A The woman was surprised to find 
a passage that had not yet been 
translated 
 
text 
 
badminton 
 
corridor 
U The woman was surprised to find 
a request that had not yet been 
processed claim earth   
A the man was surprised that the 
speaker was not going to be 
repaired 
 
amplify 
 
olive 
 
 
lecture 
U the man was surprised that the 
apple was not going to be washed snack switch   
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A 
 
The boy picked up the straw and 
put it in his father's barn 
 
 
hay 
 
 
close 
 
 
tube 
U The boy picked up the frog and 
put it in his sister's hands amphibian assorted   
A the student lost the cap that went 
with her favourite biro lid kettle headgear 
U the student visited her aunt who 
lived in her favourite city relative audience   
A the housewife knew that the dates 
she had chosen would be 
delicious food pilot diary 
U the housewife knew that the 
wounds she had suffered would 
be painful injury city   
A the man explained that the pane 
was quite old and was from an 
earlier window glass queen hurt 
U the man explained that the team 
was quite new and was from a 
different league player sketch   
A the woman explained that the plot 
was not expected to be used for 
housing land sip 
 
 
narrative 
U the woman explained that the 
cake was not intended to be eaten 
for lunch pudding cubicle   
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A The man was surprised that the 
panel that they had seen was 
wooden 
 
 
plank 
 
 
waste 
 
 
committee 
U The man was annoyed that the 
hammer that he had bought was 
broken mallet ten   
A the man was told that the 
compound contained many 
separate apartments 
 
estate guilt 
 
chemistry 
U The boy was told that the ocean 
contained many different animals sea power   
A although he had bought the bulbs, 
he was not sure how they should 
be planted flower chat electric 
U although he had noticed the ants, 
he was not sure how they could be 
removed insect poem   
A their grandfather explained that 
the corn had always been very 
painful wart magazine cereal 
U his grandchildren thought that the 
mask had always been very scary disguise treacle   
A the businessman told him that the 
fan had been very supportive admirer search 
 
cool 
U the businessman told him that the 
coal had been very expensive heating surgeon   
A his grandmother thought that the 
boxer was too vicious for a pet dog link sport 
U his grandmother thought that the 
brandy was too expensive for a 
gift liqueur interview   
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A he believed that the pack 
contained between five and ten 
wolves 
 
 
herd 
 
 
cheap 
 
 
card 
U he noticed that the bone had 
between one and three fractures limb whistle   
A the man was not sure if the deck 
he had chosen had been shuffled casino golden 
 
floor 
U the man was not sure if the goat 
he was feeding had been groomed livestock ambulance   
A the teacher explained that the 
knight in the story was very 
chivalrous 
 
armour 
 
rectangle 
 
darkness 
U the teacher explained that the girl 
in the book was very stubborn youngster crucial   
A his friend argued that the boy's 
cue was far too short for snooker stick library 
 
prompt 
U his friend argued that the boy's 
tent was far too flimsy for camping shelter reverse   
A the teacher explained that the bark 
was going to be very damp wood pound sound 
U the teacher explained that the 
steam was going to be very hot vapour token   
A the woman asked her husband to 
choose the pear that was really 
juicy fruit bronze set 
U the teacher asked her students to 
choose a task that was fairly easy activity double   
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A the workers were told that every 
nail needed to be clean and 
manicured 
 
 
finger 
 
 
doubt 
 
 
iron 
U the students were told that the 
song needed to be long and 
melodic tune wage   
A the student wanted to find a 
cymbal to add to his drumkit metal gentle sign 
U the student wanted to find a 
feather to add to the hat accessory detective   
A the woman could not find a 
suitable spade among her 
collection of cards 
 
black petticoat 
 
dig 
U the woman could not find a 
suitable shrub among her 
collection of plants greenery nostalgia   
A the woman explained that the 
figure had been made from 
porcelain ornament bacon graph 
U the woman explained that the 
coffee had been made with cream caffeine parade   
A the student knew which flour 
should be used for that type of 
baking 
 
ingredient 
 
squeeze 
 
petal 
U the student knew which weapon 
should be used for that type of 
fighting pistol flamenco   
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A everyone believed that the lobby 
was going to become very 
powerful 
 
 
petition 
 
 
salmon 
 
 
hallway 
U everyone believed that the cattle 
was going to become very 
aggressive bull birthday   
A the woman declared that noone 
should discuss the race of the 
future applicants 
 
ethnic 
 
mushroom 
 
athlete 
U the woman declared that noone 
should contact the chief of their 
local department manager massive   
A the man was told that an organ 
was not available for the choir 
 
piano novel body 
U the man was told that the prayer 
was not suitable for the children religion employer   
A the husband explained why the 
new ruler was needed by the 
country emperor dance straight 
U the husband explained that the 
new leaflet was needed for the 
business brochure myth   
A the newspaper article about the 
star was interesting for all 
astronomers solar second famous 
U the newspaper article about the 
milk was interesting for all 
consumers dairy mile   
A the student loved the model from 
the first moment he saw her fashion tractor version 
U the woman loved the forest from 
the first moment she saw it woodland crisis   
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A the man was told that the chips 
were not suitable for his computer electronic delicate potato 
U the girl was told that the nests 
were not unusual for that species bird epidemic   
A the small child was certain that his 
chest was full of treasure storage journey cardiac 
U the small child was certain that the 
tribe was full of warriors community knuckle   
A the old woman thought that the 
sentence would be considered 
ungrammatical word 
 
antifreeze 
 
 
justice 
U the old man thought that the writer 
would be considered literary book whole   
A the old woman noticed that the 
bonnet was covered with 
embroidery hat 
 
beard 
 
 
engine 
U the old woman noticed that the 
cactus was covered with pollen prickly laughter   
A she was pleased to discover that 
the mould was suitable for making 
statues shape circle 
 
 
fungus 
U she was pleased to discover that 
the soap was suitable for washing 
crockery detergent wealth   
A her neighbour was worried that the 
spring might start to become 
uncoiled elastic nutrient waterfall 
U her neighbour was worried that the 
burn might start to become 
infected blister giraffe   
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A the teacher explained that the 
clause could not easily be 
translated 
 
 
phrase 
 
 
greedy 
 
 
sharp 
U the teacher explained that the 
snake could not easily be tamed reptile horizon   
A the schoolgirl was told that the 
poker was a very important 
heirloom fireplace vinegar betting 
U the schoolgirl was told that the 
rabbit was a very timid animal bunny scheme   
A the teacher said that the root was 
surprisingly long for a tree soil 
 
culture 
 
direction 
U the teacher knew that the guess 
was unusually good for a child estimate goldfish   
A her elderly grandmother enjoyed 
the peal that came from the 
cathedral bell damage 
 
 
rind 
U her elderly grandmother described 
the grief that came from her 
bereavement sorrow chemical   
A the man was surprised that the 
cricket produced so much chirping locust laundromat batsman 
U the man was surprised that the 
meadow produced so many 
butterflies pasture hostess   
A the man thought that the club he 
had chosen was best for that shot equipment mystery society 
U the man thought that the seat he 
had chosen was best for that 
concert chair north   
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A the professor did not know why 
the match could not be lit 
 
strike 
 
agree 
 
game 
U the professor did not know why his 
lunch could not be found eat perfect   
A the woman had read about the 
mousse in the new cookbook 
 
dessert 
 
kindness 
 
deer 
U the woman had heard about the 
elk in the local zoo animal mistake   
A the young woman noticed that the 
palm had several large fruits tropical public fist 
U the young woman noticed that her 
chin had several large spots face home   
A the young girl thought that the 
band was just perfect for the hat cloth tremble musician 
U the young girl thought that the gift 
was just perfect for her friend present morning   
A the men thought that the port 
would not be suitable for the 
dinner 
 
 
sherry 
 
 
spa 
 
 
cargo 
U the men thought that the trout 
would not be suitable for the 
dinner fish jumper   
A the woman said that the jam was 
on the other motorway traffic bedroom preserve 
U the woman said that the soup was 
on the other menu liquid arson   
A the man was annoyed that the 
horn had been damaged by the 
mechanic 
 
beep 
 
towel 
 
 
antler 
U the man was surprised that the nut 
had been cracked by the squirrel seed beer   
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A the man was surprised that the log 
contained so much information 
 
journal 
 
hen 
 
branch 
U the man was surprised that the 
cage contained so many animals confine keyboard   
A the children were told that the bat 
they had seen was a carnivore wings stale ball 
U the children were told that the fox 
they had seen was a herbivore vixen main   
A the man explained that the pen 
was mainly used for the livestock enclosure migraine ballpoint 
U the man explained that the hut 
was mainly used by the climbers cabin thumb   
A their mother told them that the tale 
was quite long but very exciting story pavement rear 
U their mother told them that the 
meat was quite tough but very 
tasty beef duty   
A the woman was not sure whether 
the stork was strong enough to fly heron baker stem 
U the woman was not sure whether 
the glove was clean enough to 
wear mitten goblet   
A the man was worried that the bale 
was too large for the trailer harvest silver prisoner 
U the man was worried that the jug 
was too small for the cocktail pour owl   
A The teenager looked at the litter 
and decided to take one kitten offspring commerce rubbish 
U The teenager went to the wedding 
and decided to take many photos ceremony remain   
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A the man would need to replace the 
pipe or he would have to stop 
smoking 
 
 
mouth 
 
 
radio 
 
 
water 
U the man would need to avoid the 
storm or he would have to change 
clothes rain wine   
A the man knew that one more ace 
would be enough to win the game 
of tennis score autumn diamond 
U the man thought that one more bet 
could be enough to win the prize 
of money gamble noon   
A the girl understood that her genes 
had all come from her ancestors biology gutter denim 
U the girl believed that her brains 
had all come from her mother clever custard   
A the woman told her daughter that 
currants were usually very tasty raisin pin tide 
U the woman told her daughter that 
winters were usually very cold season fuss   
A according to the teacher, the 
prophet was mentioned in the new 
testament preach blue finance 
U according to the teacher, the 
colonel was mentioned in the local 
newspaper military six   
A the man explained that the brake 
was not good enough for his lorry mechanic lady rest 
U the man believed that his wife was 
not kind enough to the children marriage passport   
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A the man explained why the volume 
was not going to be published 
 
edition 
 
flannel 
 
loudness 
U the man explained why the 
kingdom was not going to be 
conquered empire sponge   
A the woman was worried when she 
saw the steak, as it had been 
undercooked 
 
sirloin 
 
cassette 
 
 
wager 
U the woman was worried when she 
saw the bench, as it had been 
vandalised seating colon   
A the man really wanted mussels but 
he didn't know how they should be 
cooked shellfish west 
 
 
fitness 
U the man really hated battles as he 
didn't know how they could be 
won conflict distance   
A the man was told that the cast 
would be chosen by an 
experienced doctor plaster ivy actor 
U the man was told that the bath 
would be chosen by an 
experienced designer  tub museum   
A the man worried that the chord 
would not fit the melody note economic rope 
U the man hoped that the scar would 
not affect his confidence mark left   
A the woman had just noticed the 
flair of the girl's writing talent unit 
 
trousers 
U the woman had just noticed the 
strap of the girl's rucksack handle hope   
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A she was not sure whether the fir 
could be used for timber 
 
tree 
 
puppet 
 
mink 
U she was not sure whether the skirt 
could be used for school garment honest   
A the man did not know how the 
interest had always been 
calculated money sickness attention 
U the man did not know how the 
worker had always been tolerated employee swing   
A the teacher told the young girl that 
the hare was not a pet wildlife forecast 
 
wig 
U the teacher told the young girl that 
the town was not a city urban peach   
A the woman was told that the mint 
was used for making coins 
 
factory 
 
gym 
 
flavour 
U the woman was told that the crate 
was used for storing goods container napkin   
A the young woman knew that her 
pupils had started to dilate 
 
eye 
 
talk student 
U the young woman knew that the 
mirror had started to crack reflect ticket   
A the woman was annoyed that the 
mail was not always delivered parcel universe masculine 
U the woman was annoyed that the 
shop was not always advertised retail oil   
A the young man was not sure if the 
bass would need to be tuned guitar 
 
news 
 
bottom 
U the young man was not sure if the 
tooth would need to be drilled dental addiction   
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A the expert explained that the bolt 
had come from the base of a 
thunderstorm 
 
 
lightning 
 
 
draw 
 
 
secure 
U the detective noticed that the spy 
had walked to the front of the 
aeroplane espionage overflow   
 
